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Chapter 1
Introduction
In late 2000, eBay introduced a feature called "Buy it Now", marking a cornerstone
in the way goods are being auctioned by allowing for a unique hybris of both tra-
ditional auction and xed price mechanisms. The institution o¤ered on eBay is in
fact a Buyout Option that allows any bidder to terminate an auction without the
necessity of traditionally bidding in an auction. Buyout Options in auctions have
since its early adoption on eBay experienced phenomenal popularity on numerous
online auction markets and have to date been implemented on most such platforms
while they are still being rarely observed in classic auctions.
The implementation of optimal auction mechanisms has been a key issue in the
long lasting scientic and political debate amongst economists and has put forth a
tremendous quantity of theoretical, empirical and experimental research, long be-
fore goods have been auctioned on electronic market places. The emergence of
momentous and easily accessible auction markets however makes an advancement
and progression of auction mechanisms indispensable for its current meaningful po-
sition in commerce not to irretrievably lose ground. Moreover, the rapid growth
of online auction markets seen in preceding years has not been estimated to slow
down in the near future. While the di¤usion and use of the internet remains the
driving force for the growth of electronic based auction markets, further develop-
ment of auction mechanisms is a prerequisite. Furthermore, with regard to nancial
markets, auctions are perceived to gain momentum on its primary markets due to
their preeminent economic advantages versus other sales practices, not to mention
the use of auction mechanisms in numerous other areas of commerce.
Buyout Options in auctions however have only recently attracted the interest of
economists. The existence and increasing popularity of such options in auctions
seem peculiar from the point of view of auction theory since they may detriment the
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auctions primary benet of relieving the seller to determine the price for the good
and allowing for competition amongst bidders. The introduction of a Buyout Option
may further reduce sellers expected revenue because when it is being exercised, it
may eliminate the possibility of higher prices that would have been reached by
competitive bidding. Buyout Options may as well lead to allocative ine¢ ciencies
when they are being exercised by bidders who do not value the goods at sale most.
While such options are increasingly being used in practice, literature for the time
being still lacks much of the analysis of Buyout Options in auctions, let alone its
examination for the case of simultaneous multi unit auctions that has so far not
been addressed by auction theorists. The theoretical literature dealing with Buyout
Options in auctions has to date predominantly focused on the analysis of single unit
auctions enhanced by such an option, notwithstanding the fact that they can be used
and have indeed already been implemented for simultaneous multi unit auctions in
practice.
Motivated by the recent surge of literature on such options in auctions, the aim of
this thesis is to ll this gap and contribute to the literature by introducing a model
of a simultaneous multi unit auction enhanced with a Buyout Option. Its research
question is whether it does indeed make sense to allow a seller to o¤er such an op-
tion when simultaneously o¤ering identical goods for sale and what its implications
are on both the sellers expected utility and allocative e¢ ciency. Actually, if such
options were found to be benecial for either side of the transaction (or both), auc-
tioneers should avail themselves of the opportunity to allow for the implementation
of Buyout Options in simultaneous multi unit auctions. Due to the complexity of
Buyout Options in auctions it is however beyond the scope of this thesis to draw
a comprehensive conclusion of all possible implementations of Buyout Options in
multi unit auctions. It is rather the purpose of this study to illustrate that even for
the case where several homogeneous goods are simultaneously being o¤ered in an
auction, it may e¤ectively make sense to o¤er such an option.
If it can be shown that despite the potential allocative ine¢ ciencies and loss of seller
revenue arising with such options in place, an enhancement of a simultaneous multi
unit auction by a Buyout Option is indeed benecial for sellers and bidders alike,
these ndings would not only provide support for the actual use of such options but
would further have important implications for the understanding of its e¤ects on the
outcome of auctions where the seller simultaneously tenders more than just a single
good.
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The remainder of this thesis is organized as follows. Chapter 2 provides an overview
on fundamental auction theory and its key ndings. Chapter 3 then introduces
the taxonomy and characteristics of Buyout Options in auctions and illustrates its
potential benets and drawbacks for both the seller and the bidders. Furthermore,
a brief survey on the use of Buyout Options in a selection of real world auctions is
given to exhibit its practical signicance. The aim of chapter 4 is to provide a survey
on existing theoretical, empirical and experimental literature on Buyout Options in
auctions. Chapter 5, which, along with chapter 6, is the core of this study, presents
an analytical model of a simultaneous multi unit auction enhanced with a Buyout
Option. A model is being formulated that allows for the analysis of a simultaneous
multi unit auction enhanced with a temporary Buyout Option. Optimal equilibrium
strategies for a risk averse seller and risk neutral bidders are derived, using an
independent private values framework. Chapter 6 then discusses the results and
ndings from the model. The main contributions as well as limitations of this
work are summarized in chapter 7, concluding with a discussion on future research
opportunities in the eld.
3
4
Chapter 2
Auction Theory
In this chapter, a brief overview of auction theory is given to facilitate the classi-
cation and comprehension of common auction mechanisms as market institutions
with explicit rules that determine specic prices and the allocation of goods based
on bids submitted, as well as the model subsequently discussed. A focus is then
being put on specic topics that can be observed in real world auctions and have
fostered recent advances in auction theory. It should however be noted that the
presentation given herein is by no means exhaustive since a comprehensive formal
discussion of all topics in auction theory is beyond the scope of this thesis. Readers
are advised to refer to the sources indicated in the text for further reference on the
topics addressed hereafter.1
Auctions have increasingly gained popularity on various markets due to their pre-
eminent merits. The dynamic and exible pricing features of auctions not only allow
sellers to potentially gain higher revenues than on xed price markets but also al-
low for the achievement of economic e¢ ciency in that the bidder who most values
the good at sale receives the good, a criterion oftentimes not met by xed price
mechanisms. Furthermore, due to asymmetric information on the market value of
numerous goods amongst market participants, auctions are a valuable tool in view
of its price discovery power.
The fundamental even though not exclusive questions addressed in auction theory
are based on the ground of two primary yet distinctive measures, the pertinence
of each of them depending on the specic context. The rst aspect is from the
sellers perspective with regard to the revenue that can be raised in di¤erent auction
1 For a comprehensive overview on auction theory, see Engelbrecht-Wiggans (1980), Reiley and
Samuelson (1981), Maskin and Riley (1984), McAfee and McMillan (1987), Milgrom (1987b),
Wilson (1992), Wolfstetter (1996), Klemperer (1999), Krishna (2002), Klemperer (2004), Menezes
and Monteiro (2005) and Milgrom (2006).
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formats. Apparently, the sellers primary objective is to adopt a mechanism that
leads to the highest expected sales price. Second, from the perspective of the bidders
or the market as a holistic institution, the e¢ ciency of di¤erent mechanisms, that
is, that the goods at sale are awarded to the individuals who value them most, is
key. In fact, as will be shown in what follows, di¤erent auction mechanisms can have
highly characteristic features that depend on the context in which they are applied,
and potentially lead to very distinctive outcomes.
2.1 Brief History of Auctions
Babylonian wedding auctions as early as 500 B.C. were among the rst auctions
documented.2 In these annually held auctions, interested bridegrooms could bid for
women for a future marriage by way of a descending price auction. The auctioneers
started at a high price that they continually lowered until a bidder accepted the
maiden. It has been recorded that the prices paid for the women often related to
their beauty and the less comely women not seldom had to pay a substantial dowry to
be accepted, thereby making the actual price negative in many cases. In the Roman
Empire, auction mechanisms were also widely used for the sale of the "spoils of the
war" to the soldiers after successful warfares. Compared to the auctions held by
the Babylonians, the Roman auctions were much more sophisticated and organized
with regulated hosts and promoters who advertised and auctioned the goods. In the
Roman Empire, auctions were also extensively used to liquidate personal properties.
Marcus Aurelius is told to have sold precious furniture and heirlooms in auctions
that lasted up to two months. The etymological source of the word "auction" can
also be traced back to the Romans since it is derived from "auctus", being the past
participle of "augere", which means "to increase".
King Henry VII. of England later in the Middle Ages of the fteenth century in-
stituted some of the earliest forensic auction regulations such as including auction
licenses that indeed legally permitted vendors to sell their goods by way of an auc-
tion. In the early seventeenth century, auctions became much more common in Great
Britain to sell pieces of art and other collectibles. Only a short while later, the two
auction houses Sothebys and Christies were found in 1744 and 1766 respectively
which are dazzling names to this very day. After the colonialization of America,
auctions were widely used for the sale of grains, tobacco, land and slaves. Early
accounts of the use of auctions in the Netherlands and Germany, where fruits, veg-
2 See Cassady (1967) for a comprehensive overview of the history of auctions.
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etables and owers were sold, endorse its adoption in the later part of the nineteenth
century.
One of the most prominent contemporary institutions using an auction mechanism
instead of a xed price market is the U.S. Treasury Department to issue debt on
the primary market. The liquidity and volume of U.S. public debt securities that
are continuously and extensively being traded on global nancial markets points to
the importance of its sale on the primary market and not least to the relevance of
auctions on nancial markets.3 Another increasingly signicant use of auctions on
nancial markets is with regard to the issue of shares on primary markets.4 Googles
initial public o¤ering in August 2004 marked a breakthrough of auction mechanisms
used on the issue market for equities despite the fact that only few issuers have so
far decided to follow its path. Future however will show whether auctions will gain
importance on nancial markets as they o¤er the best conceivable means for both
sides of such transactions.
The growth of the number of internet auction sites as well as its trading volume
is ultimately the paradigm of todays importance of auctions in everyday life. To
exemplify the relevance of online auction markets, the volume of goods sold on eBay
has experienced a remarkable growth over the past few years, starting from a volume
of only USD 1.15 billion in gross merchandise sales in the rst quarter of 2000 to
an amount of USD 14.5 billion in gross merchandise sales in the second quarter of
2007.5 The substantial evolution of the overall nominal value of goods sold on eBay
is apparent from Figure 2:1.
Online auction markets o¤er various remarkable advantages that gave rise to their
present-day status and continuous growth. Amongst others, such markets substan-
tially reduced transaction costs associated with operating and participating in an
auction.6 Moreover, the comfortable accessibility to such auctions along with the
remarkable di¤usion of the internet over the past few years has sharply increased
the spectrum of potential sellers and buyers that can meet virtually instead of the
necessity of physically being present and thereby raised the probability of bidders
with high valuations to e¤ectively participate.7 Another noteworthy fact that eases
3 See Berney (1964), Smith (1966), Back and Zender (1993), Ausubel and Cramton (1998) and
Ausubel (2002).
4 See Kandel et al. (1999), Biais and Faugeron-Crouzet (2002) and Sherman (2005).
5 See eBays quarterly nancial results.
6 See Ockenfels et al. (2006).
7 Another form of "distant" bidding has however already gained importance in traditional auctions
before electronic markets emerged by allowing bidders to participate by telephone.
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Figure 2.1: Gross Merchandise Sales on eBay, 2001Q2 - 2007Q2
the participation in online auctions is that most platforms o¤er electronic bidding
agents that enable bidders to submit their preferences before an auction takes place
(or during an auction) and therefore even eliminate the need to attend the auctions
at the scheduled time.8 The growth rates and increasing importance of such on-
line auction platforms for commerce has ultimately boosted momentum in auction
theory, making it one of the most buoyant research areas in economics.
2.2 Auction Types
Four basic types of auctions are widely used and analyzed in existing theoretical
literature. In describing the mechanisms of these auction types, for simplicity, the
focus is rst being put on auctions where a single indivisible good is at sale before
turning to an overview of auctions where multiple units are being sold. The four
fundamental auction types are: (i) ascending price auctions, (ii) descending price
8 The ability to submit bids by an agent or automatic bidding mechanism is called "proxy bidding"
in auction literature. Bidders can submit the maximum amount they are willing to pay for the
good to a bidding agent. This information is however not disclosed to any of the other auction
participants. The agent will then place bids on the bidders behalf, submitting only an amount at
the lowest possible increment that is necessary to outbid all other bidders, given that the maximum
bid submitted to the agent exceeds all other current bids. If another bidder submits a bid higher
than the maximum amount entered, such a bidder will be outbid. When no other bidder submits
a higher bid until the end of the auction, the bidder is deemed successful and receives the good.
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auctions, (iii) rst price sealed bid auctions and (iv) second price sealed bid auctions.
As the categorization of these four fundamental auction types reveals, the basic
taxonomy of their denomination is based upon the order in which prices are quoted
and in the way individual bids are tendered.
The most widely used auction type is the ascending price auction, also known as
English auction or open outcry auction, where the price is increased by the seller
from a relatively low level where multiple bidders are willing to acquire the good
until only one bidder remains. The bidder who last remains in the auction wins the
good at the price where his latest rival dropped out. If the seller posts a reserve
price, only bids at or above this ex ante specied minimum required price level are
being accepted and if no bidder posts a bid at or above the reserve price, the good is
not sold. The simplicity of ascending price auctions thus makes them very attractive
for practical use.
The descending price auction or Dutch auction works in the opposite way of an
ascending price auction in that the seller starts at a relatively high price level, at
which presumably no bidder will buy the good, that is then subsequently being
lowered. The bidder who rst accepts a price wins the good and pays the price at
which the auction stopped. Therefore, the descending price auction is often referred
to as the converse of the ascending price auction, despite its evident signicant
distinctions. When comparing with the ascending price auction where the price
is specied by the second strongest bidder, the nal price in the descending price
auction is solely determined by the bidder who rst accepts to buy the good and thus
by the winning bidder. Note that the term "Dutch Auction" has recently widely
been used in nance literature and on multiple online auction sites to refer to a type
of auction other than the descending price auction, that is, the term is extensively
being used to refer to what is dened as a multi unit uniform price auction in auction
literature, thereby potentially leading to great confusion.
In contrast to the two rst auction types, in a rst price sealed bid auction individual
bidders do not receive information about the other bids during the auction since they
are all being independently submitted to the seller by sealed bids. The bidder with
the highest bid wins the auction and pays a price equal to his bid.
Finally, in a second price sealed bid auction or Vickrey auction, bidders also inde-
pendently submit their bid as in the rst price sealed bid auction. However, here
the bidder with the highest valuation wins the good and only pays a price equal to
the second highest bid submitted. Obviously, in this type of an auction, the nal
price is determined by the second highest bid.
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2.3 Auction Models
A key feature of commerce in general and especially in auction practice is the pres-
ence of asymmetric information. Bidders competing in auctions may have di¤ering
valuations for the good at sale that are ex ante not entirely revealed to the seller or
to the other competing bidders. Likewise, the sellers valuation for the good may be
withheld and not revealed to the bidders. If there was full disclosure of all partici-
pantsvaluations for the good, the seller could anticipate the outcome of the auction
and behave appropriately to fully extract the biddersrent and thereby maximizing
his revenue. The seller could then simply make a xed price o¤er to the bidder with
the highest valuation at or just below his valuation. However, in most transactions
the buying partiesvaluations for the good are not common knowledge. Auctions
are a formidable mechanism for a seller who is uncertain about the values that each
bidder attaches to the good being sold to extract the highest possible revenue. Auc-
tions can hence be classied into three distinct models. These are: (i) independent
private values auctions, (ii) common values auctions and (iii) interdependent values
auctions.
In independent private values auctions the individual bidders have independent and
private valuations for the good at sale. Thus, di¤erent bidders may have di¤erent
valuations for the good that are not preliminarily known with certainty by the
seller or by the other bidders. Recall that if the seller knew the individual bidders
valuations, he could simply make a take-it-or-leave-it o¤er to extract the highest
possible rent from the bidder with the highest valuation. Furthermore, there is
asymmetric information amongst the bidders since they do not know the valuations
of their respective competitors, leading to possibly material consequences for their
optimal bidding behaviour. Moreover, in the independent private values model,
biddersvaluations are una¤ected by signals or additional information on the value
of the good from any other bidder that may be revealed during the auction process.
Thus, even if the individual valuations were common knowledge among all auction
participants, each individual bidders valuation would be una¤ected. Independent
private values auctions are most plausible for goods whose values are derived from
its consumption or possession alone and not on the basis of a possible resale market.
As opposed to independent private values auctions, in the common values auction
model, the good to be sold has the same ex ante value to every bidder. Nevertheless,
individual bidders have di¤erent information about the actual or "true" value of
the good and therefore its value is not known with certainty at the time of the
commencement of the auction. Thus, since the value of the good is not known
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by the bidders before the conclusion of the auction, an individual bidder may gain
information about the true value of the good by observing other biddersbehaviour
during the auction or by receiving additional information on the good. Such a
bidder can then accordingly update his estimate of the goods true value, and the
auction to a certain extent follows the principle "felix qui potuit rerum cognoscere
causas".9 Most auctions in which bidders intend to resell the good after successful
participation at any given subsequent stage after the conclusion of the auction on a
secondary market are common values auctions.
The interdependent values auction model is a more general model that includes
both the private and common values models as special cases. The interdependent
values model is an integrative approach that considers auctions in which bidder
valuations depend on their individual preferences, the preferences of other bidders
and the specic characteristics of the good to be sold. A bidders valuation of the
good does thus depend on the information received on other biddersvaluations and
from the good itself. In this setting, a high valuation of one bidder makes it more
likely that other bidders have relatively high valuations for the same good if they
receive information about the valuation of the bidder who values the good relatively
high. Thus, interdependent value auctions are particularly suited for goods that can
possibly be resold on any form of a market subsequent to the auction. When bidders
fully ignore the information revealed during the auction, then the interdependent
values model is equivalent to the independent private values model. On the other
hand, if only a single measure on the quality of the good at sale is equally known
by all bidders but no additional information on the good or the respective other
bidders can be revealed, then the interdependent values model and the common
values model are equivalent since all bidders identically base their valuations on
that single measure.
In what follows, the di¤erent auction types and models are being presented for
auctions where only a single good is at sale. Subsequently, auctions in which multiple
homogeneous goods are tendered are being introduced. The main ndings of auction
theory can thereby easily be derived and illustrated in a comprehensive manner.
9 Quoted from Vergils Georgics, Book II. This phrase points to the fact that the bidder who was
able to estimate the true value of the good best turns out to optimally submit a bid. A rough
translation of the phrase could be: "Happy is the one who was able to understand the causes of
things".
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2.4 Single Unit Auctions
To commence, auctions in which only a single good is sold are being considered.
Single unit auctions have extensively been analyzed and discussed in theoretical as
well as empirical literature and have bred the ndings perceived as amongst the most
remarkable in auction theory. These fundamental results will now be described by
applying an accessible and non-technical approach.
Independent Private Values
To start with, note that given independently and identically distributed bidder val-
uations, the descending price auction and the rst price sealed bid auction are
strategically equivalent.10 Despite the fact that the descending price auction is an
open auction, the only information being revealed in the course of the auction is
when a bidder accepts a price, thus not until the end of the auction. Therefore, a
specic bid in the sealed bid rst price auction is equivalent to a bid posted in a
descending price auction since only the bidder submitting the highest bid wins the
good in either case, paying the bid he previously submitted. Similarly, the ascend-
ing price auction is equivalent to the second price sealed bid auction since in both
auction formats it is optimal for every bidder to bid up to his valuation, despite
the fact that in an ascending price auction the information that some bidders drop
out might reveal some information about the value of the good. This information is
however useless if individual valuations are independent.11
Since given independent and private bidder valuations, the sealed bid rst price
auction is equivalent to the descending price auction and the ascending price auction
is equivalent to the second price sealed bid auction, it su¢ ces to solely consider one of
the respective auction types when comparing the four auctions. Clearly, in a second
price sealed bid auction it is a dominant strategy for every bidder to truthfully bid
his valuation.12 In a rst price sealed bid auction however, no bidder would bid
an amount equal to his valuation since then he could not gain any positive payo¤
as the maximum payo¤ he could in that case receive is zero. When participating
in a rst price sealed bid auction, a bidder needs to balance between increasing
his bid up to his valuation and thereby increasing the probability of winning the
10Here and in what follows, it is assumed that bidders are risk neutral and symmetric, that is, the
distribution of values is the same for all bidders. Further, auctions are considered to be strategically
equivalent if for any bidders strategy in one auction, there is a corresponding strategy in the other
auction resulting in the same outcome. See Krishna (2002), p. 4.
11 See Krishna (2002), pp. 15-16.
12 See Vickrey (1961).
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auction while at the same time reducing his expected payo¤. Bidders will therefore
tend to "shade" their bids and optimally bid an amount equal to or just above
the second highest bidders valuation and thus potentially lowering expected seller
revenue. However, given that bidder valuations are independently and identically
distributed and are private information, expected seller revenue is the same both in
a second price sealed bid auction and in a rst price sealed bid auction, that is, the
expectation of the second highest bidders valuation. Therefore, with independent
and identically distributed private bidder valuations, expected seller revenue is the
same in all four auction types. This result is known as the Revenue Equivalence
Theorem, one of the most remarkable ndings in auction theory.13
Interdependent Values
When relaxing the assumption of independent private bidder valuations and allowing
for the possibility that bidders instead have partial information with regard to the
value of the good and other biddersvaluations, the results obtained from the case of
independent private valuations may substantially di¤er. Since with interdependent
valuations, bidders do not know the actual value of the good with certainty at
the beginning of the auction and may receive valuable information about the other
biddersvaluations during the auction, they may need to revise their estimation of
the value of the good which makes bidding strategies considerably more complex.
With interdependent values, the winning of an auction may lead to a decrease of
the estimated value of the good since a successful bidder eventually pays too much,
a result referred to as the Winners Curse in auction theory.14 To avoid such an
unfavourable outcome, bidders will therefore shade their bids well below their initial
estimates for the good with positive probability which in turn might detriment
seller revenue. Furthermore, ascending price auctions and second price sealed bid
auctions are no longer strategically equivalent since bidders in an ascending price
auction can indeed update their estimates on the true value of the good.15 Also,
13 See Vickrey (1961), Vickrey (1962), Myerson (1981) and Reiley and Samuelson (1981). The key
assumptions underlying the Revenue Equivalence Theorem are (i) independence (the values of
di¤erent bidders are independently distributed), (ii) risk neutrality (all bidders seek to maximize
their expected prots), (iii) no budget constraints (all bidders have the ability to pay up to their
respective values) and (iv) symmetry (the values of all bidders are distributed according to some
specic distribution function). A violation of one of these assumptions will indeed a¤ect the
Revenue Equivalence Theorem and potentially invalidate it. See Krishna (2002), p. 37.
14 See Ortega Reichert (1968), Wilson (1969), Capen et al. (1971), Wilson (1977), Kagel and Levin
(1986), Thaler (1988), Thiel (1988), Harstad and Rotkopf (1995), Bulow and Klemperer (2002)
and Bajari and Hortascu (2003).
15 If however only two bidders participate in the auction, the ascending price auction is still equivalent
to the second price sealed bid auction since when either of the bidder drops out, the auction is
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the Revenue Equivalence Theorem will no longer hold with interdependent values
due to the correlation of bidder valuations. In particular, the second price sealed
bid auction will generate at least as much expected seller revenue as the rst price
sealed bid auction. Similarly, expected seller revenue in ascending price auctions
weakly dominates expected seller revenue in second price sealed bid auctions. In
auction theory, these ndings are captured as the Revenue Ranking Principle.16
2.5 Multi Unit Auctions
When instead of only a single good several identical goods are auctioned, a seller
again has various options when choosing an auction mechanism. This section aims to
give a brief yet partial overview on fundamental principles and results from auction
theory pertaining to multi unit auctions.17
Start by noting that when several homogeneous goods are being o¤ered and bidders
have multi unit demand, their bidding behaviour does critically depend on their
marginal valuations of the goods, that is, they can either have decreasing marginal
valuations (as for substitutes), constant marginal valuations or even increasing mar-
ginal valuations (as for complements).18 Furthermore, the seller has di¤erent ways
to sell the items, either one at a time in separate multiple auctions or simultaneously
in a single auction.19
Simultaneous Auctions
When multiple identical goods are simultaneously being o¤ered in a single auction,
the seller can choose between several distinct auction formats, amongst others three
sealed bid auction formats. These are: (i) Multi unit discriminatory auctions, (ii)
over and the remaining bidder can no longer update his estimate of the true value. See Krishna
(2002), p. 86.
16 See Ortega Reichert (1968), Wilson (1969) and Milgrom and Weber (1982).
17For simplicity, only the case for independent private valuations and ex ante symmetric and risk
neutral bidders is here being discussed. For further reference with regard to multi unit auctions with
interdependent valuations, see Maskin (1992), Dasgupta and Maskin (2000), Jehiel and Moldovanu
(2001) and Maskin (2001). Moreover, the discussion is in terms of discrete multi unit auctions.
When alternatively extending the models to the continuous case, as for share auctions of a perfectly
divisible good, the essential properties of the di¤erent models presented hereafter are not a¤ected.
See Wilson (1979), Back and Zender (1993) and Wang and Zender (1993).
18 In the following, it is assumed that biddersmarginal valuations are declining, that is, the value
of an additional good decreases with the number of goods already acquired. Therefore, bidders
demand is non-increasing in price. This situation is in extenso discussed in auction theory and can
be applied to most real world multi unit auctions.
19The terms "good", "item" and "unit" are subsequently synonymously being used.
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multi unit uniform price auctions and (iii) multi unit Vickrey auctions. These three
auction formats, while all allocating the goods to the highest bids submitted, sub-
stantially di¤er in their pricing rules.
In a multi unit discriminatory auction, the highest submitted bids are deemed suc-
cessful and every winning bidder pays an amount equal to the sum of his bids
for which he was awarded a good. Therefore, this price determination mechanism
amounts to perfect price discrimination since it can alternatively be seen as the
extension of the rst price sealed bid auction to multiple units (each bidder pays
the price submitted by his demand function).20 Obviously there is bid shading in
this auction format since when instead bidding truthfully, there would be no gains
from winning any good.21 With positive probability, bidders even submit at de-
mand functions, that is, they bid the same price for each good. Most likely however,
bidders submit downward sloping demand functions, that is, bidding lower prices
for additional goods. As a consequence, equilibria in multi unit discriminatory auc-
tions generally are ine¢ cient.22 However, with single unit demand, the multi unit
discriminatory auction turns out to be e¢ cient.
An example will help understand the price determination mechanism of a multi unit
discriminatory auction. Consider the case where a seller o¤ers ve homogeneous
goods for sale to three bidders that submit bid vectors b1 = (23; 17; 13; 11; 9), b2 =
(16; 14; 12; 10; 8) and b3 = (15; 7; 5; 3; 2), where the subscript denotes the individual
bidder and bid vectors are sorted in decreasing order where the highest value is the
respective bid for the rst unit, the second bid for the second unit, and so forth.23
Thus, the ve highest bids are (23; 17; 16; 15; 14). Since in a multi unit discriminatory
auction the respective highest bids are awarded with a good, bidder 1 receives two
units and pays 23 for the rst unit and 17 for the second unit. Bidder 2 receives two
units as well and pays 16 and 14 for the rst and second unit respectively. Bidder
3 only receives a single item at a price of 15. Thus, individual payo¤ is zero for all
bidders in this example since they pay prices equal to their individual valuations for
all goods obtained. Overall seller revenue is 23 + 17 + 16 + 15 + 14 = 85.
20Further, note that if only a single good was auctioned, this auction format would naturally reduce
to a single unit rst price sealed bid auction.
21 See Ausubel and Cramton (1996) and Engelbrecht-Wiggans and Kahn (1998b).
22 See Vickrey (1961).
23 In this example, it is assumed that the bids submitted for the individual goods are equal to the
bidders true valuations for the goods. Thus, bidders are assumed to be "naive" in that they do not
strategically shade their bids. Further, assume that an individual bidders payo¤ is the di¤erence
between his individual valuation and the price paid for the goods.
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In contrast, in multi unit uniform price auctions or non-discriminatory multi unit
auctions, the goods are sold at a unique price, often referred to as the "market
clearing price", where aggregate demand equals supply.24 In this auction format,
the number of goods each bidder obtains equals the number of his competitorsbids
he defeats.25 In multi unit uniform price auctions, it is a dominant strategy for
bidders to bid truthfully for the rst good and shade bids for all additional goods
since with positive probability every bid submitted by successful bidders other than
the one for the rst unit determines the nal price e¤ective for all units.26 Thus,
a successful bidder may himself inuence the price he will eventually need to pay.
Therefore, the fact that bidders shade their bids generally leads to an ine¢ cient
allocation.27 However, when all bidders again only have single unit demand, they
have no incentive to shade their bids since no winning bidder does inuence the nal
price.28 Thus, with single unit demand, even the multi unit uniform price auction
is e¢ cient.
Note that the general ine¢ ciency in both the multi unit discriminatory auction and
the multi unit uniform price auction does not arise from the fact that multiple units
are being tendered but stems from the fact that bidders feature multi unit demand.
When bidders instead have single unit demand, these two auction formats are even
revenue equivalent.29
Considering again the example with the bidding vectors given above, in the case
of the multi unit uniform price auction, the goods are identically awarded to the
respective bidders with the highest bids submitted, but at a unique price of 13 (since
this is the highest losing bid, submitted by bidder 1 for his third good requested).
Thus bidder 1 and bidder 2 would each pay 26 and receive two goods while bidder 3
would receive a single good at the same price. Bidder 1s payo¤ is 23+17 213 =
14, bidder 2s payo¤16+14 213 = 4 and bidder 3s payo¤amounts to 15 13 = 2.
Finally, seller revenue would amount to 5 13 = 65.
24Assume that the nal price is equal to the highest losing bid.
25Further, note that when only a single good is being sold, the multi unit uniform price auction
reduces to a single unit second price sealed bid auction.
26 In extreme cases, the equilibrium price can even tend to zero. However, when the number of bidders
exceeds the number of goods at sale, such low revenue equilibria cannot arise. See Noussair (1995)
and Engelbrecht-Wiggans and Kahn (1998a).
27 See Vickrey (1961).
28Note that when the nal price is instead determined by the lowest winning bid, other outcomes
are possible since then successful bidders can potentially inuence the price.
29 In this special case, the Revenue Equivalence Theorem can be applied.
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In multi unit Vickrey auctions, a successful bidder pays the respective highest losing
bids of all other bidders for every good awarded.30 Therefore, similar to the multi
unit discriminatory auction format, winning bidders do not pay a uniform price
but here, prices are based on the other biddersbehaviour.31 As it is the case for
single unit Vickrey auctions, it is a dominant strategy to truthfully bid in multi unit
Vickrey auctions and the auction allocates the objects e¢ ciently.32
Given the bid vectors in the previous example, bidder 1 would again receive two
goods but pay an amount equal to the other bidders highest losing bids, that is, he
would pay 12 for the rst good and 10 for the second good and receive a payo¤ of
23 + 17  12  10 = 18. Similarly, bidder 2 would receive two goods and pay 13 for
the rst and 11 for the second good and receive a payo¤ of 16 + 14  13  11 = 6.
Bidder 3 pays 13 for the single good awarded, yielding a payo¤ of 15   13 = 2. In
sum, in the multi unit Vickrey auction format, the seller would receive a revenue of
13 + 13 + 12 + 11 + 10 = 59.
As it can be seen from the example, given identical bid vectors in all of the three
distinctive auction formats, the seller receives most in the multi unit discriminatory
auction (85), followed by the multi unit uniform price auction (65) and the multi
unit Vickrey auction (59). From the perspective of the bidders however, the multi
unit Vickrey auction is most favourable since it yields the highest payo¤s for all
three bidders, followed by the multi unit uniform price auction and the multi unit
discriminatory auction where they all receive payo¤s of zero.33 The outcome of all
three auction formats in this simplied example however is e¢ cient. It has thereby
been illustrated that the choice of an auction design given multiple homogeneous
goods are at sale can have contrary benets for the seller and the bidders. Note
however that based on the results of this example, universal predictions on the
superiority of one of the di¤erent auction formats cannot be made on no account.
All of the multi unit auctions described so far are sealed bid in that every bidder
submits a secret bid to the seller, indicating how much he is willing to pay for each
unit. Recall that if all bidders only request one unit, even for the case of multi
unit supply, the Revenue Equivalence Theorem can be applied, that is, the multi
30 See Vickrey (1961).
31Note however that when only a single good was sold, the multi unit Vickrey auction reduces to a
single unit second price sealed bid auction identical to the multi unit uniform price auction.
32The proof provided by Vickrey (1961) and in section 5:2 of this thesis can accordingly be extended
to the case for multi unit demand since by not bidding truthfully for all units, a bidder would forgo
surplus with positive probability.
33Note that in the example bidder 3 is however indi¤erent between the multi unit uniform price
auction and the multi unit Vickrey auction.
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unit discriminatory auction, the multi unit uniform price auction as well as the
multi unit Vickrey auction all generate the same expected revenue. However, as it
has been highlighted, with multi unit demand in general only the Vickrey auction
is e¢ cient and therefore the Revenue Equivalence Theorem cannot universally be
applied to multi unit auctions. In fact, even an exclusive ranking of the di¤erent
auction formats in terms of seller revenue cannot be obtained since the auction
outcome critically depends on the distribution of bidder valuations.
Alternatively to the sealed bid formats discussed so far, the seller can just as well
correspondingly choose open auction formats to tender his goods:
In multi unit open descending price auctions or multi unit Dutch auctions, the price
is continuously being lowered by the seller from a level high enough where no bidder
is willing to buy any good until bidders will eventually agree to buy, similar to
the single unit descending price auction. The goods are then sold at the prevailing
prices and the auction ends when all goods are sold. The outcome of the multi unit
descending price auction is equivalent to the multi unit discriminatory auction.34
In contrast, when the seller chooses a multi unit open ascending price auction or
multi unit English auction, the auction starts at a relatively low price, where ag-
gregate demand exceeds supply, that is subsequently being gradually raised. As the
price increases, the demand at the prevailing price is being reduced and the auction
ends when aggregate demand equals supply. The goods are then being sold to all
remaining bidders at that specic price, therefore leading to the same outcome as
the multi unit uniform price auction.35
Finally, the multi unit Ausubel auction is a modied multi unit ascending price
auction format.36 As in the multi unit open ascending price auction, the seller
starts with a relatively low price where aggregate demand exceeds supply that is
then being continuously raised. As the price increases, bidders will eventually reduce
their amount requested and the goods are sold to those bidders that face a positive
residual supply at the prevailing price. As it is the case in the multi unit Vickrey
auction, it is a dominant strategy to bid truthfully resulting in an e¢ cient allocation.
Therefore, the multi unit Ausubel auction is outcome equivalent to the multi unit
Vickrey auction.
34 If only a single good was at sale, the multi unit open descending price auction is equivalent to a
single unit rst price sealed bid auction.
35Clearly, when o¤ering only a single good, the multi unit open ascending price auction reduces to
a standard single unit ascending price auction.
36 See Ausubel (1997).
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Note that under the assumption of independent private valuations, any equilibrium
in the multi unit discriminatory auction is equivalent to an equilibrium in the multi
unit open descending price auction, any equilibrium in the multi unit uniform price
auction is equivalent to the multi unit open ascending price auction and any equilib-
rium in the multi unit Vickrey auction to one in the multi unit Ausubel auction.37
Sequential Auctions
Alternatively to simultaneously selling multiple identical units in a single auction,
sellers can choose to o¤er the goods in separate sequential auctions. In the following,
for simplicity, it is assumed that bidders all have single unit demand, that is, they
only bid for up to a single good in the respective auctions.38
If the seller chooses to tender the goods in sequential rst price auctions, the goods
are sold in order of decreasing bids, that is, the respective goods will be allocated to
the bidder with the highest bid in each of the auctions and successful bidders pay
the price they bid. Since the goods are sold in a sequence of auctions, unsuccessful
bidders can opt to bid for a good in any subsequent auction. Note that even if all
prices of earlier auctions are disclosed, this has no impact on bidder behaviour since
valuations are private and independently and identically distributed. Therefore,
optimal bidder behaviour in late auctions does not depend on the prices determined
by already completed auctions. However, if bidders fail to win a good in one auction,
they tend to bid higher in subsequent auctions since the number of goods still for
sale decreases with the number of completed auctions. At the same time, since the
number of remaining bidders decreases with every auction ended, as a consequence,
the valuations of the remaining bidders are smaller which induces bidders to reduce
their bids accordingly. Indeed, in equilibrium these two contrary e¤ects entirely
o¤set each other leading to a martingale price path, that is, the expected price of
an auction equals the price paid in the antecedent auction and the goods are being
allocated e¢ ciently.39
If the goods were instead sold by sequential second price auctions, it only is a dom-
inant strategy to bid truthfully in the last auction to be held. In earlier auctions
however, bidders optimally submit bids lower than their valuations since there is
potential additional value from higher expected payo¤ by winning a good in some
37 See Krishna (2002), pp. 179-181.
38For the case of multi unit demand, see Weber (1983), Hausch (1986), Black and de Meza (1992)
and Milgrom and Weber (2000).
39 See Milgrom and Weber (2000).
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later auction. As in sequential rst price auctions, the equilibrium price path is a
martingale.40 As for the case of sequential rst price auctions, sequential second
price auctions allocate the goods e¢ ciently among all participating bidders, despite
the fact that bidders bid more aggressively in sequential second price auctions. As
a result, the two auction formats are revenue equivalent.41
2.6 Reserve Prices
This subsection aims to resume the key ndings of the impact of reserve prices in
auctions presented by auction theory. The di¤erent methods to sell a good by way
of an auction discussed so far can be enhanced by reserve prices, permitting the
seller to strategically and more actively engage in the auction mechanism instead of
leaving the determination of the nal price only to the competing bidders.
A reserve price in an auction species a minimum bidding level required from the
bidders to successfully participate, that is, only bids that at least meet the reserve
price are deemed adequate by the seller. An appropriately set reserve price may
prevent the sale of the good at price levels regarded insu¢ cient by the seller and
can foster competition amongst bidders. When choosing to augment an auction by
a reserve price, the seller can choose between either a public reserve price that is
fully disclosed before the auction takes place and can thereafter not be altered or
a secret reserve price that is not being publicly announced prior to the beginning
of the auction process. As for public reserve prices, given an auction has a secret
reserve price, the good is only sold if the nal highest bid is above the reserve price.
Clearly, a seller would optimally choose a reserve price at least as high as his own
valuation of the good since otherwise he would run the risk that the transaction
takes place at a price that is lower than his valuation, ultimately yielding a loss for
the seller with positive probability (that is, if the nal price is between the reserve
price and the sellers actual valuation). As it will be shown hereafter, given specic
circumstances, a seller might however optimally choose a reserve price that strictly
exceeds his own valuation for the good.
Given independent private bidder valuations, a seller may increase his expected
revenue by appropriately setting a reserve price.42 If he chooses a reserve price that
is able to extract (some of) the highest bidders surplus, it is clearly benecial for
the seller to choose a reserve price that is well above his own valuation. However,
40 See Milgrom and Weber (2000).
41 See Krishna (2002), p. 217.
42 See Myerson (1981) and Reiley and Samuelson (1981).
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since bidder valuations are private information, the choice of a reserve price above
the sellers valuation may at the same time lead to an ex post ine¢ cient auction
outcome when the highest bidders valuation is below the posted reserve price but
at the same time exceeding the sellers own valuation of the good, implying that
the good will not be sold when instead it would have been sold if the reserve price
would have been set at some lower level still exceeding the sellers valuation for
the good. Consider rst the case of a single unit second price sealed bid auction: A
reserve price in that case has no e¤ect on bidder behaviour since it is still a dominant
strategy to bid truthfully. If the seller chooses a reserve price that strictly exceeds
the second highest bidders valuation but is below or at most equal to the highest
bidders valuation, the transaction takes place at a price higher as if no reserve
price was given since then, the nal price would have been equal to the second
highest bidders valuation and thus lower than the reserve price. In that case, the
seller would increase his revenue versus the auction without a reserve price. Next,
consider a single unit rst price sealed bid auction that is enhanced by a reserve
price. Analogously to the second price sealed bid auction, besides the fact that
a reserve price strictly above zero may exclude some bidders with relatively low
valuations, it may raise more seller revenue by inducing the remaining bidders to
bid more aggressively.43
Similarly, when bidder valuations instead were interdependent, a reserve price will
usually increase expected seller revenue when chosen appropriately.44 As bidders
in this case do not know the value of the good with certainty, the disclosed level
of a reserve price may reveal information on the e¤ective value of the good that
allows bidders to amend their bidding behaviour. An obvious consequence is that
they reduce bid shading and thereby leading to higher price levels. On the other
hand however, given positive reserve prices, bidders with valuations less than the
reserve price who would otherwise have participated in the auction are being ex-
cluded leading to a potential informational loss for the remaining bidders since they
can no longer observe actions taken by those bidders.45 Thus, even though reserve
prices may in general strictly increase expected seller revenue, their virtues critically
depend on their respective level chosen by the seller.
43 See Krishna (2002), pp. 24-26 and Menezes and Monteiro (2005), pp. 22-24.
44 See Milgrom and Weber (1982).
45This is particularly the case in open ascending price auctions.
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2.7 Strategic Manipulation in Auctions
Despite the eminent advantages of auctions by virtue of its price discovery ability
in comparison to xed price markets, the existence of asymmetric information in
auctions can give rise to several anomalies that may in part deteriorate its evident
merits. Recent literature has pointed to increasing fraudulent and illicit behaviour
on both the seller and the bidder side, especially with regard to online auctions.
On numerous markets where auction mechanisms are applied, rules or regulations
against fraud are di¢ cult to enforce due to the fact that auction participants can
oftentimes hide themselves behind articial identities.46 Amongst the most notable
kinds of strategic manipulation are collusion, shilling, bid shielding and bid sniping.47
Collusion
A major concern sellers may face is the risk of collusion amongst bidders.48 When
relaxing the assumption of bidders independently and noncooperatively making their
bidding decisions, collusion among some or all of the bidders may arise with the
ultimate aim to avoid bidding up prices. The possibility of collusion will in the
following be presented for the case of single unit rst and second price auctions.
Similarly, multi unit auctions are also suspectible to collusion.49
To illustrate the phenomenon of collusion, assume again the independent private
values model, that is, biddersvaluations are private and independently drawn from
an identical distribution. Assume further that bidders are ex ante asymmetric.50
Start by considering a single unit second price sealed bid auction where a subset from
all participating bidders colludes.51 For those bidders colluding it is straightforward
that bidding truthfully remains to be a dominant strategy as it is for bidders outside
the bidding ring. It is moreover a dominant strategy for such a bidding ring as a
whole to only submit a single bid equal to its highest bidders valuation while for all
46Online auction platforms increasingly try to eliminate strategic bid manipulation by requiring
information that identies its customers, such as details on their credit cards or residential authen-
tication.
47 See Lucking-Reiley (2000).
48Collusive arrangements in auctions are alternatively called "bidding rings" or "cartels" in existing
literature (see McA¤ee and McMillan (1992)). These di¤erent notations are in the following being
synonymously used.
49 See Cramton and Schwartz (2000), Bajari and Summers (2002), Brusco and Lopomo (2002), Klem-
perer (2004) and Milgrom (2006).
50Even if bidders were ex ante symmetric, the presence of collusion would naturally introduce asym-
metries between bidders who actively collude and bidders who do not. See Krishna (2002), p.
152.
51 See Robinson (1985), Graham and Marshall (1987) and Pesendorfer and Swinkels (2000).
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other bidders submitting bids of zero - or at most equal to the reserve price.52 As a
result, only a single "serious" bid is being submitted by the bidding ring, leading to
possible gains for its bidders by suppressing competition.53 Given that with positive
probability a colluding bidder has the second highest bidders valuation over the
entire bidder population (including both bidders inside and outside of the ring), the
nal price paid by the bidding ring may turn out to be strictly lower than without
such a collusive agreement. Therefore, engaging in collusion may be protable for its
members since overall, the expected prices paid by ring members are lower versus
an auction in which they did not collude. Further, note that all other bidders
who are not part of the bidding ring are not worse o¤ since their probability of
winning the good as well as their expected payo¤ remain the same. Since thereby
the expected prot of noncolluding bidders is una¤ected, the gains from collusion
are at the full expense of seller revenue. Obviously, from the biddersperspective, a
bidding ring including all bidders is most e¢ cient since thereby their overall prots
are maximized. As a consequence, second price auctions are remarkably vulnerable
to collusion.54
Next, consider a single unit rst price sealed bid auction.55 Again, when bidders
collude, they would seek for the lowest possible price necessary to obtain the good.
However, unlike in a second price sealed bid auction, bidders e¤ectively colluding
have an incentive to cheat on the agreement: If a bidder indeed had a valuation above
the price agreed upon by the bidding ring, he could strictly increase his expected
payo¤by defeating the gains from collusion if he submitted a bid exceeding the price
optimal for the bidding ring. As an example, examine the case where all bidders
in the auction would collude. Then, it would be in the bidding rings best interest
to submit a price equal to the reserve price or alternatively the lowest necessary
price to obtain the good. If a bidder had a valuation above the reserve price - or
the price required for successful bidding, he would have an incentive to submit a
bid exceeding a price agreed upon, thereby winning the good and at the same time
gain a prot exceeding his expected payo¤ he would obtain when colluding with
52Note that the bidding ring has to induce bidders to fully reveal their valuations to facilitate an
e¤ective operation. Therefore, an optimal mechanism design needs to be implemented amongst the
colluding bidders for them to truthfully reveal this information. At this point however, it is being
abstained from introducing more complexity and it is simply assumed that bidding rings indeed
work in the way described. For a more detailed overview on mechanism design, see Myerson (1981)
and Krishna (2002).
53Obviously, these gains must be shared amongst the members of the ring to o¤er incentives to
collude.
54 See Robinson (1985).
55 See McAfee and McMillan (1992).
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positive probability.56 Therefore, in contrast to second price sealed bid auctions,
rst price sealed auctions usually are more robust to collusion. Moreover, collusion
in rst price auctions has an impact on overall bidder behaviour versus second price
auctions where it remains una¤ected. Specically, non-colluding bidders in rst price
auctions would have an incentive to accordingly lower their bids when presuming
that collusion exists in an auction. Again, as for the case of a second price sealed
bid auction, collusion can potentially reduce seller revenue.
Shilling
A phenomenon that has attracted considerable attention in recent auction theory is
the possibility of sellers to manipulate the auction outcome by shilling.57 Shilling is
referred to events where a seller tries to drive the nal auction price higher when only
a single bidder remains in the auction by bidding against that bidder himself.58 Even
if in most auctions sellers are not allowed to submit bids in their own auction, they
can circumvent this restriction by either creating alias identities and then submitting
bids or by instructing other bidders to submit bids on their behalf.59 Thereby, the
nal auction price may be higher than in the auction without shilling and the winning
bidder ends up paying more with positive probability. Shilling could therefore be
regarded as secret and dynamic reserve prices that are not publicly announced and
are being modied by the seller in the course of an auction. In the context of
independent private bidder valuations it is however not at all times optimal for the
seller to shill bids since it could enforce bid shading if bidders anticipate that the
seller will manipulate the auction.60 Likewise, even in a common values setting it
might not always be appropriate to shill bids when bidders anticipate shilling.
Bid Shielding
Bid shielding occurs when a bidder submits a relatively low bid for the good at
sale and at the same time illicitly submits an extremely high bid (again by either
another alias identity or getting another bidder to submit a bid on his behalf).61
56Note however that specic forms of enforcement to behave appropriately within the bidding ring
could be introduced.
57 See Sinha and Greenleaf (2000), Chakraborty and Kosmopoulou (2004), Engelberg and Williams
(2005) and Kau¤man and Wood (2005).
58A seller could similarly bid against numerous active bidders.
59This phenomenon is especially common on online auction platforms. The possibility to use di¤erent
anonymous identities on such auction platforms substantially facilitates shilling.
60 See Sinha and Greenleaf (2000).
61 See Lucking-Reiley (2000).
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Thereby, the high bid acts as a shield for such a bidder since the high bid excludes
other bidders from participating in the auction if the current bid already exceeds
their valuation of the good. The high bid is then being retracted just before the
end of the auction and leaving the lower bid possibly winning the auction despite
the fact that other bidders would have participated in the auction when the lower of
the two bids was the current bid.62 Bid shielding is therefore only e¤ective in open
ascending price auctions.
Bid Sniping
A further phenomenon observed on various auction markets is bid sniping.63 Bid
sniping is identied as the event of high volume bidding near the end of an auction.
Arguing solely with auction theory, at rst sight such late bidding should not have
a signicant impact on the outcome of an auction if bidders condition their bidding
behaviour primarily on their individual valuations for the good, especially in inde-
pendent values auctions. Specically, in sealed bid auctions such late bidding does
certainly not have any impact on bidder behaviour and the outcome of the auction.
However, in open ascending price auctions where information is being revealed dur-
ing the auction, it may be reasonable for bidders to snipe, especially if bidders do
not initially bid according to their valuation and increment their bids during the
course of the auction. In this case, bidding late in an auction can be optimal given
a predetermined closing time of the auction if a bidder submits a relatively high bid
to which other bidders cannot respond in time, that is, before the auction ends.64
Thus, by optimally submitting a late bid, such a bidder could outbid the incremental
bidder and win the auction at a comparably low price which in turn reduces seller
revenue with positive probability.
Obviously, given interdependent private bidder valuations, late bidding is reasonable
since bidders continuously update their valuations given the continuous ow of in-
formation observed during the auction.65 Furthermore, with interdependent private
valuations, it can be in an individual bidders best interest not to reveal information
on his valuation in an early stage of the auction that would induce other bidders to
62Bid shielding can only emerge at very specic auction mechanisms where bidders can indeed observe
the bids and enter the auction at any given time of the auction. Another restriction is that the
auction end must be known ex ante for the shielding bidder to be able to manipulate and bidders
must be able to withdraw their bids.
63 See Ockenfels and Roth (2002), Bajari and Hortascu (2003), Hayne and Vijayasarathy (2003) and
Anwar et al. (2006).
64 See Ockenfels and Roth (2006).
65 See Bajari and Hortascu (2003), Ockenfels and Roth (2006) and Rasmusen (2006).
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update their valuations and thereby lessen the probability of their successful par-
ticipation in the auction (and receiving the good at sale at a relatively low price).
With regard to simultaneous auctions of identical goods, the possibility of observing
the development of prices over a number of distinct auctions may further create
incentives for bid sniping in that bidders can dynamically update their bids in the
di¤erent auctions, and at any one time competitively submit a bid at the auction
with the lowest current price.66 A possibility for the seller to reduce the negative
impact of bid sniping on the auction outcome is to o¤er extension periods that allow
auctions with a predetermined ending date to continue for some time given that bids
have been submitted shortly before an auction was scheduled to end.
66 See Stryszowska (2005), Anwar et al. (2006), and Peters and Severinov (2006).
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Chapter 3
Buyout Options in Auctions
3.1 Overview
The di¤usion of the internet and online trading engines has brought forward a re-
newed interest in auction design and its implications for participating agents. The
increasing number of items sold on platforms such as eBay, Amazon and similar
suppliers of online trading systems asserts the importance of suitable auction mech-
anisms that may increase seller revenue, optimally allocate goods amongst bidders
and foster market e¢ ciency. The current stance of auction literature o¤ers a broad
range of theoretical and empirical work that addresses and analyzes a multitude of
topics. The aim of this chapter is to give a modest overview on the topic of Buyout
Options in auctions and its present-day use followed by a survey of the existing
literature in the subsequent chapter.
Before describing the characteristics of Buyout Options in auctions, a clarication
due to its terminology is necessary to avoid potential misunderstandings since Buy-
out Options in auctions do not feature the usual apparent attributes that can be
found at options on nancial markets. In nancial market theory, an option is usu-
ally referred to as a contract that gives the holder the right, but not the obligation,
to close a certain transaction at some specic time in the future. In contrast, the
option of interest here does not comprise a similar contract but can rather be seen as
the right to conduct a transaction immediately without the option of the execution
at some later time, as will be described in the following paragraphs. In other words,
Buyout Options in auctions do rather resemble o¤er prices than any future contract.
Buyout Prices in auctions, though their names and rules may vary in detail, are
prices for the good at sale that are ex ante announced by the seller, the existence and
amount of which are publicly known by all auction participants, i.e., all participating
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bidders and sellers. A Buyout Option allows the seller to set a predetermined price
at which any bidder may immediately purchase the item without the necessity of
competing in the auction or even before the auction e¤ectively starts. As long as
bidding in the auction is less than the announced Buyout Price, the auction continues
until no bidder is willing to increase his current bid (there can exist events during an
auction where the Buyout Option might disappear though). If a bidder is however
willing to post a bid equal to the Buyout Price, the auction immediately ends and
the good is sold to that specic bidder at the posted Buyout Price. Thereby, Buyout
Options allow bidders to buy an early end to the auction when exercising the option.1
The determination of the nal price in an auction enhanced with a Buyout Option
though critically depends on the specic auction mechanism in place, that is, if the
Buyout Option is indeed being exercised and if so, under what circumstances or if
the good is sold by way of the standard auction. According to this denition, a
Buyout Price is in some sense the functional opposite of a reserve price in that a
reserve price denes a minimum bidding level required to successfully participate in
an auction while a Buyout Price establishes a maximum bidding level at which the
seller is willing to tender the good immediately.2
There are di¤erent forms of Buyout Options conceivable and indeed already in use
on several auction markets. They can be distinctively classied into permanent,
temporary and limited Buyout Options.
Permanent Buyout Options remain available throughout the entire course of an
auction and do not disappear as soon as a prespecied event occurs short of being
exercised by any bidder. Thus, bidders cannot alter the availability of a permanent
Buyout Option except by its execution or alternatively by submitting a bid higher
than the prevailing Buyout Price.3
On the other hand, a temporary Buyout Option disappears as soon as any bid is
being submitted at or above a given (secret) reserve price. Clearly, when a seller
o¤ers a temporary Buyout Option, bidders must decide on whether to exercise the
Buyout Option before the actual auction starts whereas when o¤ering a permanent
Buyout Option, bidders can wait and observe the process of the auction before
1 See Lucking-Reiley (2000).
2 The denition of Buyout Options in auctions given here is not comprehensive in that they can also
be implemented in multi unit or share auctions, as will be shown later. For simplicity, the Buyout
Option here and in the following paragraphs is exemplied in the forefront of single unit auctions
despite the fact that any arbitrary auction mechanism can be enhanced by such an option.
3 Submitting a bid above the Buyout Price is however not reasonable since then such a bidder would
pay a price higher than the minimum bidding level required to receive the item.
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exercising the option so long as no other bidder exercises the option or submits a bid
above the Buyout Price. Thus, if the auction is open and bidders are able to observe
their competitorsbids, they may nd a permanent Buyout Option benecial since
in that case they can condition their decision on the execution of the option on the
other biddersbehaviour. However, if the auction is sealed, that is, if bidders cannot
observe their competitorsbids, then a permanent Buyout Option does not o¤er any
advantages versus a temporary Buyout Option since bidders cannot condition their
bidding behaviour for the Buyout Option on the other playersbids. Temporary
Buyout Options do therefore not only disappear as soon as any appropriate bid has
been submitted but also endow individual bidders with substantial control over the
availability of the option for other bidders by either exercising the option or simply
submitting an appropriate bid whereas in the case of permanent Buyout Options,
bidders can only eliminate the option by either exercising it or posting a bid above
the given Buyout Price.
Buyout Prices are considered to be limited if they are only in e¤ect for a limited
period of time during an auction and cease to be available after a specic point
in time or if a particular event occurs. Several kinds of limited Buyout Options
are conceivable, despite not yet systematically discussed in existing literature. The
time of the disappearance of a limited Buyout Option could for instance either be
ex ante xed by the seller or be conditioned on bidding behaviour in the auction.
If the Buyout Option however ceases to be available at a prespecied time in the
auction, individual bidders cannot inuence its disappearance other than exercising
it whereas if it is conditioned on bidding behaviour, they have some control. The
fundamental discrepancies in the duration of the availability of the di¤erent Buyout
Options can subsequently lead to di¤ering auction equilibria and results.4
Buyout Options can further be classied as static and dynamic Buyout Prices. Static
Buyout Prices are constant over time and do not change during the progression of an
auction. Dynamic Buyout Prices contrariwise are not constant during the course of
an auction but may instead vary over time according to a prespecied trajectory or if
certain events occur. The practice of static Buyout Prices seems to be predominantly
in use on todays auction markets and dynamic Buyout Prices have so far only been
discussed very scarcely in existing literature. Furthermore, the greater complexity
of dynamic Buyout Prices eclipses its practicability for a broader use in real world
auctions.
4 See Lee and Ahn (2004), Reynolds and Wooders (2005) and Gupta and Gallien (2007).
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As it has been described beforehand, the enhancement of an auction by a Buyout
Option o¤ers a unique hybrid market institution, combining both xed price o¤ers
and auction mechanisms. The Buyout Option thus allows a seller to o¤er the good
in a hybrid of auction and posted prices instead of exclusively choosing either of the
two institutions which under certain circumstances might be benecial for the auc-
tion participants. The common view on Buyout Options in the current theoretical
literature is that they can be viewed as providing a form of insurance for risk averse
or time impatient auction participants.5 The seller can potentially increase expected
revenue by exploiting the risk aversion of bidders if their valuations indeed exceed
a properly set Buyout Price. Additionally, a risk averse seller can further benet
from the implementation of a Buyout Option since it may reduce the variance of
his revenue. Risk averse bidders on the other hand are generally not worse o¤ when
such options are being o¤ered since they can exercise the Buyout Option to be able
to achieve a positive prot instead of bearing the risk of not winning the auction
and are thus willing to pay a risk premium on the allocation of the good.
The option allowing a potential bidder to purchase the item being auctioned at
a prespecied Buyout Price instead of attempting to obtain the good through a
traditional auction procedure does therefore feature several benets for the bidders.
Amongst others, the execution of such an option allows a bidder to:6 (i) Get the
good right away (allowing the bidder to reduce costs associated with waiting for the
auction to close, which could be at some indenite time in the future), (ii) secure
an ex ante specied price (traditional bidding in an auction may be able to drive
the nal selling price above the Buyout Price), (iii) eliminate any risk of losing the
auction to a bidder with a higher willingness to pay and (iv) save monitoring costs
associated with ongoing screening of the process of the auction.
The decision on whether to execute the Buyout Option when available or bidding
in the auction instead however is a trade-o¤ for bidders: If a bidder exercises the
Buyout Option he could buy himself an early end of the auction and receiving the
good at the ex ante specied price and guaranteeing himself a positive prot. A
bidder may potentially pay less when exercising the Buyout Option than he would
have needed to when bidding in a traditional auction. At the same time though he
would run the risk of forfeiting additional prot he could have gained when instead
only participating in the traditional auction if the nal price of the good would have
been lower than the Buyout Price.
5 See Hidvégi et al. (2006).
6 See Mathews (2004).
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When a Buyout Option is exercised by a bidder, it may benet both the bidder
and the seller by terminating the auction earlier than if no such option would have
been in place. Clearly, when auction participants are time impatient or the auction
process itself is costly, than an early end of the auction is benecial. Despite these
possible obvious positive e¤ects of an early termination of the auction, Buyout
Options might at the same time adversely a¤ect seller revenue since bidders that
would have participated in the auction without a Buyout Option may be ruled out
due to the early termination of the auction. Thus, when the seller chooses to o¤er a
Buyout Option which in turn is exercised with positive probability before the regular
end of the auction, he may prevent bidders with relatively high valuations to bid for
the good and thereby lower his revenue.
When enhancing an auction by a Buyout Option, the seller can guarantee himself
a price for the good at sale which exceeds the reserve price with positive probabil-
ity. However, if the Buyout Option is being exercised by bidders, the seller could
run the risk of losing potential revenue since bidders with valuations exceeding the
Buyout Price that indeed exercise the Buyout Option would also potentially have
paid more in a traditional auction than they do when exercising the Buyout Option.
Furthermore, when bidders randomly arrive at the auction, potential bidders have
a greater likelihood of viewing the good at sale if the good is indeed posted for a
longer time instead of only a very short time.7 Therefore, intuitively the striking
question of whether such an option is in fact not reducing the sellers expected rev-
enue does arise and if it actually makes sense that a seller limits the range of possible
prices in an auction at an ex ante specied upper bound and if so, how this upper
bound should be optimally set. Moreover, Buyout Options do, when indeed being
exercised, defy the benets of auctions in that they eliminate the dynamic pricing
mechanism that is being credited with the merit of ultimately being an e¢ cient way
of economic transactions.
As it has been remarked, when Buyout Options are in place, besides the fact that
the seller has to bear some loss of revenue, the nal outcome of an auction is in-
e¢ cient with positive probability. Thus, special attention must be turned to the
possibility of allocative ine¢ ciency that may be induced by the enhancement of an
auction by such an option. A Buyout Option allows any given bidder to buy the
good immediately and thereby ruling out all other bidders. Suppose the Buyout Op-
tion is being exercised by a bidder whose valuation for the good is not the highest
among all bidders participating in the auction. Then, the outcome of the auction is
7 See McAfee and McMillan (1987), Gilkeson and Reynolds (2003) and Song and Baker (2007).
31
ine¢ cient, since the bidder who most values the good would not win. If the seller
had instead chosen not to o¤er a Buyout Option, the auction would have been won
by the bidder with the highest valuation which would have been an e¢ cient result.
Thus, by facilitating ine¢ cient outcomes, Buyout Options may purge one of the key
advantages of auction mechanisms, that is, allocative e¢ ciency.
Buyout Options however may reduce the probability of collusion amongst bidders by
creating incentives for bidders to cheat on any agreement when their payo¤ from in-
deed exercising the option strictly exceeds the gains they could obtain by colluding.
Similarly, Buyout Options may diminish bid shielding because illicitly submitting
high bids becomes costly (clearly, such deceptive bids should not exceed the Buyout
Price). Bidders that could have been ruled out when bid shields were present can
then still successfully participate in an auction. In addition, bid sniping may be
eliminated when an auction is ended at an early stage when the Buyout Option is
being executed before the predetermined conclusion of the bidding period. While
the enhancement of an auction by a Buyout Option in respect of the possibility of
strategic manipulation on the biddersside is clearly in favour of the seller, bidders
may likewise benet from such options. From the bidders perspective, an auc-
tion enhanced by a Buyout Option may likewise reduce their risk of manipulative
exposure since it allows them to elude shilling by exercising the option. These addi-
tional benets on either side of the transaction would however require the seller to
accordingly choose the Buyout Price. Thus, besides the beforehand described obvi-
ous advantages of Buyout Options, they may as well contribute to the reduction of
strategic manipulation in auctions.
The potential benets and hazards described above indicate the intriguing complex-
ity of whether Buyout Options are indeed benecial for the auction participants
and if so, how a seller would optimally choose its price. The analysis of Buyout
Options in auctions is therefore not only mathematically greatly challenging but as
well intuitively intricate.
3.2 Numerical Example
To illustrate the complex and possibly diametrically opposed benets of Buyout
Options in auctions described above, a simple numerical example of an auction
enhanced by a temporary Buyout Option is being presented hereafter.8
8 The possibility to post a reserve price is omitted to be able to solely illustrate the impacts the
sellers choice of Buyout Prices can have on the outcome of the auction.
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Assume that a seller o¤ers a single good for sale in a standard second price sealed
bid auction. Further, assume that there are three bidders (denoted A, B and C)
with individual private valuations of vA = 10, vB = 7 and vC = 3, where vi denotes
the valuation of bidder i, each of them willing to acquire the good. Suppose for
simplicity that the sellers aim is solely to maximize his expected revenue and that
individual bidderspayo¤s are i = vi   p, where p denotes the price paid if they
indeed win the auction, or zero when they do not successfully participate.
If the seller were not able to o¤er a Buyout Option, he would simply sell the good
by way of a standard second price sealed bid auction mechanism. Recall that in a
second price sealed bid auction it is a dominant strategy for every bidder to truthfully
bid his valuation. Then, bidder A would win the auction and pay a price p = 7.9
Therefore, the seller receives a revenue of 7 and bidder As payo¤ is A = 10 7 = 3.
Note that the auction outcome is e¢ cient in that the bidder who values the good
most gets it.
Now consider the case where the seller is able to o¤er a Buyout Option at price
b. The Buyout Option is only available so long as no traditional bid has been
submitted, that is, before the auction starts, and disappears if no bidder chooses to
exercise it before the commencement of the actual auction. To keep things simple,
it is assumed that any bidder with a valuation above or equal to the Buyout Price
will exercise the Buyout Option.10 Furthermore, if two or more bidders exercise the
Buyout Option, the good is randomly assigned to one of these bidders with the same
probability. Thus, if two bidders exercise the Buyout Option, they both receive the
good with probability 1
2
and when all three bidders exercise the option, they each
receive it with probability 1
3
.
Obviously, a seller would not want to o¤er a Buyout Price b = 0 since this would
amount to o¤ering the good for free. If the seller chooses a Buyout Price 0 < b  3,
all three bidders would exercise the option and the seller receives b  3. If bidder
A receives the item, his payo¤ is A = 10  b, if B wins, his payo¤ is A = 7  b
and if C is the winner, he receives C = 3   b. If the seller would instead choose
a Buyout Price 3 < b  7, bidder A and B would exercise the Buyout Option,
each of them receiving the good with probability 1
2
and gaining an expected payo¤
9 Since in a second price sealed bid auction the bidder submitting the highest bid wins the auction
and ends up paying the second highest bid submitted.
10This assumption is restrictive but helps to make the results and its implications tractable in this
numerical example. As it will be shown later in the analysis of the model in chapter 5, it is much
closer to reality to specify some threshold value depending on individual bidder valuations that
determines optimal individual bidder behaviour.
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of i = 12 (vi   b) (and the seller receives b). Note that the auction outcome is
ine¢ cient with positive probability so long as the seller chooses a Buyout Price
b  7 since the successful bidder is randomly chosen and the bidder with the highest
valuation might not win the auction.
Next, consider the case where the seller sets the Buyout Price 7 < b  10. Then,
only bidder A will exercise the Buyout Option and receive a payo¤ of A = 10  b
with probability one while the seller obtains b. In this case, the allocation of the
good is again e¢ cient. If the seller would choose a Buyout Price exceeding the
highest bidders valuation (b > 10), no bidder will exercise the Buyout Option and
the good is sold by a standard second price sealed bid auction with again bidder A
receiving the good at price p = 7 and obtaining a payo¤ of A = 3.
The results conditional on the sellers choice of the level of the Buyout Price are
summarized in Table 3:1.
Table 3.1: Auction participants welfare conditional on the Buyout Price
b Seller A B C E¢ ciency
  7 10  7 = 3 0 0 given
0 < b  3 b 13 (10  b) 13 (7  b) 13 (3  b) uncertain
3 < b  7 b 12 (10  b) 12 (7  b) 0 uncertain
7 < b  10 b 10  b 0 0 given
10 < b 7 10  7 = 3 0 0 given
As can be seen from Figure 3:1, the seller would maximize his revenue by choosing
a Buyout Price equal to the highest bidders valuation, that is b = 10. The shaded
area in Figure 3:1, depicting excess seller revenue versus the standard second price
sealed bid auction, shows that the sellers revenue is strictly higher than in the
standard second price sealed bid auction when he chooses a Buyout Price b 2 (7; 10].
This result is not surprising since extracting the highest bidders entire rent would
per denitionem maximize seller revenue. If the seller instead o¤ered a Buyout
Price lower than the second highest bidders valuation, his revenue would be strictly
lower versus the revenue he would have received when not o¤ering a Buyout Option.
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Figure 3.1: Seller revenue conditional on the Buyout Price
The seller would be indi¤erent between not o¤ering a Buyout Option and setting a
Buyout Price high enough so that no bidder will exercise the option (b > 10). The
challenge however is that the seller does not know the individual biddersvaluations
since they are private information. To enhance the auction with a Buyout Option
would therefore only be benecial to the seller if he chooses a Buyout Price exceeding
the second highest bidders valuation but at most equal to the highest bidders
valuation. Thereby it has been shown that on one hand the seller can strictly
increase his revenue by enhancing the auction with an appropriately set Buyout
Price while on the other hand losing some revenue when missing the appropriate
level of the Buyout Price.
With regard to bidderspayo¤s, only the case of the bidder with the highest valuation
is of interest since all other bidders cannot be worse o¤ when the seller o¤ers a
Buyout Option: If the seller did not enhance the auction by a Buyout Option, they
would all receive a payo¤of zero. However, when the seller chooses to o¤er a Buyout
Option, their expected payo¤may strictly rise to some positive amount. Therefore,
it is always benecial for these bidders when such an option is in place.
As depicted in Figure 3:2, if the seller sets a Buyout Price above the highest bidders
valuation (b > 10), bidder A would receive the same expected payo¤ as in the
standard second price sealed bid auction (A = 3). If the prevailing Buyout Price
would be between the second highest bidders and the highest bidders valuation, A
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Figure 3.2: Bidder As revenue conditional on the Buyout Price
would be worse o¤ since he exercises the Buyout Option and thereby reducing his
payo¤well below the level he would receive in the standard auction. However, if the
seller would instead choose a Buyout Price of at most the second highest bidders
valuation (b  7), bidder A would be better o¤ if and only if (i) the seller would
choose a Buyout Price b < 1 if b 2 (0; 3] or (ii) the seller would choose a Buyout
Price b < 4 if b 2 (3; 7].11 The shaded areas in Figure 3:2 again identify the range
of Buyout Prices that would be benecial for A. Therefore, given the assumptions
on bidder valuations, the bidder with the highest valuation would only prefer the
auction enhanced by a Buyout Option if the seller sets relatively low Buyout Prices.
It has therefore been shown that all bidders can cash in from the auction enhanced
by a Buyout Option, while their individual benets considerably depend on the price
of the option chosen by the seller.
The numerical example presented here helps to emphasize the complexity of the
problem faced by the seller as well as the possible impacts on both the allocative
e¢ ciency and bidder payo¤s. Due to the prevalent informational asymmetry, both
the seller and the bidders need to trade o¤ the o¤ering and execution respectively of
the Buyout Option given their respective level of information. It has further been
11Ad (i): Clearly, bidder A only has a higher expected payo¤ if 13 (10  b) > 3 or by rearranging, b < 1
given that the seller chooses a Buyout Price b 2 (0; 3]. Ad (ii): Analogously, bidder A s expected
payo¤ is strictly higher in the setting with a Buyout Option if 12 (10  b) > 3 or equivalently b < 4
for all b 2 (3; 7].
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shown that it can be benecial to both the seller and the bidders to enhance the
auction by a Buyout Option. However, in the example, when the seller chooses a
Buyout Price that strictly increases his revenue, the other side of the transaction
is worse o¤ since then the bidder exercising the Buyout Option has a strictly lower
payo¤than in the auction without a Buyout Option (while the other bidderspayo¤s
are una¤ected). If the seller instead chooses a Buyout Price that is benecial to
at least one bidder, this would entail a detriment of his revenue. By this simple
numerical example it has been shown while possibly favourable to one side of the
transaction, the enhancement of the auction by a Buyout Option does not necessarily
lead to a pareto improvement and might in addition lead to allocative ine¢ ciency,
which are both critical arguments when analyzing auction mechanisms.12
3.3 Empirical Evidence for the Use of Buyout Op-
tions in Auctions
After having introduced the diverse characteristics of Buyout Options, examples of
actual implementations of such options in real world auctions are subsequently being
presented to provide empirical evidence of its widespread use. The application of
Buyout Options in online auctions has over the past few years extensively increased
its share in market transactions and has become very popular with sellers.
As it is being revealed by data gathered from eBays nancial reports over the
past few years, depicted in Figure 3:3, the share of transactions concluded by the
execution of Buyout Options has experienced a steady increase since its introduction
in the fourth quarter of the year 2000. According to eBays quarterly nancial
statements, by the end of the second quarter of 2007, xed price trading that can
primarily be related to the "Buy It Now" feature on its worldwide trading platforms,
accounted for 39% of total gross merchandise sales of USD 14.5 billion up from a
share of approximately 11% of total gross merchandise sales of USD 5.25 billion in
the second quarter of 2001.13
These data not only provide evidence that Buyout Options are indeed largely being
used at auctions on eBay but also points to its economic relevance when considering
the nominal value of goods sold by the execution of such options.
12Numerous more sophisticated models however may lead to a pareto improvement. See e.g. Mathews
and Katzman (2006) and the model that will follow later on in chapter 5.
13Gross merchandise sales are the total value of all successfully closed items between users on eBay
trading platforms. Further, note that Buyout Options were indeed already o¤ered on approximately
35% of all listings on eBay in the second quarter of 2001.
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Figure 3.3: Fixed Price Trading on eBay, 2001Q2 - 2007Q2
In the following, a brief overview on some of todays most prominent online auction
markets is given to exhibit the practical importance of Buyout Options in auction
markets and the distinctive auction formats in use.
eBay
Todays market leader for online auctions, eBay, o¤ers a range of auction formats
to sell and buy items. These are: (i) Auction-like listings, including reserve price
auctions and private auctions that follow a standard ascending price auction proce-
dure, (ii) second chance o¤ers, where sellers can under certain circumstances o¤er
the good at sale to a bidder other than the auctions actual winner, (iii) multiple
item auctions where a seller can simultaneously tender two or more identical goods
and (iv) specialty sites, where amongst others online storefronts of high-volume sell-
ers and vehicles listings can be found.14 eBay o¤ers two separate xed price format
features in auctions that allow potential buyers to get goods instantaneously at a
posted price. The rst feature is the "Buy It Now" option that enables bidders to
purchase the item without placing a competitive bid. The "Buy It Now" option
however disappears as soon as the reserve price for a good is met and is thereafter
14A comprehensive overview and description of these auction formats can be found on eBays web-
page, see www.ebay.com.
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no longer available. It is therefore a temporary Buyout Option, as preliminary dis-
cussed. The other option o¤ered is the "Best O¤er" where instead of the seller,
bidders are able to submit an o¤er specifying a price at which they are willing to
buy the good immediately.15 These o¤ers can then be accepted at the discretion
of the seller. Intuitively, these two features are very similar in that a xed price
o¤er is being made apart from traditional bidding in the auction by one side of the
transaction that can then be accepted or forfeited by the other side.
There are three distinct ways to sell multiple identical items on eBay. Closest to
the auction analyzed in the model of this thesis is the online auction-type listing. In
an online auction-type listing the seller can simultaneously o¤er multiple identical
goods in a standard multi unit uniform price auction.16 Bidders can specify both
the price they are willing to pay per unit and the number of goods they would like
to acquire.17 The winning bids at the end of the auction are determined on the basis
of the highest bids per item in decreasing order and the price paid for all items is
equal to the lowest winning bid. Thus, the price determination mechanism in this
auction format is uniform in that the prices for every individual item are the same.18
If several successful bids with the same price for an item are submitted, the bidders
who submitted their bids earlier are awarded the goods. However, eBays online
auction-type listing di¤ers in some critical ways from the model discussed in chapter
5: In the auction on eBay, bidders submit a price-quantity pair when participating in
the auction while the model assumes single unit demand. Furthermore, the auction
format employed in the model is a sealed bid auction while on eBay, it is an open
multi unit uniform price auction where bidders can observe the bidding history
during the auction and continuously alter their bidding behaviour (i.e., they can
increase their bidding price when overbid by their respective competitors). However,
this discrepancy can be disregarded for the case of multi unit open uniform price
auctions, since in such an auction it is a dominant strategy for every bidder to
truthfully bid up to his valuation so long as the nal price is being determined by
the highest losing bid.19 With regard to the price determination mechanism, in
the analysis of the model it is further assumed that price discrimination is adopted
15Best O¤ers automatically expire after 48 hours, making them limited Buyout Options with an ex
ante know expiry time.
16 eBay denotes these multi unit auctions "Dutch Auctions" in contrast to the common use of the
terminology in auction theory.
17 In multiple item listings, bidders cannot use proxy bidding to enter a maximum bid.
18 It is possible that not all winning bidders receive the entire quantity they bid for, what is referred
to as "bid rationing" in auction theory.
19 In eBays multiple online auction-type listings, winning bidders have further the right to refuse
partial quantities. That is, if a bidder wins some but not the entire quantity of goods requested,
he does not need to buy any of them and retract his bid.
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whereas eBay uses a uniform price scheme.
When instead choosing to o¤er multiple goods by way of a xed price listing, sellers
simply list their goods at a fully disclosed ex ante determined xed price. Potential
buyers can then choose the quantity they want and pay the given price. A third
way to sell multiple identical goods on eBay is by lot listings where the seller can
choose to sell a well-dened number of goods as a "lot" to a single bidder. These
lots are then being awarded to the bidder with the highest bid.
However, sellers on eBay are currently only able to enhance an auction with a Buyout
Option when o¤ering a single good. The only ways to o¤er multiple goods are thus
either by a standard multi unit uniform price auction or by a xed price listing, and
thereby not enabling the seller to use a hybris of selling mechanisms when tendering
multiple goods.
Amazon
Other than o¤ering goods on its traditional xed price online platform, sellers can
choose to sell their items by way of an open ascending price auction at Amazon.20
The Buyout Option by which bidders can call an early halt to the auction is called
"Take-It Price" at Amazon. Sellers can alter the price of the option so long as no bid
has been submitted. The option cannot be changed thereafter and remains available
until either a bidder submits a bid equal to the Take-It Price or the auction ends
and the good is awarded to the bidder with the highest bid. The Buyout Option
available on Amazon can therefore be classied as a permanent Buyout Option.
Furthermore, bidders can use "Bid-Click", a proxy bidding tool o¤ered at auctions.
At Amazon, even though the auction duration must be ex ante specied by the
seller, auctions are enhanced by the so called "Going, Going, Gone" feature that
automatically extends an auction by another 10 minutes from the time of the latest
bid submitted whenever an appropriate bid is cast in the last 10 minutes before the
closing time of an auction. Thereby, they o¤er bidders to challenge late bids which
can be benecial for the seller since the risk of potential high bids towards the end
of an auction being ruled out by an early termination of the process is reduced and
thereby abating the potential detriments of bid sniping.
In what is again called a "Dutch Auction", sellers have the possibility to simultane-
ously list multiple identical items for sale. Similar to the multiple item auctions at
eBay, bidders at Amazon can submit bids specifying both the quantity requested and
20 See www.amazon.com.
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the price they are willing to pay. Winning bidders likewise pay the lowest winning
bid and the allocation of the goods follows the level of bids successfully submitted
in decreasing order. Bid rationing is again possible if demand exceeds supply at
the nal auction price. However, unlike in the eBay auction, bidders are bound to
purchase any number of goods they successfully bid for despite the fact that they
may receive fewer units than requested. As it is the case at eBay, sellers at Amazon
currently cannot enhance multi unit auctions with a Buyout Option.
Tazbar
Tazbar o¤ers four di¤erent types of auctions.21 These are: (i) Standard auctions,
(ii) instant purchase auctions, (iii) multiple item instant purchase auctions and (iv)
combinatorial standard and instant purchase auctions. In a standard auction, bid-
ders can submit traditional bids over a period of time ex ante set by the seller with
the bidder submitting the highest bid winning the auction. The "book bids" fea-
ture allows bidders to use an agent that is de facto a proxy bidding tool, similar to
the ones o¤ered at eBay and Amazon. Furthermore, analogous to the auctions on
Amazon, an auction is automatically extended by 30 seconds if a successful bid has
been submitted in the last 30 seconds of the prespecied duration of the auction to
help preventing bid sniping. In instant purchase auctions, sellers can list goods for
a predetermined period of time at a xed price. Bidders can then choose to agree to
pay the given price and receive the good instantly and thereby ending the auction.
This type of auction could therefore rather be classied as a conventional xed price
o¤ering. The multiple item instant purchase auction allows sellers to o¤er multiple
identical goods over a specic period of time, but at a xed price. The multiple
item instant purchase auction ends when either the bidding time is over or all goods
have been sold. Thus, the notation of this type of auction is rather miserable and
misleading since it e¤ectively is a simple xed price o¤er and not an auction in
the traditional sense. What is referred to as combinatorial standard and instant
purchase auctions is actually a combination of both the standard auction and the
instant purchase auction. In this hybris of a xed price o¤ering and a traditional
auction, the seller can o¤er a Buyout Option denoted "instant purchase price" that
can be exercised by any bidder and thereby terminating the auction. The Buyout
Option disappears as soon as a bid above the reserve price has been submitted,
thereby making it a temporary Buyout Option. These instant purchase prices can
however not be used at the simultaneous sale of multiple items.
21 See www.tazbar.com.
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Tazbar furthermore o¤ers another type of auction, called wanted auctions. In a
wanted auction, a potential buyer can place an advert for a good he wishes to
acquire.22 Sellers can subsequently place o¤ers against that auction where the seller
with the lowest price wins. The auction ends as soon as either the o¤er period reaches
an end or the buyer chooses to accept an o¤er submitted. If the good is not purchased
by the buyer and remains unsold, it is being automatically moved to the instant
purchase auction section of Tazbars platform. Other potential buyers, while not
being able to place bids for the same good during the auction, can submit sealed bids
that come into e¤ect if the good is moved to the instant purchase auction, with the
highest bidder winning the good. Thereby, a system is created where, in contrast to
most other auction sites, the inclusion of the demand side as auctioneers is captured.
Furthermore, this type of auction can indeed be classied as a Dutch auction in the
traditional sense since the price starts at a high level that is subsequently being
lowered until it is eventually accepted (by the potential buyer in this specic case).
Yahoo!
The auction mechanism available on Yahoo! platforms is briey being presented
despite the fact that the US and Canada auction sites were closed down on June 16,
2007.23 Sellers at Yahoo! can as well enhance their auction by permanent Buyout
Options, called "Buy Prices". Auctions can further be endowed with an extension
feature that allows auctions to automatically continue so long as bidding is active.
On the other hand, sellers can choose what is called a "hard close time" that denes
a specic ending time of an auction. Yahoo! does o¤er an automated proxy bidding
system that can be used by bidders to let the agent bid for them. Moreover, it
is stated on Yahoo!s auction pages that sellers can choose to simultaneously o¤er
multiple identical items in a single auction. However, on all three remaining sites
still in operation, not a single multi unit auction could be observed and no further
details were disclosed on the multi unit auction format.
22These auctions are also called "Reverse Auctions" in auction theory. See Milgrom (1987a) and
Wang (1993).
23 See www.yahoo.com. The closing of these auctions sites had so far no impact on the Yahoo!
auction sites in Hong Kong, Singapore and Taiwan. Yahoo! especially deserves to be mentioned
since several authors have used its permanent Buyout Option to compare it with temporary Buyout
Options. See Lee and Ahn (2004), Reynolds and Wooders (2005) and Gupta and Gallien (2007).
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Ricardo
Ricardo o¤ers a seller to either tender his goods by a xed price o¤er, by a standard
ascending price auction or by an auction enhanced by a permanent Buyout Option.24
Obviously, if an auction is enhanced by a Buyout Option, bidders can terminate
the auction by exercising the option and receiving the good instantaneously. This
platform allows an auction to extend its prespecied duration by 5 minutes if a
successful bid has been submitted within the last 5 minutes of the auction. In the
multi item auction format available at Ricardo, sellers can o¤er multiple identical
goods for which bidders can submit bids that specify the quantity as well as the price
they are willing to pay for each good. The goods are then awarded to the bidders
submitting the highest bids. The nal price for the goods is again determined by
the lowest winning bid and identical for all winning bidders. If several identical bids
have been submitted, the bidders submitting successful bids earlier receive the goods
whilst bid rationing is possible when demand exceeds supply at the nal price. In
contrast to other auction sites described earlier, proxy bidding can be used in both
single unit and multi unit auctions. The Buyout Option in turn can only be added
in single unit auctions.
Overstock
At Overstock, sellers can enhance their auction by the "Make It Mine" feature that
is available to bidders so long as no bid has exceeded its stated reserve price, thus
a temporary Buyout Option in the traditional sense.25 If the Buyout Option is not
being exercised by any of the bidders, the good is sold by way of a standard ascending
price auction with proxy bidding. An auction at Overstock is also automatically
being extended for an additional 10 minutes if a successful bid is submitted within
10 minutes of the auction closing time. Overstock currently does not o¤er any kind
of multi item auctions where multiple goods can be simultaneously put for sale.
uBid
Sellers at uBid can choose between o¤ering goods by way of a traditional ascending
price auction, an auction enhanced by a permanent Buyout Option or by simply
posting a xed price without the possibility of competitive bidding.26 Furthermore,
24 See www.ricardo.ch.
25 See www.overstock.com. The Buyout Price at Overstock must at least be 1.5 times the auctions
reserve price.
26 See www.ubid.com.
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they can simultaneously o¤er an arbitrary amount of identical items in one single
auction. When simultaneously o¤ering multiple items in an auction, the winning
bids are determined according to the bid prices successfully submitted, the quantity
requested (where larger quantities are given precedence) and the initial bid time
(where earlier bids win).27 Successful bidders at uBid however do not pay a price
determined by the lowest winning bidder as on the other auction sites listed here,
but instead have to pay their individual price submitted in the auction. Therefore,
the multi unit auction format uses a discriminatory pricing rule. The duration of
uBid auctions are moreover being indenitely extended by 10 minutes if a successful
bid is submitted within the last 10 minutes before the end of an auction. The "Bid
up to my Maximum Bid" or "Bid Butler" feature o¤ered at most auctions allows
the bidders to submit bids by means of a proxy bidding tool instead of placing a
single bid. Bidders in the auction can buy the items immediately by executing the
"uBuy It" feature, even when multiple items are being o¤ered. Thus, it is the only
of the auction sites mentioned in this chapter that actually allows for the sale of
only part of the total supply by a permanent Buyout Option in a multi unit auction
and at the same time selling the remaining items by a traditional auction.
eBid
In contrast to uBid, the Buyout Option o¤ered at eBid, denoted "BuyNow", is only
available during the opening period of an auction before any bidding has e¤ectively
started, thus making it a temporary Buyout Option. However, the Buyout Option
can also be used for multi unit auctions, where it is likewise only available before
the rst competitive bid is being submitted. In the multi unit auction format, all
successful bidders pay the same price, which is equal to the lowest winning bid.
Proxy bidding, even though available, can only be used at single unit auctions and
does not exist when several goods are simultaneously at sale. Similar to Tazbar,
eBid further allows bidders to post a "Wanted Auction", stating their willingness to
buy a certain good for at most the posted price where the winning seller is the one
submitting the lowest price.
The di¤erent auction formats and use of Buyout Options on the auction platforms
presented beforehand are summarized in Table 3:2. As can be seen from Table 3:2,
out of the auction sites listed above, only uBid and eBid o¤er Buyout Options for
the simultaneous sale of multiple goods while uBid is the only platform that uses a
discriminatory mechanism to determine prices at its multi unit auction alternative.
27 If the total quantity of goods requested by successful bidders exceeds the number of units o¤ered,
certain bidders might receive only a partial quantity of their demand.
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Table 3.2: Use of Buyout Options in online auctions
Pricing Rule Buyout Option Buyout Option
Auction Site Uniform Discr. Temporary Permanent for Multiple Units
Amazon x x
eBay x x
eBid x x x
Overstock x
Ricardo x x
uBid x x x
Yahoo! ? x ?
Tazbar x x
Despite the fact that Buyout Options have so far only widely been o¤ered on online
based auction platforms, their potential range of application is in principle unlim-
ited. Wherever an auction is in place to market any kind of services or goods, Buyout
Options could be a valuable device to optimize the outcome of transactions, rang-
ing from business-to-business procurement auctions to business-to-consumer mar-
ketplaces providing forward auction services and from nancial market auctions to
consumer-to-consumer auctions such as auctions of art. Time will tell whether Buy-
out Options will experience a broader application on real-world auction markets.
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Chapter 4
Related Literature on Buyout
Options in Auctions
While literature on auctions is large, existing research on Buyout Options in auctions
is relatively novel and limited. The theoretical, empirical and experimental work
on Buyout Options and its key ndings completed to date is descriptively outlined
hereafter to provide a sound overview of the fundamentals the subsequent model in
chapter 5 is based on.
Lucking-Reiley (2000) was the rst to observe the use of Buyout Options in auctions
in an exhaustive survey of internet auctions that were being used as of 1999. Further
to explicitly mentioning the analysis of the consequences of enhancing an auction
by a Buyout Option, Lucking-Reiley quotes evidence that indeed the execution of
these options in online auctions is relatively frequent.
4.1 Theoretical Literature
At the outset of the theoretical literature on Buyout Options in auctions are con-
siderations of auction participantsrisk attitudes towards the acquisition and sale
of the good at stake. Recall that risk aversion on either side of the transaction is
one of the two intuitively apparent factors that may reason the enhancement of an
auction with a Buyout Option as well as its execution.
Budish and Takeyama (2001) consider an independent private values ascending price
auction for a single good where a revenue-maximizing seller faces two bidders. The
bidders may either have a high valuation or a low valuation for the good at sale
with exogenously given probabilities. While the seller does not post a reserve price,
he can enhance the auction by a permanent Buyout Option. They show that in
47
this setup a seller would only receive higher expected revenue if bidders are risk
averse while when bidders are risk neutral, the expected revenues are equivalent in
the auctions with and without a Buyout Option. They further nd that with risk
averse bidders, the sellers expected revenue in the ascending price auction with a
properly set Buyout Price can exceed that from a standard rst price sealed bid
auction. Thus, given bidder risk aversion, the Revenue Equivalence Theorem does
no longer hold, even for the case where no Buyout Option is being o¤ered.1 The
key argument for this outcome is that by reducing risk for some high value bidders,
the seller can extract a premium by o¤ering such a Buyout Option.
Reynolds andWooders (2005) extend the results presented by Budish and Takeyama
(2001) by presenting a more general model for a single unit ascending price auction
with a reserve price and a Buyout Option where bidder valuations are independently
and identically drawn from a continuous distribution. They characterize equilibrium
bidding strategies for both temporary and permanent Buyout Options. The analysis
shows that if bidders have constant absolute risk aversion, both the auction enhanced
by a temporary Buyout Option and the auction with a permanent Buyout Option are
payo¤ equivalent from the biddersperspective. Bidders having decreasing absolute
risk aversion however prefer the auction with a temporary Buyout Option while
bidders with increasing absolute risk aversion prefer the auction with a permanent
Buyout Option. They nd that if bidders are risk averse, enhancing the auction
with a Buyout Option raises expected seller revenue for a wide range of Buyout
Prices as the bidders are willing to pay a price including a risk premium rather
than bearing the risk of not winning the auction or winning the auction at an
uncertain price. If bidders are instead risk neutral, ceteris paribus, both the auction
with a temporary and a permanent Buyout Option yield the same expected seller
revenue, that is, assuming identical reserve prices and Buyout Prices. If bidders have
constant or decreasing absolute risk aversion, then the auction with a permanent
Buyout Option raises more seller revenue than the auction with a temporary Buyout
Option. Additionally, expected seller revenue is the same in the ascending price
auction without a Buyout Option as in the auctions enhanced by a Buyout Option
if the Buyout Price is set at a level such that it is not being exercised at the start
of the auction, given the same reserve price.
A model of a single unit second price sealed bid auction with a reserve price enhanced
by a permanent Buyout Option is studied by Hidvégi et al. (2006). Bidders again
have independent private valuations randomly drawn from a common cumulative
1 See also Vickrey (1961), Vickrey (1962), Reiley and Samuelson (1981) and Myerson (1981).
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distribution function. The strategy space for all bidders with a valuation above the
Buyout Price is characterized by four possible strategies, that is: (1) To tradition-
ally bid up to their valuation, (2) to keep bidding until winning the auction or an
individual bidders threshold Buyout Price is reached and then immediately exercise
the Buyout Option, (3) to conditionally bid their valuation but immediately exercise
the Buyout Option if at least one other bidder submits a bid or (4) to uncondition-
ally exercise the Buyout Option. It is being shown that there exists an equilibrium
with unique reference points where bidders with a valuation above the Buyout Price
and below the lower of the two reference points exercise the Buyout Option as soon
as the highest bid reaches a threshold price, bidders with valuations between the
reference points exercise the Buyout Option conditional on the existence of a valid
bid at least as high as the reserve price and bidders with valuations above the upper
reference point unconditionally exercise the Buyout Option. The biddersequilib-
rium threshold Buyout Prices are strictly decreasing in their valuation so that the
bidder with the highest valuation for the good will reach his threshold value rst and
thereby guaranteeing an e¢ cient outcome of the auction since such a bidder will rst
exercise the Buyout Option. Furthermore, the more risk averse a bidder, the lower
his threshold Buyout Price, thus implying that the seller can gain higher expected
prots since these bidders tend to exercise the Buyout Option earlier. Hidvégi et al.
(2006) show that risk averse bidders are not necessarily better o¤ in such an auction
with a Buyout Option since they try to reduce the risk of losing the auction by bid-
ding for the Buyout Price and therefore potentially paying more than they would in
a standard second price sealed bid auction without a Buyout Option. They prove
that when bidders are risk neutral or uniformly risk averse, their expected utility in
a second price sealed bid auction enhanced with a Buyout Option is the same as in
the standard auction without a Buyout Option if the Buyout Price is properly set
above the lower bound. In contrast, the sellers revenue is higher in the auction with
a Buyout Price when bidders are risk averse. Moreover, if the seller is risk averse,
he always prefers the auction with a Buyout Option since then his expected utility
is never lower than in the standard auction setting without a Buyout Option.
Most relevant for the subsequent analysis of a simultaneous multi unit auction en-
hanced by a Buyout Option is the Model introduced by Mathews and Katzman
(2006). Mathews and Katzman (2006) focus on the impact of risk aversion on the
part of the seller in a single unit auction with a temporary Buyout Option. In their
model, a seller o¤ers a good to risk neutral bidders in a second price sealed bid
auction enhanced by a temporary Buyout Option. A risk averse seller, regardless
of his degree of risk aversion, will always prefer being able to o¤er such a Buyout
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Option compared to the standard auction format. To maximize his expected utility,
a risk averse seller o¤ers a Buyout Option low enough so that it is being exercised
with positive probability. The auction may result in an ex ante pareto improvement
if all bidders are better o¤ when a Buyout Option is being o¤ered. However, with
positive probability there exist bidders with relatively high valuations that are worse
o¤ when the seller is able to o¤er a temporary Buyout Option and the allocation of
the good may be ine¢ cient.
Chen et al. (2006) propose a dynamic single unit ascending price auction with a
permanent Buyout Option where biddersvaluations are independently drawn from
a uniform distribution. Their study focuses on the e¤ects of sellersand biddersrisk
attitudes towards the execution of the Buyout Option. They nd that if both the
seller and the bidders are risk neutral, the seller receives the same expected revenue
when o¤ering or not o¤ering a Buyout Option. Thus in this case, the two auctions
are revenue equivalent. However, when either the seller or the bidders are risk
averse, the sellers expected utility is strictly higher when o¤ering an appropriately
set Buyout Price since it reduces the risk that both the seller and bidders face in
the bidding process. Bidders on the other hand only have a higher expected utility
if they have very high valuations despite the fact that the Buyout Option might be
benecial for them by o¤ering them an option to immediately buy the good at an
ex ante determined price. Chen et al. (2006) additionally argue that the o¤ering of
a Buyout Option increases competition amongst bidders. They further nd that the
optimal equilibrium Buyout Price is increasing in the biddersdegree of risk aversion
and at the same time decreasing in the sellers degree of risk aversion. Empirical
data from 2182 observations collected from Taiwans Yahoo! auctions furthermore
nds evidence for three testable implications of the theoretical model, namely that,
on average, (i) the transaction price of homogeneous goods is higher when an auction
is enhanced by a Buyout Option, (ii) the transaction price of a good is increasing
in its Buyout Price and (iii) the longer it takes for a good to be sold, the lower will
be its transaction price.
Klumpp and Ranger (2006) consider a single unit ascending price auction with inde-
pendent private bidder valuations enhanced with a permanent Buyout Option but
without a reserve price. They extend previous research by analyzing the auction
mechanism in a more exhaustive way, taking into account that in such auctions
bidders usually have more information available on which to condition their bidding
behaviour. In particular, they argue that in most ascending auction formats bid-
ders continuously observe how many of their competitors and at what price they
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drop out of the auction. Therefore, in equilibrium, bidders revise their threshold
Buyout Prices every time a bidder drops out of the auction making their behaviour
dependent on the history of the auction and thereby resulting in a lower likelihood
of bidders exercising the Buyout Option immediately at the start of the auction.
Thus, bidders tend to bid less aggressively in the model proposed by Klumpp and
Ranger (2006). Nevertheless, they show that with risk averse bidders, it is possible
for the seller to set a Buyout Price lower than the highest bidders valuation for
which his ex ante expected revenue is higher than in the standard auction format
without a Buyout Option.
In a simple model of an ascending price auction with independent private bidder
valuations, Jung and Kim (2004) show that a seller can strictly increase his expected
revenue when o¤ering a Buyout Option even in the case of risk neutral bidders. They
show that if biddersvaluations are drawn from a uniform distribution, the revenue
gain from employing a Buyout Option decreases in the number of potential bidders
participating in the auction. However, the model proposed by Jung and Kim (2004)
is characterized by strong limitations that make their results less signicant, even
from a theoretical point of view.
A further yet decisive alternative explanation for the existence of Buyout Options in
auctions is time impatience on either side of the transaction. If auction participants
discount the value of future transactions, it may be optimal to introduce a Buyout
Option since, on one hand, the seller may be willing to pay a premium to sell the
good early or, on the other hand, the bidders may be willing to pay a premium to
receive the good quickly.
Mathews (2004) analyzes a single unit ascending price auction with a temporary
Buyout Option that allows for the study of the impact of time discounting on both
sides of the transaction. Again, biddersvaluations are independently drawn from
a common continuous uniform distribution function and are private information.
Mathews (2004) nds a symmetric equilibrium in which the seller sets a Buyout
Price high enough so that no bidder will exercise the Buyout Option if neither the
seller nor the bidders do in fact discount future transactions. However, if the seller
is time impatient, he will choose a Buyout Price low enough so that the Buyout
Option is exercised with positive probability. Similarly, if potential bidders are
time impatient, the seller maximizes his expected revenue by choosing a Buyout
Price low enough for the Buyout Option to be exercised with positive probability,
regardless of whether the seller discounts future transactions or simply maximizes
expected revenue. Thus, by o¤ering an appropriately set Buyout Price, the seller
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can strictly increase his expected utility if time impatience exists on either side of
the transaction. Finally, allowing a time impatient seller facing bidders that are
not time impatient to o¤er a Buyout Option results in an ex post improvement
compared to the auction where the seller is not able to o¤er a Buyout Option.
Mathews (2006) presents a more generalized version of the model developed in Math-
ews (2004) by relaxing the assumption of uniformly distributed bidder valuations
in order to examine in more detail the ex ante welfare implications of auction par-
ticipants when a temporary Buyout Option is in place. It is shown that if the
seller is either risk averse or time impatient, allowing him to o¤er a Buyout Option
will increase his utility. A risk averse seller will always choose a Buyout Price low
enough so that it is being exercised with positive probability. Despite the fact that
the enhancement of the auction by a Buyout Option may reduce expected revenue,
a risk averse seller will nd the altered mechanism benecial since it reduces the
risk induced by selling the good at a lower price in a standard ascending price auc-
tion without a Buyout Option. A seller discounting future transactions will as well
choose a Buyout Price such that the Buyout Option is exercised with positive prob-
ability. Again, the Buyout Option decreases his expected revenue but potentially
allows the transaction to occur sooner and thereby increasing his utility. If however
the seller is neither risk averse nor time impatient, he will not nd it benecial to
o¤er a Buyout Option. On the other hand, when examining bidder welfare, the
impact of a temporary Buyout Option critically depends on the distribution from
which their valuations are drawn. If the auction results in an ex ante pareto im-
provement, clearly all bidders are better o¤ when the seller o¤ers a Buyout Option.
It is however possible that, again, bidders with relatively high valuations are worse
o¤ if the seller o¤ers such an option. Compared to the standard ascending price
auction mechanism, the enhancement of the auction by a Buyout Option is only
benecial whenever the probability density function is non-decreasing in bidder val-
uations. In fact, then an auction with a Buyout Option results in an ex ante pareto
improvement compared to an auction without a Buyout Option.
Gupta and Gallien (2007) compare temporary and permanent Buyout Options using
a unied modeling framework capturing the impact of the auction participantstime
sensitivity, where the utility of both the seller and bidders are being discounted by
a respective time discounting factor. They consider a monopolistic seller o¤ering
a single good in a second price auction with a time limited bidding period facing
an arrival stream of potential bidders which is not observable per se but follows a
Poisson process with a well known exogenously given constant entry rate. Bidders
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valuations are assumed to be independently drawn from a distribution with compact
support. Furthermore, all auction participants are assumed to be risk neutral. The
auction mechanism does not contain a concealed reserve price but has a minimum
required bid that is being dened by the lower bound of the distribution of bidders
valuations which thus e¤ectively corresponds to a publicly posted reserve price since
no bids below that value are being accepted. It is additionally assumed that every
bidder knows the payment that would be made by the winning bidder if the auction
would be immediately terminated subsequent to his arrival at the auction. Every
bidder has the possibility to exercise the Buyout Option at any given time between
his arrival and the end of the auction, given that the Buyout Option is still available.
The analysis and the numerical experiments presented by Gupta and Gallien (2007)
reveal that the optimal Buyout Price for the seller increases in the expected number
of bidders and in the bidderstime sensitivity while at the same time decreasing in
the sellers time sensitivity. They also suggest that in the market environment in
which their model is embedded, the value of the permanent Buyout Price maximizing
expected seller utility exceeds the Buyout Price he would choose when o¤ering a
temporary Buyout Option. They further nd that a time sensitive seller facing only
a few patient bidders should exclusively use a xed price o¤er instead while a patient
seller facing many bidders should bypass the Buyout Option and only use a regular
auction mechanism. For market environments in-between those two extremes, the
hybrid use of an auction and a xed price o¤er in the form of a Buyout Option
is appropriate. The equilibrium analysis by Gupta and Gallien (2007) suggests
that when the seller o¤ers a temporary Buyout Option, the rst bidder to submit
a regular bid and not exercising the Buyout Option will do so immediately upon
his arrival. However, when o¤ering a permanent Buyout Option, bidders will only
submit regular bids shortly before the end of the auction.2 Therefore, the marginal
impact of a permanent Buyout Option relative to a temporary Buyout Option is
negative for the seller if bidding activity in the auction attracts more bidders, whilst
the relative attractiveness to o¤er a temporary Buyout Option decreases with the
expected number of bidders while it is increasing in the case of a permanent Buyout
Option. They further nd that the sellers expected revenue from the auction with
an optimally set permanent Buyout Price exceeds the expected revenue obtained in
the auction with an optimal temporary Buyout Option.
In addition to risk aversion and time impatience, other signicant transaction costs
may be associated with the participation in auctions. The impact of substantial
transaction costs that may emerge when participating in an auction can thus further
2 See bid sniping in section 2:7 of this thesis.
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explain the use and potential benets of Buyout Options in auctions.
Wang et al. (2004) examine a single unit second price sealed bid auction with a
reserve price and a temporary Buyout Option with a risk neutral seller. The bidders
whose private valuations are independently drawn from a uniform distribution have
participation costs that only incur upon submitting a feasible bid. They nd that
an increase in biddersparticipation costs can reduce the sellers expected revenue
when o¤ering the good without a Buyout Option. However, when enhancing the
auction with a Buyout Option, both the sellers expected revenue and bidder utility
can be increased versus an auction where no Buyout Option is available if bidders
participation costs are substantial since the Buyout Option reduces these costs by
making a participation protable even for bidders who might not have been able to
gain positive payo¤s in a setting without a Buyout Option.
A further argument justifying the use of Buyout Options in auctions is the idea
that sellers may use them to intertemporally optimize their revenues given that
homogeneous goods are sequentially being sold at di¤erent points in time or on
di¤erent markets. As it can be observed from many online auction sites, identical
goods are being sold at di¤erent times and in di¤erent auctions, thus reasoning the
consideration of intertemporal optimization and alternative competing markets.
In an early contribution, Lopomo (1998) studies simple sequential auctions. Even if
Buyout Options are not explicitly being mentioned, the mechanism examined can be
regarded as an auction with a permanent Buyout Option that potentially changes its
price (however it cannot increase). The seller facing risk neutral bidders is limited to
choose a sequence of increasing bid prices and non-increasing Buyout Options. It is
being shown that in the proposed setup, the seller will optimally choose a sequence
of Buyout Prices (or ask prices, in the terminology of the author) that are never
being exercised by any of the bidders to maximize his expected revenue.
Kirkegaard and Overgaard (2007) examine a dynamic environment of ascending
price auctions where multiple sellers compete to sell a single good to bidders with
multi unit demand. Their analysis thereby broadens the view to the extent that
bidders and sellers alike are aware of the fact that similar products or close sub-
stitutes might be o¤ered in the future as it can be observed in several of todays
online auction markets. They examine a model in which two homogeneous goods
are sequentially being o¤ered for sale and where sellers face bidders with indepen-
dent private valuations featuring decreasing marginal utility. A temporary Buyout
Option can only be o¤ered by the rst seller and in both auctions reserve prices are
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being ignored. If no seller chooses to o¤er a Buyout Option, the expected revenue
from the second auction is higher than in the rst auction. Both auctions follow
an ascending price mechanism in which the prices are determined by the respec-
tive highest losing bids, in their model thus by the bidders with the second highest
marginal valuations. Since bidders feature multi unit demand, the rival bidders
marginal valuations are relevant in that they lead to increasing expected revenues
due to the fact that the second highest bidder underestimates the intensity of com-
petition and consequently the bid necessary to win the second auction. If however
the rst seller chooses to o¤er a Buyout Option, he clearly has an incentive to extract
revenue from the subsequent auction by appropriately setting the Buyout Price. It
is being shown that for such a seller it is optimal to set a Buyout Price that is being
exercised with positive probability leading to an increase in his expected revenue
versus the revenue he could have gained in the standard setting without a Buyout
Option. Kirkegaard and Overgaard (2007) nd that the seller o¤ering the rst good
can always increase his revenue by introducing an appropriately set Buyout Price
whereas the second sellers revenue is adversely a¤ected as is overall revenue from
both auctions combined. Furthermore, the availability of a Buyout Option in the
rst auction in their model introduces ex post ine¢ ciency in that bidders who would
not have won a good in the standard setting can indeed win a good with positive
probability.
Lee and Ahn (2004) were the rst to analyze ascending price auctions with Buyout
Options in the presence of competing xed price markets. In their approach, bidding
in the auction or exercising the Buyout Option is not the only way to get the good
but potential bidders have the possibility to buy identical goods on alternative xed
price markets, shedding light not only on whether to bid in the auction or exercise
the Buyout Option, but also on where to buy the good. Thereby, they introduce
an outside option for all potential bidders that needs to be accounted for in the
analysis of optimal bidder and seller behaviour. Lee and Ahn (2004) examine an
ascending price auction where a risk neutral seller o¤ers a single good to multiple risk
neutral bidders with independent private valuations drawn from a standard uniform
distribution. When o¤ering a temporary Buyout Option, they nd that the seller
would optimally set the Buyout Price below the lowest available market price since
otherwise the Buyout Option would not have any e¤ect as bidders would instead
prefer buying at their outside option. Bidders will thus only exercise the Buyout
Option if it is set low enough to compensate them for the benet the seller could
expect from the bidders being engaged in participating in the auction by actively
bidding. On the other hand, they nd that when the seller o¤ers a permanent
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Buyout Option, bidders with a valuation above a certain threshold value given by
the equilibrium condition can experience a utility loss since they are compelled to
bear more risk of being outbid by bidders with a lower valuation exercising the
Buyout Option. With regard to expected seller revenue, when o¤ering either a
permanent or a temporary Buyout Option, a seller can at most gain a revenue equal
to the auction without a Buyout Option when appropriately setting the Buyout
Price. Therefore, enhancing the auction by a Buyout Option does not lead to an
increase of expected seller revenue.
Bose and Daripa (2006) focus on the role of auctions for sellers who use these in
addition to traditional xed price sales to be able to expand their market base to
potential buyers with lower valuations that might not want to buy a good at the xed
price. They examine a scenario in which bidders with valuations above a specic
threshold value drawn from a cumulative distribution function buy the good through
the posted price mechanism and buyers below the threshold valuation compete in
an auction with a temporary Buyout Option. A model with a risk neutral seller and
two ex ante symmetric risk neutral buyers with private valuations is analyzed. Bose
and Daripa (2006) nd that the optimal mechanism involves a posted price selling
followed by a second price sealed bid auction enhanced by a temporary Buyout
Option with pooling at the top of the distribution of biddersvaluations.
4.2 Empirical and Experimental Literature
Despite the increasing number of theoretical considerations of the use of Buyout
Options in auctions, empirical literature has to date been relatively sparse.
Durham et al. (2004a) conduct a eld experiment combined with data from eBay
auctions for 2001 American Eagle Silver Dollars to examine the use and execution of
temporary Buyout Options. They study the impact of bidder and seller reputation
and the level of the Buyout Price on bidder behaviour. They nd that sellers who
choose to o¤er the goods in an auction with a Buyout Option are typically sellers
with a relatively high reputation, assuming that the reputation score is a proxy for
seller experience in the market and familiarity with the auction procedure, since
it is fairly well correlated with the number of transactions completed antecedent
to the auctions observed.3 Furthermore, the probability of a Buyout Option to be
exercised increases in seller reputation and decreases in the level of the posted Buyout
3 Sellers and bidders on eBay can post comments and rankings on members they have bought from or
sold to after the conclusion of an auction. This information, along with an overall feedback score,
is then being disclosed to all members and can be regarded as an individual members reputation.
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Price. They also nd that a seller without any reputation considerably changes
bidder behaviour in that his reputation lowers the average selling price, regardless
of the presence of a Buyout Option. A reputation of zero does as well reduce the
likelihood of bidders to accept the Buyout Price. Moreover, bidder reputation is
signicant in auctions with a Buyout Option as bidders are more likely to exercise
the Buyout Option with increasing reputation likely being a result of them having
more experience and recognizing that the Buyout Option may reduce risk on their
side. Finally, the data suggest that the average price e¤ectively paid in the auctions
is positively related to seller reputation while at the same time negatively related to
bidder reputation. Additionally, the data show that, on average, the use of Buyout
Options does indeed tend to raise seller revenue. In a subsequent study, Durham
et al. (2004b) show that bidders do not always take the advantage of executing a
Buyout Option even when the Buyout Price is set below the prevailing market price.
Anderson et al. (2004) analyze data gathered from the sale of Palm Vx handheld
computers on eBay. When comparing all auctions, the probability of the sale of a
good is somewhat more likely when sellers o¤er a Buyout Option. The data reveal
that when sellers o¤er new or undamaged goods, the Buyout Prices are, on average,
higher versus the case when damaged goods are being o¤ered. Moreover, they nd
that auctions where larger quantities of the good were available have lower average
Buyout Prices and are also less likely to be determined by the execution of the
Buyout Option. With regard to the entire data set, Anderson et al. (2004) show
that the existence of a Buyout Option does not have a signicant e¤ect on the nal
sales price. However, when examining the subset of auctions that were enhanced by
a Buyout Option, when the Buyout Price was accepted by a bidder, the goods were
on average sold at higher prices and thus leading the sellers o¤ering the option to
obtain higher revenues.
Hendricks et al. (2005) use data collected from Texas Instruments TI-83 calculators
auctioned on eBay of which nearly one third o¤ered a Buyout Option. They nd
that the auctions where a Buyout Option was o¤ered on average generated more
revenue than the auctions where such an option was not in place. However, since the
auctions with a Buyout Option on average had signicantly higher reserve prices, it
is not clear whether the Buyout Option alone was accountable for the higher average
revenue.
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Ackerberg et al. (2006) develop a structural model for bidding in auctions with a
temporary Buyout Option and apply it to data collected from the sale of portable
computers on eBay. The data indicate that the average sales price does not signi-
cantly di¤er in the auctions where a Buyout Option was being o¤ered and where not.
However, seller revenue is on average higher in auctions where the Buyout Option
was indeed exercised. They further note that the information on the good provided
by the seller is less in the auctions without Buyout Options and that the average
length of the auctions with a Buyout Option is higher than in the standard setting
where sellers do not o¤er such an option. In addition, with regard to the auctions
enhanced by a Buyout Option, the proportion of auctions where bidders exercised
the Buyout Option is higher for auctions where sellers choose a higher length of the
ex ante determined duration of bidding time.
Chan et al. (2006) study the e¤ect of Buyout Prices on bidderswillingness to pay
in auctions with a permanent Buyout Option. From the data of 2322 notebook
auctions conducted on one of the largest auction sites in Korea, they nd that
by setting a Buyout Price higher than the expected price of the good, a seller
can increase bidderswillingness to pay whereas by lowering the Buyout Price he
reduces it. In their empirical analysis they show that a signicant number of sellers
set Buyout Prices that do not maximize their revenue by either setting the Buyout
Price too high or too low and claim that this suboptimality reects the sellers
misinterpretation of competition amongst the goods that are concurrently being
o¤ered at the di¤erent auctions. They further claim to o¤er a model that allows for
the derivation of an optimally set Buyout Price.
Song and Baker (2007) contribute to the empirical literature by introducing a tax-
onomy of variables exclusively controlled by the seller rather than variables under
the control of bidders. Amongst others they test if the presence of a Buyout Op-
tion is associated with lower seller revenue and, more generally, if the presence of a
Buyout Option will negatively inuence the association between the number of bids
and seller revenue. They further test whether the availability of Buyout Options has
a positive e¤ect on the association between the initial bid price and seller revenue.
By using data on 378 DVD movie auctions and 412 MP3 player auctions on eBay,
they nd that the Buyout Price is not a signicant predictor for seller revenue since
it does not provide additional value or information for bidders competing for goods
that are widely available and whose costs can be easily deducted from existing xed
price markets (such as for DVD movies and MP3 players). However, the negative
moderating e¤ects of a Buyout Option on the relationship of the number of bids
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and the nal closing price of the auction as well as the positive e¤ect of the option
on the relationship between the initial bid price and the closing price are found to
be highly signicant.
The impact of Buyout Options in online auctions with independent bidder valuations
on e¢ ciency, participant revenues and bidding behaviour is investigated by Peeters
et al. (2007). By conducting a laboratory experiment, they nd that allocative
e¢ ciency is unambiguously reduced when enhancing an auction with a temporary
Buyout Option. In contrast to a wide range of theoretical models, they show that
Buyout Options can reduce seller revenue in that it reduces the nal price of the
auction when the Buyout Option is not exercised in an environment where bidders
only know the distribution of their valuation. Their main argument is that when
bidders are uncertain about their own valuation, the Buyout Option is utilized
as an anchor for bidding behaviour in the auction. However, when bidders know
their private valuation, an overall price reduction is not a robust result and is not
conrmed by the data. They further show that bidders in the experiment were
unwilling to post bids exceeding the Buyout Price.
Grebe et al. (2006) conduct an experiment using an unchanged real world market
environment by inviting participants who already used the eBay platform to study
seller and bidder behaviour in ascending price auctions with a temporary Buyout
Option. They nd that even experienced sellers choose Buyout Prices lower than
they would optimally set to maximize revenue as well as bidders systematically
underbidding their true valuation. The reason for sellers tending to lower their
Buyout Prices is to be found in their experience, that is, after unsuccessfully o¤ering
goods in previous auctions, they reduce the Buyout Price which results in foregoing
potential revenue.
The properties of temporary Buyout Options in private and common bidder valu-
ation auctions are experimentally tested by Shariar and Wooders (2006). For the
case of pure private bidder valuations, they nd that the use of a Buyout Option
has a positive and statistically signicant e¤ect on seller revenue along with a reduc-
tion of the variance of seller revenue, thus being benecial for the seller consistent
with theoretical predictions if either the seller or bidders are risk averse. On the
other hand, in the case of common values, their results show that Buyout Prices
have a small positive though statistically insignicant e¤ect on seller revenue and
its variance.
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The survey of prevailing literature on Buyout Options in auctions given in this chap-
ter has highlighted the numerous facets that can be addressed using theoretical,
empirical as well as experimental methods. Existing literature has so far primar-
ily examined the e¤ects of risk aversion, time impatience and participation costs
of auction participants and the consideration of alternative competing markets on
the outcome of auctions enhanced with Buyout Options. The contemplated consid-
erations may justify the implementation of Buyout Options in auctions since they
may be benecial for all participants leading to a potential improvement of auction
results. At the same time however, literature suggests that despite its obvious ben-
ecial implications, the existence of Buyout Options may give rise to the possibility
of ine¢ cient auction outcomes since the goods may be allocated to bidders that do
not value them most when the options are indeed being exercised.
It further points to the fact that the topic of Buyout Options in auctions is a subject
that has not only recently attracted attention but that there still is considerable
research required to contribute to a sound comprehension of the impact such options
have on the outcome of alternative auction formats.
Moreover, the survey on existing literature indicates that single unit ascending price
and sequential single unit auctions enhanced with a Buyout Option have hitherto
predominantly and extensively been studied. Auctions in which identical goods are
simultaneously being o¤ered have so far not been discussed despite the fact that such
auctions do in fact exist in practice. The aim of the subsequent chapters is to extend
existing work on Buyout Options in auctions to the case for the simultaneous sale of
multiple goods. A multi unit Vickrey auction with discriminatory pricing enhanced
with a temporary Buyout Option where a risk averse seller simultaneously o¤ers two
identical goods to risk neutral bidders with single unit demand will be examined,
thereby making it a hopefully valuable contribution to existing literature on Buyout
Options in auctions.
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Chapter 5
The Model
5.1 Model Setup
In this section an analytical model is developed to study the optimal equilibrium
strategies of the seller and the bidders in an auction enhanced with a temporary
Buyout Option, where two homogeneous goods are simultaneously being o¤ered for
sale. The following analysis is based on the model introduced by Mathews and
Katzman (2006).
There are n + 1 ex ante symmetric risk neutral bidders (with n  3) with single
unit demand competing in a multi unit Vickrey auction with discriminatory pricing.1
Each bidder has a private valuation for the good denoted vi (with 0  vL < vH <1).
The bidders individual private valuations are drawn from a common continuous
uniform distribution function F (v) = v vL
vH vL (such that F (vL) = 0 and F (vH) = 1)
with an associated probability density function f (v) with f (v) = @F (v)
@v
= 1
vH vL 2
(0;1). If a bidder with valuation vi obtains the good in the auction at price p, his
payo¤ is vi   p; if he does not successfully participate in the auction or does not
submit a bid, he obtains a payo¤ of zero. On the other hand, a risk averse seller
with a strictly concave continuous utility function u (x) for a given realization of
revenue x (such that u (0) = 0, @u(x)
@x
> 0 and @
2u(x)
@x2
< 0 for all x > 0) o¤ers two
homogeneous goods for sale.2 Further, assume that u (x) takes the form
p
x.3
1 The particular pricing rule will be described in more detail later on in this chapter.
2 Given a distribution of realizations of revenue R (x), the expected utility for such a seller is
U (R (x)) =
R
u (x) dR (x).
3 Clearly, the necessary conditions to characterize risk aversion hold for u (x) =
p
x since @u(x)@x =
1
2
p
x
> 0 and @
2u(x)
@x2 =   14x 32 < 0 for any x > 0.
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The model is set up as a three stage sequential game, depicted in Figure 5:1:
t
Stage One Stage Two Stage Three
Seller chooses r
and B
Bidders decide on
the execution of B
Auction with r
Figure 5.1: Course of the game
In the rst stage of the game, the seller chooses a Buyout Price B along with a
reserve price r, both identically applying for the two respective homogeneous goods
at sale. Obviously, a seller will choose B  r since otherwise he would make a xed
price o¤er at a price lower than his reserve price.
In the second stage of the game, all bidders simultaneously and independently
decide on the execution of the Buyout Option at the ex ante specied Buyout Price
B. If multiple bidders exercise the Buyout Option, the goods are being awarded
randomly with each of these bidders having the same probability of receiving a
good.4 If both goods are sold in the second stage, the game ends and no further
supply is being tendered in the auction in stage three. If the game does not come
to an end after stage two, the Buyout Option expires and is no longer available to
the bidders in the subsequent stage.
If supply exceeds demand after stage two, that is, if no bidder exercises the Buyout
Option or only a single bidder exercises the Buyout Option respectively, the remain-
ing goods are being sold by way of a multi unit Vickrey auction with discriminatory
pricing with reserve price r in stage three of the game. That is, an auction only
takes place if not all goods have been sold in the second stage of the game (i.e. if at
least one good is still at sale). It is further assumed that bidders can only submit
an identical bid for both goods, that is, they cannot bid di¤erent prices for the two
goods.5 Thus, the bid they submit for either the Buyout Option or the auction
identically applies to all available goods.
Throughout it is being assumed that the exogenously given number of potential
bidders in the auction, the distribution of bidders individual valuations and the
4 If n bidders exercise the Buyout Option, each of the n bidders receives a good with probability 2n
(with n > 2). If only one or two bidders exercise the Buyout Option, they receive the good with
probability 1.
5 Throughout the discussion of the model, bids are expressed in terms of prices.
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sellers reserve price r and Buyout Price B are common knowledge. The information
asymmetry in the model therefore stems from the fact that each bidder knows his
own valuation with certainty but only knows the distribution from which the other
bidders valuations are drawn and the seller only knows the distribution of the
bidders valuations.
A special clarication is needed for the pricing rule of the goods in the model. In
the second stage of the game the seller makes a xed price o¤er at the ex ante
prespecied Buyout Price B  r. Thus, the fully disclosed Buyout Price does not
change over the course of the second stage of the game and applies for both goods
alike. However, in stage three of the game where the Buyout Option has already
expired, a discriminatory pricing mechanism is employed. The prices for the goods
auctioned in stage three of the game can potentially vary, depending on the bids
submitted.
If a single good is sold in the second stage of the game (if only a single bidder
exercises the Buyout Option), the price for the remaining good in stage three of
the game will be determined following a standard single unit second price sealed
bid auction.6 That is, if the highest and second highest bids in the auction both
exceed the reserve price, the bidder with the highest bid receives the good paying
the second highest bid (or equivalently the highest losing bid). If the highest bid
exceeds the reserve price and the second highest bid is lower than the reserve price
(or equal to it), the bidder submitting the highest bid receives the good and pays
the reserve price. If no bidder bids above the reserve price, the good is not sold and
all bidders and the seller end up receiving a payo¤ of zero.
If however no bidder exercises the Buyout Option in stage two and both goods are
being sold in the auction, the prices for the goods in stage three are determined as
follows: Denote by b1 the highest bid, by b2 the second highest bid and by b3 the
third highest bid submitted in the auction and by p1 and p2 the prices paid for the
rst and second good respectively. If b1 > r, b2 > r and b3 > r, the price for the
rst good is p1 = b2 and the price for the second good is p2 = b3. Thus, in this
case both prices for the goods exceed the reserve price (i.e., p1 > r and p2 > r). If
b1 > r, b2 > r and b3  r, the price for the rst good is p1 = b2 while the price for
the second good is p2 = r. If b1 > r, b2  r and b3  r, it will follow that p1 = r
and p2 = r if b2 = r. If however b2 < r, the second good will not be sold and the
seller receives a payo¤ of zero from the second good. If b1  r, b2  r and b3  r it
6 Note that if only a single good is being o¤ered, the multi unit Vickrey auction reduces to a standard
single unit second price auction, see section 2:5 of this thesis.
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will analogously follow that p1 = r in the event of b1 = r and p2 = r if b2 = r. The
seller will receive a payo¤ of zero if both b1 and b2 are less than the reserve price
since in that case, no good is sold in the auction.
The expected prices p1 and p2 paid in the auction if two goods are at sale can thus
be summarized as follows:
E

p1

=
8>>>>><>>>>>:
b2 if b1 > r and b2 > r
r if b1  r and b2  r
0 if b1 < r
and
E

p2

=
8>>>>><>>>>>:
b3 if b1 > r, b2 > r and b3 > r
r if b1  r, b2  r and b3  r
0 if b2 < r
Thus, if both goods are sold in stage two of the game, the sellers utility is given
by u
 
2B

. If one good is sold in stage two and one in stage three at a price ep  r
his utility is u
 
B + ep. If only one good is sold in stage two and none in stage
three, his utility simply is u
 
B

. If however both units are sold in stage three at
a price ep1  r for the rst good and at a price ep2  r for the second good, his
utility is u (ep1 + ep2). If only one good is sold in stage three at a price ep3  r, his
utility is u (ep3), and if no good is sold either in stage two or three, his utility is zero.
The exact pricing mechanism for the auction will be explained in more detail when
turning to the analysis of expected seller utility.
It has thereby been shown that in the auction, the winning bidders do not necessarily
pay the same price for the goods and that the bidder with the highest valuation ends
up paying a surplus compared to the price paid by the bidder with the second highest
valuation for the good with positive probability (that is, if the bidder submitting
the second highest bid has a valuation above the reserve price). However, since each
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bidder features single unit demand, he has no incentive to lower his bid as it could
occur if he would feature multi unit demand.7
Since the decisions of the seller and the bidders are being made sequentially, the
game can be solved recursively, starting with the bidders decision in the second and
third stage of the game on whether to execute the Buyout Option or participating in
the auction instead. Based on the ndings from the analysis of equilibrium bidder
behaviour, the decisions on the choice of a reserve price and Buyout Price faced by
the seller in stage one of the game can then subsequently be examined.
5.2 Optimal Equilibrium Bidder Behaviour
Since the model can be solved recursively by way of backward induction, in a rst
step optimal bidder behaviour in the second and third stage of the game is analyzed.
To characterize optimal bidder behaviour in the model, a symmetric equilibrium in
which each bidder follows a pure strategy needs to be computed.
Clearly only bidders with vi  r will ever consider participating in the auction. If
a bidder with vi < r were to participate in the auction, he could receive a negative
payo¤ (vi   r < 0 for all vi < r) since, upon successful participation, he would be
paying a price exceeding his valuation with positive probability depending on the
next highest bid.8 Similarly, only bidders with a valuation vi  B will ever consider
exercising the Buyout Option in stage two since otherwise they would receive a
strictly negative payo¤ with positive probability (vi   B < 0 for all vi < B). It
therefore remains to specify a pure equilibrium strategy for those bidders with vi  r
that determines under which circumstances they will exercise the Buyout Option or
rather participate in the auction in stage three. A specic threshold valuation v
needs to be found that determines optimal equilibrium bidder behaviour, that is, a
threshold value that exactly states which bidders would exercise the Buyout Option
or participate in the auction instead (where bidders with vi < v would prefer to bid
in the auction, bidders with vi = v would be indi¤erent and bidders with vi > v
would exercise the Buyout Option).
As it has been shown by Vickrey (1961) in his seminal paper in auction theory, it
is optimal for a bidder to truthfully bid his own valuation in a standard single unit
7 Indeed with multi unit demand, bidders may shade their bids, see section 2:5 of this thesis.
8 Note that at the same time, only bids at least as high as the reserve price are deemed adequate by
the seller. Thus, submitting a bid strictly lower than the reserve price has no e¤ect on the outcome
of the auction.
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second price sealed bid auction. Assume for an auction where individual bidders
payo¤s are dened as v   p that a bidder i with valuation vi  r would instead
submit a bid higher than his valuation v+i > vi.
9 If he would win the auction
(if he were the bidder with the highest bid submitted) and the next highest bid
vmax i < v
+
i (the highest losing bid) would exceed bidder is true valuation, that is
vmax i > vi, he would have to pay a price p = v
max
 i > vi guaranteeing him a strictly
negative payo¤ (vi   p < 0). If instead the bidder would submit a bid lower than
his valuation v  < vi and at the same time some other bidder would submit a bid
v i with v

 i > v
  and v i < vi, the bidder would not win the good and end up
receiving a payo¤ of zero when he could instead have overbid the highest bidder
and still gaining a positive payo¤, that is, if bidder i had instead submitted a bid
v i + " < vi (with " > 0). Bidders in single unit second price sealed bid auctions
therefore have no incentive to deviate from truthful bidding as this guarantees them
the highest possible expected payo¤. It is thus a dominant strategy for bidders in
a single unit second price sealed bid auction to bid their true valuation. The same
holds for a multi unit second price sealed bid auction or Vickrey auction with single
unit demand. In this setup, it is just as well a dominant strategy for every bidder
to truthfully bid in the auction since this will guarantee them the highest possible
expected payo¤.10 If every bidder follows this strategy, the outcome of the auction is
e¢ cient in that the bidders with the highest valuations receive the goods. Thereby,
optimal bidder behaviour for stage three of the game is given, that is, every bidder
will bid his true valuation for the good.
Expected Bidder Payo¤ from not Exercising the Buyout Option
To start with, the expected payo¤ for a bidder who does not exercise the Buyout
Option in stage two of the game and only participates in the auction in stage three
of the game is derived. For any arbitrary bidder with valuation vi, the expected
payo¤ from not exercising the Buyout Option in stage two and solely participating
in the auction in stage three is:11
9 As it has been shown, only bidders with vi  r will ever participate in the auction.
10 See Vickrey (1961).
11Recall that only bidders with a valuation at or above the reserve price participate in the auction.
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 (vi) = (vi   r)F (r)n
+
minfvi;vgZ
r
(vi   y)nF (y)n 1 f (y) dy
+(vi   r)F (r)n 1 (1  F (vi))
+
minfvi;vgZ
r
(vi   y) (n  1)F (y)n 2 f (y) (1  F (vi)) dy,
where the rst two terms combined are his expected payo¤ if he were the bidder
with the highest valuation whilst the third and fourth term combined describe his
expected payo¤ if he were the bidder with the second highest valuation, given that
all bidders follow the dominant strategy of bidding their true valuation. That is, if
any given bidder with vi were the bidder with the highest valuation and the second
highest bidders valuation were vmax i  r, he would receive a payo¤ of vi   r. If
the second highest bidders valuation would though exceed the reserve price, bidder
i would end up paying a price higher than the reserve price. If however bidder i
were the bidder with the second highest valuation, he would again pay a price equal
to the reserve price if the next highest bid would be lower than or equal to r and
a price equal to the third highest bid if it exceeded r. If bidder i had a valuation
lower than the second highest valuation he would not win a good in the auction and
receive a payo¤ of zero. It is further assumed that bidders competing in the auction
do not have additional participation costs.
 (vi) can be simplied and rewritten as:12
 (vi) = (vi  min fvi; vg)

F (min fvi; vg)n + (1  F (vi))F (min fvi; vg)n 1

+
minfvi;vgZ
r
F (y)n + (1  F (vi))F (y)n 1 dy.
12 See Appendix A:1.
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Expected Bidder Payo¤ from Exercising the Buyout Option
Having derived biddersexpected payo¤ from only actively participating in the auc-
tion in stage three, the expected payo¤ of a bidder with vi from exercising the
Buyout Option in stage two of the game can analogously be derived. Such a bid-
ders expected payo¤ is:
 (vi) =
 
vi  B
 "
2
nX
j=0
(1  F (v))j F (v)n j
1 + j

n
j

  F (v)n
#
,
where the rst multiplier is his payo¤ (the di¤erence between his valuation and the
Buyout Price) and the second multiplier is the probability with which he is awarded
a good upon exercising the Buyout Option.13 This expression can be simplied to:14
 (vi) =
 
vi  B
 2  1  F (v)n+1  (n+ 1) (1  F (v))F (v)n
(n+ 1) (1  F (v)) .
Hence, the bidders expected payo¤s when either participating in the second or
third stage of the game have been explicitly determined. In what follows, optimal
equilibrium bidder behaviour is being derived on the basis of a consideration of these
distinctive expected payo¤s.
Equilibrium Bidder Threshold Buyout Price
To characterize optimal equilibrium bidder behaviour, the expected payo¤ from ex-
ercising the Buyout Option needs to be compared with the expected payo¤ from not
exercising the Buyout Option and participating in the auction instead. Consider
therefore an equilibrium bidder with valuation vi = v. For such a bidder for a strat-
egy to characterize an equilibrium, he must receive the same expected payo¤ from
exercising or not exercising the Buyout Option. Therefore, the following condition
must hold in equilibrium:
 (v) =  (v) .
13The probability of successfully exercising the Buyout Option is the probability of receiving the
good upon execution given the probabilities of other bidders simultaneously exercising the Buyout
Option.
14 See Appendix A:2.
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Since
 (v) =
vZ
r
F (y)n + (1  F (v))F (y)n 1 dy
and
 (v) =
 
v  B 2  1  F (v)n+1  (n+ 1) (1  F (v))F (v)n
(n+ 1) (1  F (v)) ,
 (v) =  (v) can equivalently be expressed as
vZ
r
F (y)n + (1  F (v))F (y)n 1 dy
=
 
v  B 2  1  F (v)n+1  (n+ 1) (1  F (v))F (v)n
(n+ 1) (1  F (v)) .
From this equilibrium condition, for a bidder with valuation vi = v, the equilibrium
threshold Buyout Price that species optimal bidding behaviour can be explicitly
derived:
B (v; r) = v  
264
(n+1)(1 F (v))
2(1 F (v)n+1) (n+1)(1 F (v))F (v)n


vR
r
F (y)n + (1  F (v))F (y)n 1 dy
 375 .
Therefore, for a bidder with vi = v, if the seller sets a Buyout Price lower than
B (v; r), he will exercise the Buyout Option in stage two of the game. If however
the ex ante specied Buyout Price is set equal to or above his threshold value
(B  B (v; r)), he will not exercise the Buyout Option but only participate in the
auction in stage three instead.15
15 It is assumed that even though such a bidder is e¤ectively indi¤erent between exercising and not
exercising the Buyout Option if B = B (v; r), he will in that case not exercise the Buyout Option.
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To further determine optimal equilibrium bidder behaviour for any given bidder
with a valuation vi 6= v, the respective marginal expected payo¤s need to be taken
into account. The marginal expected payo¤ from not exercising the Buyout Option
for a bidder with vi is:16
@ (vi)
@vi
= F (min fvi; vg)n
+(1  F (vi))F (min fvi; vg)n 1
  (vi  min fvi; vg)F (min fvi; vg)n 1 f (vi)
 
minfvi;vgZ
r
f (vi)F (y)
n 1 dy.
Note that
@ (vi)
@vi

vi<v
= F (vi)
n + (1  F (vi))F (vi)n 1  
viZ
r
f (vi)F (y)
n 1 dy
and
@ (vi)
@vi

vi=v
= F (v)n + (1  F (v))F (v)n 1  
vZ
r
f (v)F (y)n 1 dy,
from which it follows that @(vi)
@vi

vi<v
< @(vi)
@vi

vi=v
.17
On the other hand, for such a bidder, his marginal expected payo¤ from exercising
the Buyout Option is
@ (vi)
@vi
=
2
 
1  F (v)n+1  (n+ 1) (1  F (v))F (v)n
(n+ 1) (1  F (v)) .
16 See Appendix A:3.
17 See Appendix B:1.
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For a bidder with valuation vi > v, in equilibrium his marginal expected payo¤ from
exercising the Buyout Option must exceed his marginal expected payo¤ from not
exercising the Buyout Option for him to exercise the Buyout Option. Again the case
for the equilibrium bidder with vi = v is examined, that is
@(vi)
@vi

vi=v
> @(vi)
@vi

vi=v
must hold.
Thus for such a bidder, the following condition must be fullled:
2
 
1  F (v)n+1  (n+ 1) (1  F (v))F (v)n
(n+ 1) (1  F (v))
> F (v)n + (1  F (v))F (v)n 1  
vZ
r
f (v)F (y)n 1 dy.
This condition clearly holds for all F (v) < 1.18 It therefore follows from @(vi)
@vi

vi<v
<
@(vi)
@vi

vi=v
and @(vi)
@vi

vi=v
> @(vi)
@vi

vi=v
that  (vi) >  (vi) for any bidder with vi > v
and  (vi) <  (vi) for all bidders with vi < v. Thus, a bidder with a valuation vi > v
has a higher expected payo¤ from exercising the Buyout Option while a bidder with
vi < v has a higher expected payo¤ from not exercising the Buyout Option and only
participating in the auction in stage three. Thereby the equilibrium threshold value
v has been explicitly dened that characterizes optimal bidder behaviour.
From this, the threshold equilibrium Buyout Price B (vi; r) for any bidder with vi
can be derived and is given by:
B (vi; r) = vi  
264
(n+1)(1 F (vi))
2(1 F (vi)n+1) (n+1)(1 F (vi))F (vi)n


viR
r
F (y)n + (1  F (vi))F (y)n 1 dy
 375 .
The equilibrium strategies for all bidders with vi 2 [vL; vH ] can therefore be described
as follows: Denote a bidders equilibrium strategy space by S (vi)
a
b where the super-
script a 2 fbid; no bidg describes bidding behaviour for the execution of the Buyout
Option in stage two (where "bid" implies exercising the Buyout Option and "no
bid" implies forfeiting the Buyout Option) and the subscript b 2 fbid vi; no bidg
18 See Appendix B:2.
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describes bidding behaviour for stage three of the game (where "bid" implies truth-
fully bidding his valuation and "no bid" implies not submitting any bid and thereby
not participating in the auction). Formally the optimal equilibrium strategy bS (vi)
for a bidder with a valuation vi is of the form:
bS (vi)
8>>>>><>>>>>:
S (vi)
bid
bid vi
if vi  r and B (vi; r) > B
S (vi)
no bid
bid vi
if vi  r and B (vi; r)  B
S (vi)
no bid
no bid if vi < r and B (vi; r)  B.
bS (vi) thus implies that if in stage one of the game the seller would choose a Buyout
Price B  B (vi; r), a bidder with valuation vi will never exercise the Buyout Option.
In this case, such a bidder will instead participate in the auction in stage three so long
as vi  r. If however the seller would choose to set a Buyout Price B < B (vi; r),
a bidder with vi would exercise the Buyout Option in equilibrium and waive his
participation in the auction.19 If the seller would set the Buyout Price atB = B (r; r)
every bidder with vi > r would exercise the Buyout Option (since B (r; r) = r).
Furthermore, if the seller chooses a Buyout Price B  B (vH ; r) no bidder will
exercise the Option and both goods would be sold by way of a multi unit Vickrey
auction in stage three of the game. This strategy space determines a symmetric
equilibrium since no bidder has an incentive to deviate as it will be shown hereafter.
To see that the derived equilibrium threshold Buyout Price for any bidder with vi
does indeed characterize a unique symmetric equilibrium from the strategy spacebS (vi), it must be shown that there exists no other stable equilibrium. Assume that
there was another equilibrium characterized by a threshold value ev 6= v. If ev would
indeed constitute another stable equilibrium, a bidder with vi = ev would need to
have the same expected payo¤ from both exercising and not exercising the Buyout
Option. This would imply that
19 Such a bidder would nevertheless post a bid for the auction since by executing the Buyout Option
he does not necessarily get one of the goods with probability one. However, this would not have
any impact on the outcome of the auction since if a bidder indeed exercising the Buyout Option
does not receive a good, the game ends.
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evZ
r
F (y)n + (1  F (ev))F (y)n 1 dy
=
 ev  B 2  1  F (ev)n+1  (n+ 1) (1  F (ev))F (ev)n
(n+ 1) (1  F (ev))
and thus B (ev; r) = ev  
2664
(n+1)(1 F (ev))
2(1 F (ev)n+1) (n+1)(1 F (ev))F (ev)n( evR
r
F (y)n + (1  F (ev))F (y)n 1 dy)
3775 or analogously
that B (ev; r) = B = B (v; r) (since v is characterized by B = B (v; r)), which cannot
hold due to the fact that the threshold Buyout Price is strictly increasing in v
(@B(v;r)
@v
> 0).20 Therefore B (v; r) = v  
264
(n+1)(1 F (v))
2(1 F (v)n+1) (n+1)(1 F (v))F (v)n
vR
r
F (y)n + (1  F (v))F (y)n 1 dy
 375
supports a unique symmetric equilibrium from the set of optimal strategies.
Comparative Statics of the Threshold Buyout Price
To gain further insight into optimal bidder behaviour, the ceteris paribus impact
of a change in either the underlying private valuation or the reserve price is being
analyzed.
The rst derivative of the threshold Buyout Price over a bidders private valuation
yields
@B (v; r)
@v
= 1 
264
(n+1)(1 F (v))
2(1 F (v)n+1) (n+1)(1 F (v))F (v)n


F (v)n 1  
vR
r
f (v)F (y)n 1 dy
 375
+
2666664
(n+1)f(v)
2(1 F (v)n+1) (n+1)(1 F (v))F (v)n


1  (n+1)(1 F (v))F (v)n 1[F (v)+(1 F (v))n]
2(1 F (v)n+1) (n+1)(1 F (v))F (v)n



vR
r
F (y)n + (1  F (v))F (y)n 1 dy

3777775 ,
20 See Appendix B:3.
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which is strictly positive for all F (v) < 1.21 Thus for such bidders (i.e. a bidder
with vi 2 [vL; vH)), the higher a bidders valuation the higher is his threshold Buyout
Price. This seems quite obvious since the higher a bidder values the good, the sooner
he will exercise the Buyout Option, that is, he would accept a higher Buyout Price
than if he had a lower valuation for the good. This points to the fact that if a bidder
has a relatively low valuation, his incentive to participate in the auction instead of
exercising the Buyout Option in the second stage of the game is relatively high
and such bidders would accept to bear the risk of not winning the auction even if
their valuation might exceed the posted Buyout Price and despite the fact that they
could have gained a positive payo¤when exercising the Buyout Option with positive
probability. A bidder with a comparably high valuation on the other hand is willing
to pay a higher price for the good and therefore sooner exercise the Buyout Option.
Likewise, the rst derivative of the threshold Buyout Price over the reserve price is
@B (v; r)
@r
=
(n+ 1) (1  F (v))
2
 
1  F (v)n+1  (n+ 1) (1  F (v))F (v)n
 F (r)n + (1  F (v))F (r)n 1 ,
which is strictly positive for all F (v) < 1.22 Therefore, if the seller sets a relatively
high reserve price, the Buyout Option is sooner exercised by those bidders with
a valuation still exceeding the prevailing reserve price. This results from the fact
that a successful participation in the auction in stage three of the game becomes
potentially more costly if the seller increases the reserve price (as a bidder will end
up paying more for the good if the price in the auction is indeed determined by the
reserve price).
It has therefore been shown that the threshold Buyout Price is increasing in both
the individual bidders valuation and the reserve price posted by the seller (i.e.,
@B(v;r)
@v
> 0 and @B(v;r)
@r
> 0 for F (v) < 1).
21 See Appendix B:3.
22 See Appendix B:4.
74
5.3 Optimal Equilibrium Seller Behaviour
Given optimal equilibrium bidder behaviour in stage two and three of the game, the
choice of B and r by the seller in stage one will now be derived. Since B depends
on the two variables v and r, the sellers optimization problem needs to be analyzed
as an optimal choice of v and r. Given that the seller simultaneously o¤ers two
homogeneous goods for sale, the expected joint utility from each of the individual
goods needs to be considered when computing overall expected seller utility.
Optimal Choice of B
Given that all bidders follow the equilibrium strategy described above, the expected
joint utility for a seller from o¤ering the two goods is
U (v; r) =
vHZ
v
8>>>>>>>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>:
yR
v
u (2B (v; r)) k (z) dz
+
vR
r
8>><>>:
zR
r
u (B (v; r) + q) l (q) dq
+
rR
vL
u (B (v; r) + r) l (q) dq
9>>=>>; k (z) dz
+
rR
vL
u (B (v; r)) k (z) dz
9>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>=>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>;
h (y) dy
+
vZ
r
8>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>:
yR
r
8>><>>:
zR
r
u (z + q) l (q) dq
+
rR
vL
u (z + r) l (q) dq
9>>=>>; k (z) dz
+
rR
vL
u (r) k (z) dz
9>>>>>>>>>=>>>>>>>>>;
h (y) dy,
where y is the largest, z is the second largest and q is the third largest of the
n + 1 realized bidder valuations. h (y) denotes the probability density function of
y while k (z) denotes the probability density function of z given y and l (q) the
probability density function of q given y and z. The rst term describes the sellers
expected utility if the highest of the n + 1 realized vi is above the equilibrium
threshold valuation (y > v). As it has been examined from equilibrium bidder
75
behaviour, a bidder with vi = y will then exercise the Buyout Option. If z as well
lies above the equilibrium threshold value of v, the sellers utility would accordingly
be u (2B (v; r)). However, if the second highest bidders valuation is between the
reserve price and the equilibrium threshold value, the sellers utility would either
be u (B (v; r) + q) if the third highest bidders valuation exceeds the reserve price
or u (B (v; r) + r) if q  r. If the second highest valuation is below the reserve
price, his utility simply is u (B (v; r)) since only a single good will be sold at the
Buyout Price. The second term of the sum describes the sellers expected utility if
the highest bidders valuation is at or above the reserve price but lower than the
equilibrium threshold value (in that case, even the bidder with the highest valuation
would not exercise the Buyout Option). If z exceeds the reserve price, the sellers
utility is either u (z + q) if q > r or u (z + r) if q  r, that is, the seller would
receive either an amount equal to the second and third highest valuation or the
second highest valuation and the reserve price. Finally, if only the highest bidders
valuation exceeds or is equal to the reserve price, the seller would receive r. If
y < r, the seller receives zero. The sellers expected utility E [U (v; r)] can therefore
be summarized as follows:
E [U (v; r)] =
8>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>:
u
 
2B

if y 2 (v; vH ] and z 2 (v; y]
u
 
B + q

if y 2 (v; vH ] , z 2 [r; v] and q 2 [r; z]
u
 
B + r

if y 2 (v; vH ] , z 2 [r; v] and q 2 [vL; r)
u
 
B

if y 2 (v; vH ] and z 2 [vL; r)
u (z + q) if y 2 [r; v] , z 2 [r; y] and q 2 [r; z]
u (z + r) if y 2 [r; v] , z 2 [r; y] and q 2 [vL; r)
u (r) if y 2 [r; v] and z 2 [vL; r)
0 if y 2 [vL; r).
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Substituting for h (y) = (n+ 1)F (y)n f (y), k (z) = nF (z)
n 1f(z)
F (y)n
and
l (q) = (n 1)F (q)
n 2f(q)
F (z)n 1 , and further simplifying for F (vL) = 0 and F (vH) = 1,
U (v; r) can be rewritten as:23
U (v; r) = u (2B (v; r))
vHZ
v
n (n+ 1)F (z)n 1 f (z) [1  F (z)] dz
+
vZ
r
"
u (B (v; r) + q)n (n+ 1) (n  1)
F (q)n 2 f (q) [F (v)  F (q)] [1  F (v)]
#
dq
+u (B (v; r) + r)n (n+ 1)F (r)n 1 [F (v)  F (r)] [1  F (v)]
+u (B (v; r)) (n+ 1)F (r)n [1  F (v)]
+
vZ
r
8<:
zZ
r
"
u (z + q)n (n+ 1)
 (n  1)F (q)n 2 f (q)
#
dq
9=; f (z) [F (v)  F (z)] dz
+
vZ
r
u (z + r)n (n+ 1)F (r)n 1 f (z) [F (v)  F (z)] dz
+u (r) (n+ 1)F (r)n [F (v)  F (r)] .
It is straightforward that a seller will choose a Buyout Price B > r (or v > r since
the analysis of optimal seller behaviour is in terms of choosing v) because otherwise
he would o¤er the goods at a xed price less than or equal to the reserve price,
making the reserve price redundant (since B (r; r) = r). If the seller were to choose
a Buyout Price B  B (vH ; r), no bidder would ever exercise the Buyout Option. If
it can be shown that sellers expected marginal utility from the highest type bidder
is decreasing in v ( @U(v;r)
@v

v=vH
< 0), it would follow that the seller would optimally
choose a Buyout Price strictly lower than the threshold Buyout Price for the bidder
with the highest valuation (that is, he would choose B < B (vH ; r)) since then he
could ceteris paribus increase his expected utility when lowering the Buyout Price
from B (vH ; r) to some B (vH ; r)  " (with " > 0).
23For the derivation of the respective probability density functions, see Appendix A:4. For the
derivation of U (v; r), see Appendix A:5.
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From the sellers expected utility function it follows that
@U (v; r)
@v
=
24 2@u(2B(v;r))@v @B(v;r)@v

vHR
v
n (n+ 1)F (z)n 1 f (z) [1  F (z)] dz
35
 u (2B (v; r))n (n+ 1)F (v)n 1 f (v) [1  F (v)]
+
vZ
r
"
@u(B(v;r)+q)
@v
@B(v;r)
@v
n (n+ 1) (n  1)
F (q)n 2 f (q) [F (v)  F (q)] [1  F (v)]
#
dq
+
vZ
r
"
u (B (v; r) + q)n (n+ 1) (n  1)
F (q)n 2 f (q) f (v) f1  2F (v) + F (q)g
#
dq
+
"
@u(B(v;r)+r)
@v
@B(v;r)
@v
n (n+ 1)
F (r)n 1 [F (v)  F (r)] [1  F (v)]
#
+u (B (v; r) + r)n (n+ 1)F (r)n 1 f (v) [1  2F (v) + F (r)]
+
@u (B (v; r))
@v
@B (v; r)
@v
(n+ 1)F (r)n [1  F (v)]
 u (B (v; r)) (n+ 1)F (r)n f (v)
+
vZ
r
8<:
zZ
r
"
u (z + q)n (n+ 1) (n  1)
F (q)n 2 f (q)
#
dq
9=; f (z) f (v) dz
+
vZ
r
u (z + r)n (n+ 1)F (r)n 1 f (z) f (v) dz
+u (r) (n+ 1)F (r)n f (v) .
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With regard to the highest type bidder, his marginal utility is
@U (v; r)
@v

v=vH
=  
vHZ
r
"
u (B (v; r) + q)n (n+ 1) (n  1)
F (q)n 2 f (q) [F (vH)  F (q)] f (vH)
#
dq
 u (B (v; r) + r)n (n+ 1)F (r)n 1 [F (vH)  F (r)] f (vH)
 u (B (v; r)) (n+ 1)F (r)n f (vH)
+
vHZ
r
8<:
zZ
r
"
u (z + q)n (n+ 1) (n  1)
F (q)n 2 f (q)
#
dq
9=; f (z) f (vH) dz
+
vHZ
r
u (z + r)n (n+ 1)F (r)n 1 f (z) f (vH) dz
+u (r) (n+ 1)F (r)n f (vH) .
Rearranging and substituting for F (vH) = 1 yields
@U (v; r)
@v

v=vH
=   (n+ 1) f (vH)
8>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>:
u (B (v; r))F (r)n
+
vHR
r
"
u (B (v; r) + q)n (n  1)
F (q)n 2 f (q) [1  F (q)]
#
dq
+u (B (v; r) + r)nF (r)n 1 [1  F (r)]
 
vHR
r
8>>><>>>:
26664
zR
r
u (z + q)n
 (n  1)
F (q)n 2 f (q)
37775 dq
9>>>=>>>; f (z) dz
 
vHR
r
u (z + r)nF (r)n 1 f (z) dz
 u (r)F (r)n
9>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>=>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>;
.
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Dene
A (r) = u (B (v; r))F (r)n
+
vHZ
r
u (B (v; r) + q)n (n  1)F (q)n 2 f (q) [1  F (q)] dq
+u (B (v; r) + r)nF (r)n 1 [1  F (r)]
 
vHZ
r
8<:
zZ
r
u (z + q)n (n  1)F (q)n 2 f (q) dq
9=; f (z) dz
 
vHZ
r
u (z + r)nF (r)n 1 f (z) dz   u (r)F (r)n .
Since B (vH ; r) = vH  
vHR
r
F (y)n dy, it follows that:24
A (r) = u
0@vH   vHZ
r
F (y)n dy
1AF (r)n
+
vHZ
r
u
0@vH   vHZ
r
F (y)n dy + q
1An (n  1)F (q)n 2 f (q) [1  F (q)] dq
+u
0@vH   vHZ
r
F (y)n dy + r
1AnF (r)n 1 [1  F (r)]
 
vHZ
r
8<:
zZ
r
u (z + q)n (n  1)F (q)n 2 f (q) dq
9=; f (z) dz
 
vHZ
r
u (z + r)nF (r)n 1 f (z) dz   u (r)F (r)n .
24 See Appendix A:6.
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It su¢ ces to show that A (r) > 0 for @U(v;r)
@v

v=vH
to be strictly negative for any given
value of vL  r < vH . From Figure 5:2 it can be seen that this condition clearly
holds:25
( )rA
r
Figure 5.2: A (r) for n = 3, vH = 1 and vL = 0
Since @U(v;r)
@v

v=vH
< 0, the seller will therefore optimally choose a Buyout Price
lower than the highest bidders threshold Buyout Price (B < B (vH ; r)), regardless
of his choice of r since he could thereby strictly increase his expected utility.
Optimal Choice of r
Furthermore, it can be shown that the seller will optimally choose a reserve price
lower than the reserve price he would set if he did not o¤er a Buyout Option in
stage two of the game, that is, if the two goods were auctioned by way of a standard
multi unit Vickrey auction.
25A (r) > 0 in fact holds for any given values of n, vL and vH .
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Start by noting that
@U (v; r)
@r
= (n+ 1)
8>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>:
F (r)n 1 f (r)
8>>>><>>>>:
u (B (v; r))n [1  F (v)] 
u (B (v; r) + r)n [1  F (v)]
 u (2r)n [F (v)  F (r)]
+u (r) fn [F (v)  F (r)]  F (r)g
9>>>>=>>>>;
+@B(v;r)
@r
8>>>>>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>>>>>:
2@u(2B(v;r))
@r
vHR
v
nF (z)n 1 f (z) [1  F (z)] dz
+
vR
r
264
@u(B(v;r)+q)
@r
n (n  1)
F (q)n 2 f (q)
 [F (v)  F (q)] [1  F (v)]
375 dq
+
"
@u(B(v;r)+r)
@r
nF (r)n 1
 [F (v)  F (r)] [1  F (v)]
#
+@u(B(v;r))
@r
F (r)n [1  F (v)]
9>>>>>>>>>>>>>=>>>>>>>>>>>>>;
+@u(B(v;r)+r)
@r
nF (r)n 1 [F (v)  F (r)] [1  F (v)]
+
vR
r
@u(z+r)
@r
nF (r)n 1 f (z) [F (v)  F (z)] dz
+@u(r)
@r
F (r)n [F (v)  F (r)]
9>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>=>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>;
.
As can be seen from Figure 5:3, there exists a unique r (v) for any v such that
@U(v;r)
@r
 0 for all r  r (v) and @U(v;r)
@r
< 0 for all r > r (v).26 Thus, given the
distribution of bidder valuations and the equilibrium value of v, there exists a unique
reserve price below which the sellers expected utility is increasing in r and above
which his expected utility is decreasing whilst the specic value of r (v) ceteris
paribus maximizes his expected utility.
26This in fact holds for any given values of n, vL, vH and v.
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Figure 5.3: @U(v;r)
@r
for n = 3, vH = 1, vL = 0 and v = 0:5
If the seller would not o¤er a Buyout Option but instead sell the two goods in a
standard multi unit Vickrey auction with discriminatory pricing, as preliminarily
described, his expected utility is:27
USV A (r) =
vHZ
r
8>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>:
yR
r
8>><>>:
zR
r
u (z + q) l (q) dq
+
rR
vL
u (z + r) l (q) dq
9>>=>>; k (z) dz
+
rR
vL
u (r) k (z) dz
9>>>>>>>>>=>>>>>>>>>;
h (y) dy.
Again, denote by y the largest of the n+1 realized vi and by z and q the second and
third largest of the n+ 1 realized vi given y and z respectively. Further, h (y), k (z)
and l (q) dene the probability density functions of y, z and q. Clearly, the seller
will only receive a positive expected utility if at least the highest bidders valuation
27The sellers expected utility in a standard multi unit Vickrey auction with discriminatory pricing
can easily be derived from the sellers expected utility function from the auction with a Buyout
Price by simply eliminating the expected utility he could gain from o¤ering the goods at the Buyout
Price and exchanging the delimiters of the integers for the ones e¤ective in the standard auction
mechanism.
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is drawn from [r; vH ]. If the highest bidders valuation is instead below r, the seller
would receive a utility of zero. If the highest bidders valuation is between r and
vH , his expected utility is his utility from either z + q if both the second and third
highest of the n+1 realized values of vi exceed the reserve price or from z+r if only
z is above the reserve price. If however only the highest bidders valuation would
exceed or be equal to the reserve price, the sellers expected utility is u (r) since only
one good would be sold. If not a single bidder had a valuation above the reserve
price, both goods remain unsold and the sellers utility is zero. The sellers expected
utility from a standard multi unit Vickrey auction without a Buyout Option can
therefore be summarized as follows:
E [USV A (r)] =
8>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>:
u (z + q) if y 2 [r; vH ] , z 2 [r; y] and q 2 [r; z]
u (z + r) if y 2 [r; vH ] , z 2 [r; y] and q 2 [vL; r)
u (r) if y 2 [r; vH ] and z 2 [vL; r)
0 if y 2 [vL; r)
Again, substituting for h (y) = (n+ 1)F (y)n f (y), k (z) = nF (z)
n 1f(z)
F (y)n
and l (q) =
(n 1)F (q)n 2f(q)
F (z)n 1 and for F (vL) = 0 and F (vH) = 1 yields:
28
USV A (r) =
vHZ
r
8<:
zZ
r
"
u (z + q)n (n+ 1)
 (n  1)F (q)n 2 f (q)
#
dq
9=; f (z) [1  F (z)] dz
+
vHZ
r
u (z + r)n (n+ 1)F (r)n 1 f (z) [1  F (z)] dz
+u (r) (n+ 1)F (r)n [1  F (r)] .
28 See Appendix A:7.
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In a standard multi unit Vickrey auction with discriminatory pricing, the seller
would maximize his expected utility by choosing a reserve price r that fulls the
condition @USV A(r)
@r
= 0. Therefore, the following condition must hold:
@USV A (r)
@r
=
vHZ
r
@u (z + r)
@r
n (n+ 1)F (r)
n 1 f (z) [1  F (z)] dz
 u (2r)n (n+ 1)F (r)n 1 f (r) [1  F (r)]
+
@u (r)
@r
(n+ 1)F (r)
n [1  F (r)]
+u (r) (n+ 1)F (r)
n 1 f (r) fn [1  F (r)]  F (r)g .
If @U(v;r)
@r

r=r
< 0, it will follow that a seller in the auction enhanced with a Buyout
Option would optimally choose a reserve price strictly lower than the reserve price
maximizing his expected utility in the standard auction format without a Buyout
Option (if @U(v;r)
@r

r=r
< 0, he would optimally choose a reserve price lower than r
as it has been shown above since in that case he could strictly increase his expected
utility by lowering the reserve price to some r (v)  r < r).
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When substituting the optimal reserve price from the equilibrium condition of
@USV A(r)
@r
= 0 into @U(v;r)
@r
, it follows that:
@U (v; r)
@r

r=r
=   (n+ 1)
8>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>:
nF (r)n 1 f (r) (1  F (v))
8>>><>>>:
u (r)  u (2r)
 u (B (v; r))
+u (B (v; r) + r)
9>>>=>>>;
 @B(v;r)
@r
8>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>:
264 2
@u(2B(v;r))
@r

vHR
v
"
nF (z)n 1 f (z)
 [1  F (z)]
#
dz
375
+
vR
r
266664
@u(B(v;r)+q)
@r
n (n  1)
F (q)n 2 f (q)
 [F (v)  F (q)]
 [1  F (v)]
377775 dq
+
264
@u(B(v;r)+r)
@r
nF (r)n 1
 [F (v)  F (r)]
 [1  F (v)]
375
+@u(B(v;r))
@r
F (r)n [1  F (v)]
9>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>=>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>;
 @u(B(v;r)+r)
@r
nF (r)n 1 [F (v)  F (r)] [1  F (v)]
 
vR
r
@u(z+r)
@r
nF (r)n 1 f (z) [F (v)  F (z)] dz
+@u(r)
@r
F (r)n (1  F (v))
+
vHR
r
@u(z+r)
@r
nF (r)n 1 f (z) [1  F (z)] dz
9>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>=>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>;
.
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Dene
Z (v; r)jr=r = nF (r)n 1 f (r) (1  F (v))
8><>:
u (r)  u (2r)  u (B (v; r))
+u (B (v; r) + r)
9>=>;
 @B (v; r)
@r
8>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>:
2@u(2B(v;r))
@r
vHR
v
nF (z)n 1 f (z) [1  F (z)] dz
+
vR
r
"
@u(B(v;r)+q)
@r
n (n  1)F (q)n 2 f (q)
 [F (v)  F (q)] [1  F (v)]
#
dq
+@u(B(v;r)+r)
@r
nF (r)n 1 [F (v)  F (r)] [1  F (v)]
+@u(B(v;r))
@r
F (r)n [1  F (v)]
9>>>>>>>>=>>>>>>>>;
 @u (B (v; r) + r)
@r
nF (r)n 1 [F (v)  F (r)] [1  F (v)]
 
vZ
r
@u (z + r)
@r
nF (r)n 1 f (z) [F (v)  F (z)] dz
+
@u (r)
@r
F (r)n (1  F (v))
+
vHZ
r
@u (z + r)
@r
nF (r)n 1 f (z) [1  F (z)] dz.
Thus, if Z (v; r)jr=r > 0 it will immediately follow that @U(v;r)@r

r=r
< 0.
From Figure 5:4 it can be seen that Z (v; r)jr=r is indeed strictly positive for any
given value of r < v < vH .29 Therefore, it has been shown that
@U(v;r)
@r

r=r
< 0 for
any given value of r < v < vH .
It has hence been shown that the seller will optimally choose a Buyout Price strictly
lower than the highest bidders threshold Buyout Price (B < B (vH ; r)) and at the
same time a reserve price lower than in the standard multi unit Vickrey auction
without a Buyout Option (r < r).
29 Z (v; r)jr=r > 0 in fact holds for any given values of n, vL and vH .
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Figure 5.4: Z (v; r)jr=r for n = 3, vH = 1, vL = 0 and r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Chapter 6
Discussion and Findings
Given that bidders follow the equilibrium strategy depicted above, allowing a seller
to o¤er a Buyout Option increases his expected utility, if he optimally sets the
reserve price and the Buyout Price. It is however not clear for which bidders the
enhancement of the auction by a Buyout Option would indeed be benecial. To
address this issue, the bidderswelfare of the two auctions will hereafter be examined
in detail. As it has been shown above, the seller will optimally choose a Buyout Price
lower than the threshold Buyout Price for the bidder with the highest valuation (B <
B (vH ; r)) along with a reserve price lower than the reserve price maximizing his
expected utility in a standard multi unit Vickrey auction (r < r), given all bidders
follow the equilibrium strategy bS (v). It will now be examined whether bidders have
a higher expected payo¤ from participating in the auction enhanced with a Buyout
Option or if they are better o¤ in the standard multi unit Vickrey auction where the
seller chooses a reserve price r. In doing so, the expected individual bidder payo¤s
from the auction enhanced with a Buyout Option with B < B (vH ; r) and r < r
will be compared with the respective expected individual bidder payo¤s from the
standard auction with no Buyout Option in place where the seller chooses r = r.
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Consider a bidder with valuation vi competing in a standard multi unit Vickrey
auction without a Buyout Option where the seller sets r = r. In this setting, such
a bidders expected payo¤ is given by:
 (vi) = max fvi   r; 0gF (r)n
+
maxfvi;rgZ
r
(vi   y)nF (y)n 1 f (y) dy
+max fvi   r; 0gF (r)n 1 (1  F (vi))
+
maxfvi;rgZ
r
(vi   y) (n  1) (1  F (vi))F (y)n 2 f (y) dy.
The rst two terms of the sum are his expected payo¤ if i indeed were the bidder
with the highest valuation while the third and fourth terms are his expected payo¤
if he were the bidder with the second highest valuation. If bidder i had a lower
valuation, his expected payo¤ is zero.
 (vi) can be simplied and reduced to:1
 (vi) =
maxfvi;rgZ
r
F (y)n + (1  F (vi))F (y)n 1 dy.
Next, consider an individual bidders expected payo¤when a Buyout Option is being
o¤ered. In the auction setup with a Buyout Option, as described in chapter 5, a
bidder with r  vi  v will choose not to exercise the Buyout Option but instead
bid for one good in stage three of the game. His expected payo¤ therefore is:
 (vi) =
viZ
r
F (y)n + (1  F (vi))F (y)n 1 dy.
1 See Appendix A:8.
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On the other hand, a bidder with vi > v will exercise the Buyout Option in stage
two and realize an expected payo¤ of
 (vi) =
 
vi  B (v; r)
 2  1  F (v)n+1  (n+ 1) (1  F (v))F (v)n
(n+ 1) (1  F (v)) .
Substituting for B (v; r) = v  
264
(n+1)(1 F (v))
2(1 F (v)n+1) (n+1)(1 F (v))F (v)n


vR
r
F (y)n + (1  F (v))F (y)n 1 dy
 375,  (vi)
can be rewritten as
 (vi) = (vi   v)
2
 
1  F (v)n+1  (n+ 1) (1  F (v))F (v)n
(n+ 1) (1  F (v))
+
vZ
r
F (y)n + (1  F (v))F (y)n 1 dy.
The expected payo¤s from the two auction formats will now be examined. To start
with, take any bidder with a valuation vi < r. Such a bidder will receive an expected
payo¤ of zero in both auction formats since he will not participate (in the case of
vi = r, the maximum payo¤ he could receive from successfully participating in the
auction would be zero too). He is therefore indi¤erent with regard to his choice for
either of the auction formats.
Consider now a bidder with r  vi  v. Such a bidders expected payo¤ from
participating in the auction with a Buyout Option is
 (vi) =
viZ
r
F (y)n + (1  F (vi))F (y)n 1 dy,
since he would not exercise the Buyout Option and only bid in stage three of the
game. Such a bidder would only prefer the auction enhanced by a Buyout Option
if  (vi) >  (vi).
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Therefore, the following condition must hold for such a bidder to prefer the auction
with a Buyout Option:
viZ
r
F (y)n + (1  F (vi))F (y)n 1 dy >
viZ
r
F (y)n + (1  F (vi))F (y)n 1 dy.
From r < r it follows that this condition clearly holds since the left hand side
of the inequality strictly exceeds its right hand counterpart. Thus, a bidder with
r < vi  v has a strictly higher expected payo¤ if the seller were able to o¤er a
Buyout Option, directly and solely originating form the fact that the seller would in
that case choose a reserve price strictly lower than in the auction without a Buyout
Option (r < r).
To conclude, the expected payo¤s for a bidder with vi > v are being analyzed. Recall
that such a bidder will always exercise the Buyout Option in stage two of the game
since his expected payo¤ from exercising the Buyout Option strictly exceeds his
expected payo¤ from not exercising the Buyout Option. Such a bidder would prefer
an auction enhanced by a Buyout Option to the standard auction setting without
a Buyout Option so long as his expected payo¤ from exercising the Buyout Option
is higher than his expected payo¤ if he would participate in the auction without a
Buyout Option. Dene  (vi; v) =  (vi)   (vi). Therefore,  (vi; v) > 0 must hold
for such a bidder to be better o¤ in the auction enhanced with a Buyout Option, or
equivalently:
 (vi; v) = (vi   v)
2
 
1  F (v)n+1  (n+ 1) (1  F (v))F (v)n
(n+ 1) (1  F (v))
+
vZ
r
F (y)n + (1  F (v))F (y)n 1 dy
 
viZ
r
F (y)n + (1  F (vi))F (y)n 1 dy
> 0.
Recall that when the seller were able to o¤er a Buyout Option, he would choose
r < r.
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Figure 6.1:  (vi; v) for n = 3, vH = 1, vL = 0, v = 0:7, r = 0:1 and r
From Figure 6:1 it can be seen that not for any bidder with vi > v, his expected
payo¤from the auction enhanced with a Buyout Option strictly exceeds his expected
payo¤ from the standard multi unit Vickrey auction with no Buyout Option in
place.2 There exists a unique reference point v (v) that determines which bidders
would prefer the auction with a Buyout Option: Any bidder with vi < v (v) has a
higher expected prot if the Buyout Option is in place while bidders with vi > v (v)
would prefer the standard auction without a Buyout Option (that is, for vi < v (v)
it would follow that  (vi; v) > 0 while for vi > v (v),  (vi; v) turns out to be
negative).3
The welfare implications of all auction participants are summarized in the following
Table 6:1. Since the seller will optimally choose a relatively low reserve price it turns
out that not exercising the Buyout Option and only participating in the auction in
stage three of the game is risky for some bidders. It therefore follows that bidders
have relatively high incentives to exercise the Buyout Option in stage two of the game
since the number of bidders indeed participating in the auction increases versus the
standard auction without a Buyout Option. Moreover, since the seller chooses a
Buyout Price lower than the highest bidders valuation, the Buyout Option will be
2 This in fact holds for any given values of n, vH , vL, r and v.
3 Note however that a bidder with vi = v (v) again would be indi¤erent between the two auction
formats.
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executed with positive probability. If the Buyout Option is however being exercised
by multiple bidders in stage two of the game, the bidders with the highest valuations
for the goods will not receive them with certainty resulting in ex post ine¢ ciency
with positive probability.
Table 6.1: Model welfare comparison
Expected Utility
Auction with
SVA Buyout Option Comparison
Seller USV A (r) U (v; r) U (v; r) > USV A (r)
Bidders vi  r 0 0 indifferent
r < vi  v  (vi)  (vi)  (vi) >  (vi)
v < vi  v (v)  (vi)  (vi)  (vi)   (vi)
v (v) < vi  (vi)  (vi)  (vi) <  (vi)
It has thereby been shown that an enhancement of the auction by a temporary
Buyout Option need not lead to an increase in expected interim bidder welfare
whatsoever. Bidders with relatively high valuations would prefer the auction without
a Buyout Option (that is, bidders with vi > v (v)). For all other bidders however
the expected payo¤ from the auction with a Buyout Option exceeds their expected
payo¤ from the auction where no Buyout Option is in place. The seller would at
all times strictly prefer the auction with a Buyout Option. Thus, if the auction is
enhanced by a Buyout Option, a pareto improvement may be achieved, but is not
in all cases attainable.
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Chapter 7
Conclusion
7.1 Summary
The aim of this thesis was to get a deeper understanding of the functioning of Buyout
Options in simultaneous multi unit auctions and to highlight its relevance in real
world auctions. The rst introductory chapter outlined the topic of this thesis and
stated its underlying research question and motivation.
Chapter 2 provided a brief overview on fundamental auction theory and its major
ndings. It constituted the two primary questions most relevant in the study of
auction mechanisms, that is to say, their revenue implications and allocative e¢ -
ciency. Clearly, it is generally in a sellers best interest to choose an auction format
that allows him to gain the highest possible revenue whilst in view of the bidders,
an auction that allocates the goods e¢ ciently is optimal (needless to say that bid-
ders likewise would opt for a mechanism that maximizes their payo¤). Auctions
are by their nature perceived as superior market institutions versus unpretentious
xed price markets since in their most conventional endowment, they allow for the
possibility of both an increase in expected seller revenue and allocative e¢ ciency in
comparison to traditional xed price institutions. The two most consequential nd-
ings and their key underlying assumptions for single unit auctions, i.e., the Revenue
Equivalence Theorem and the Revenue Ranking Principle, were presented as well
as a basic overview on the most common multi unit auction formats. Moreover,
the problem of strategic manipulation in auctions was addressed and its potentially
contrarian implications for both sides of the transaction were pictured.
Chapter 3 introduced the taxonomy and characteristics of Buyout Options in auc-
tions. The specic properties of such options were illustrated on the basis of their
particular duration of availability (permanent, temporary and limited Buyout Op-
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tions) as well as in relation to the dynamics of their particular price level (static
and dynamic Buyout Prices). It was shown that, from a sellers point of view, auc-
tions enhanced with a Buyout Option may increase expected revenue since sellers
can guarantee themselves a price for the good at sale that strictly exceeds the price
that would have been met by a standard auction without such an option if bidders
exercising the option would have indeed paid less in the standard auction. On the
other hand however, when a Buyout Option is exercised by any of the bidders, the
seller could run the risk of losing potential revenue if such bidders would have ended
up paying more if a Buyout Option were not in place. Similarly, the decision on the
execution of a Buyout Option or only traditionally bidding in the auction instead
is a trade-o¤ for the bidders since they could, on one hand, guarantee themselves
a strictly positive payo¤ with positive probability when exercising the option but
on the other hand bear the risk of losing gains they could have obtained when not
exercising the option if the nal price in the auction indeed would have been lower
than the Buyout Price. Furthermore, the application and increasing signicance of
Buyout Options in present-day real world auctions was highlighted in a survey of
distinguished online auction markets and a selection of auctions that have so far not
been enhanced by such options was pictured.
The aim of chapter 4 was to provide a review of existing theoretical, empirical and
experimental literature on Buyout Options in auctions. The topic has only very
recently attracted the interest of economists, due to the fact that Buyout Options
have merely been used in auctions since its inception on online auction platforms.
According to the most commonly used auction format in practice, single unit as-
cending price auctions have hitherto predominantly and extensively been studied.
At the outset of the theoretical literature on Buyout Options in auctions is the
examination of the e¤ects of auction participantsrisk attitudes on the outcome of
auctions.1 The general ndings are that when either the seller or the bidders are risk
averse, a seller may increase his expected utility when o¤ering a Buyout Option if he
appropriately sets its price. Furthermore, even bidders may benet from the avail-
ability of a Buyout Option if it allows them to strictly increase their expected utility.
When bidders can indeed benet from the execution of a Buyout Option, that is, if
they are risk averse in some way, they are willing to pay a mark-up for the alloca-
tion of the good that is perceived as a premium for reducing the risk of losing the
auction. Another alternative explanation for the use of Buyout Options in auctions
1 See Budish and Takeyama (2001), Jung and Kim (2004), Reynolds and Wooders (2005), Chen et
al. (2006), Hidvégi et al. (2006), Klumpp and Ranger (2006) and Mathews and Katzman (2006).
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is if auction participants discount the value of future transactions.2 In general, en-
hancing an auction with a Buyout Option when either side of the transaction is time
impatient may reduce overall expected seller revenue or bidder payo¤s but poten-
tially allows the transaction to occur sooner and thereby increasing their respective
utility. In addition to the considerations of risk aversion and time impatience, other
transaction costs such as biddersauction participation costs may explain the use
and potential benets of Buyout Options in auctions.3 The availability of Buyout
Options in auctions where bidders have substantial participation costs may increase
both the sellers expected revenue and the biddersexpected payo¤s by making the
auction protable for bidders who would not have participated in the auctions when
a Buyout Option would not have been in place. Moreover, Buyout Options may be
benecial for sellers when intertemporally optimizing sequential auctions of multiple
goods or taking into account the fact that homogeneous goods are being o¤ered on
alternative competing markets.4 Besides these potentially benecial implications of
Buyout Options in auctions, its existence gives however rise to the possibility of
ine¢ cient auction outcomes since the goods may be allocated to bidders that do not
value them most when bidders with the highest valuations miss out versus standard
auctions without Buyout Options. Furthermore, the Revenue Equivalence Theorem
may no longer hold when a Buyout Option is being o¤ered. A pareto improvement
is possible when enhancing an auction with a Buyout Option, it though critically
depends on the level of the Buyout Price chosen by the seller. In conclusion, chap-
ter 4 summarized existing empirical and experimental literature on such options in
auctions. The fact that the analysis and empirical insights on Buyout Options in
auctions gained to date are still relatively scarce ultimately makes its examination
a "hot topic" in auction theory.
Chapter 5 nally contributed to the existing literature by examining a simultaneous
multi unit Vickrey auction with discriminatory pricing enhanced with a temporary
Buyout Option where a risk averse seller o¤ers two homogeneous goods to an ex-
ogenously given number of bidders with single unit demand. To the best of my
knowledge, it is the rst attempt to analyze the impact of Buyout Options in simul-
taneous multi unit auctions, thereby making it a potentially valuable contribution
to auction theory in general and to the literature on Buyout Options in auctions in
particular. In a rst step, optimal equilibrium bidder behaviour was derived that ex-
plicitly species under which circumstances bidders will exercise the Buyout Option
2 See Mathews (2004), Mathews (2006) and Gupta and Gallien (2007).
3 See Wang et al. (2004).
4 See Lopomo (1998), Lee and Ahn (2004), Bose and Daripa (2006) and Kirkegaard and Overgaard
(2007).
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and when bidders would choose to only participate in the actual auction instead.
A threshold Buyout Price increasing in both an individual bidders valuation and
the auctions reserve price for any arbitrary bidder was derived that characterizes
a unique symmetric equilibrium. Subsequently, the analysis of optimal equilibrium
seller behaviour revealed that he would maximize expected utility by choosing a
Buyout Price lower than the highest bidders threshold Buyout Price along with a
reserve price lower than he would optimally choose in a standard auction without
such a Buyout Option.
Chapter 6 presented the ndings of the model analyzed in the antecedent chapter.
With regard to the welfare implications of temporary Buyout Options in the pro-
posed framework, a risk averse seller will always prefer to enhance the auction with
such an option since his expected utility strictly exceeds the utility he could expect
if he would choose to sell the goods by an auction without a Buyout Option. Bidders
to a large extent would just as well benet from the enhancement of the auction
with a temporary Buyout Option. However, it has been shown that bidders with
relatively high valuations would prefer the auction without a Buyout Option. Thus,
a pareto improvement may be achieved when enhancing the auction with a Buyout
Option but cannot be obtained in any case. Moreover, the adoption of a Buyout
Option may introduce an ex post ine¢ cient outcome of the auction since the goods
are not awarded to the bidders who value them most with certainty - an objective
that would be achieved when selling the goods by the standard auction instead.
The analysis of the model has therefore shown that similar to single unit auctions,
Buyout Options in simultaneous multi unit auctions may increase sellers expected
utility and at the same time be benecial to the bidders, ultimately endorsing its
advantageous use for a wider range of auctions in practice.
7.2 Limitations and Future Research
Amodel has been formulated that allows for the analysis of a simultaneous multi unit
auction enhanced with a temporary Buyout Option, motivated by the recent surge of
literature on such options in auctions. Equilibrium strategies for a risk averse seller
and risk neutral bidders have been characterized, using an independent private values
framework. Despite its contribution to the understanding of both the functioning
of Buyout Options in simultaneous multi unit auctions and its implications on the
outcome of such auctions, the model discussed in this thesis is subject to several
limitations. Due to the limitations of the model in this study, the conclusions that
can be drawn from its results need to be regarded as preliminary in the discussion
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of the analysis of Buyout Options in simultaneous multi unit auctions, a topic that
should be further examined, both analytically and empirically.
To start with, the assumption of independent private bidder valuations may not
seem natural for numerous real world multi unit auctions. For instance, wherever the
possibility of an ex post sale of the acquired goods from the auction or a correlation
of the individual valuations is conceded, the bidder valuations obviously have some
interdependency since a bidders payo¤ not solely depends on his private valuation
for the goods but at the same time critically depends on the subsequent resale price
that can be obtained from selling the goods at some later point in time or the
competing biddersvaluations. It could therefore be valuable to consider a common
values or interdependent values setting since numerous goods on auction markets
indeed have such components. Further to that, the seller could use a Buyout Price
to post a signal on the true value of the good that may in turn ultimately result in
higher expected seller revenue.
Additionally, more general preferences for the risk averse seller as well as the distrib-
ution of bidder valuations could be introduced to allow for more universal predictions
on the implications of such Buyout Options in simultaneous multi unit auctions. It
would be interesting if the results presented in the analysis above remain true in
such a more general setting with an arbitrary seller utility function and any random
distribution of bidder valuations.
The ndings presented in this thesis are nevertheless quite general despite the fact
that only the case for the simultaneous sale of two homogeneous goods with sin-
gle unit bidder demand has been analyzed. Clearly, the natural extension of this
work is to consider a model in which bidders feature multi unit demand and to
augment the number of goods sold. The consideration of a model with multi unit
demand would though add substantial notational and mathematical complexity to
the analysis since the biddersoptimal equilibrium behaviour will critically depend
on their marginal valuations for any additional good. Hence, when bidders feature
multi unit demand, their optimal equilibrium bidding behaviour may considerably
change depending on their respective marginal valuation, as it has been noted in
chapter 2. However, even for this case Buyout Options may possibly be benecial
for auction participants given that such options can again guarantee them a strict
increase in expected utility with positive probability. With regard to an increase
in the number of goods o¤ered in such an auction, it can be expected that, ceteris
paribus, the results will not materially change since the major modication will be
in respect of the probabilities with which bidders will receive a good upon exercising
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the Buyout Option or participating in the auction instead and their likelihood of
indeed buying a good early at the ex ante prespecied xed price. Albeit bidders
will in that case most likely have lower threshold Buyout Prices, a risk averse seller
will most likely choose a Buyout Price low enough to be exercised by some of the
bidders with positive probability if it increases his expected utility. Thus, from the
sellers perspective, he would as likely as not prefer to enhance such an auction with
a Buyout Option since he may still gain higher expected utility when optimally
choosing the Buyout Price.
The examination of entry costs to such auctions may also substantially a¤ect equilib-
rium bidder behaviour, possibly resulting in alternative outcomes. Such additional
costs imposed on potential buyers of the goods may on one hand deter them from
participating in the auction since their incentives to actively bid are clearly dimin-
ished as their expectations of positive prots deteriorates with such costs. On the
other hand however, Buyout Options could still guarantee these bidders a positive
expected payo¤ at an ex ante predetermined xed price and therefore potentially
attract more bidders to participate, evidently resulting in a possible increase in
expected seller revenue.
It is not trivial to explicitly determine the optimal Buyout Price. The analysis
given here does not claim to o¤er a recipe for an explicit numerical prediction for
the optimal Buyout Price but has instead pointed to the fact that there exists a
well-dened range for the price to be potentially benecial both for the seller and
the bidders. An unambiguous prediction allowing a seller to choose a Buyout Price
that maximizes his expected utility is only conceivable when additional assumptions
would be made which in turn may alleviate the plausibility of the model.
Since only a single type of auction has been examined in the model presented, an
examination of how the various types of alternative auction mechanisms for the
simultaneous sale of multiple goods may impact the outcome of an auction would
be enriching. Moreover, the study of the impact of Buyout Options on strategic
manipulation in auctions would be interesting.
Considering the numerous limitations of the model and the diverse range of possible
extensions, there still exists substantial need for future research on the topic of
Buyout Options in simultaneous multi unit auctions. In conclusion, a continuation
of this study, both analytically and empirically, is found to be a fruitful area for
auction theory as well as practice.
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Appendix A
Derivations for Chapters 5 and 6
A.1 Derivation of  (vi)
Following the rule of partial integration
bZ
a
f 0 (x) g (x) dx = f (x) g (x)jba  
bZ
a
f (x) g0 (x) dx,
the bidders expected payo¤ function  (vi) can be simplied by substituting for
minfvi;vgZ
r
(vi   y)nF (y)n 1 f (y) dy
= (vi  min fvi; vg)F (min fvi; vg)n   (vi   r)F (r)n +
minfvi;vgZ
r
F (y)n dy
and
minfvi;vgZ
r
(vi   y) (n  1) (1  F (vi))F (y)n 2 f (y) dy
= (vi  min fvi; vg) (1  F (vi))F (min fvi; vg)n 1
  (vi   r) (1  F (vi))F (r)n 1 +
minfvi;vgZ
r
(1  F (vi))F (y)n 1 dy.
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Therefore, it follows that
 (vi) = (vi   r)F (r)n + (vi  min fvi; vg)F (min fvi; vg)n
  (vi   r)F (r)n +
minfvi;vgZ
r
F (y)n dy + (vi   r)F (r)n 1 (1  F (vi))
+ (vi  min fvi; vg) (1  F (vi))F (min fvi; vg)n 1
  (vi   r) (1  F (vi))F (r)n 1 +
minfvi;vgZ
r
(1  F (vi))F (y)n 1 dy,
which can further be simplied to
 (vi) = (vi  min fvi; vg)

F (min fvi; vg)n + (1  F (vi))F (min fvi; vg)n 1

+
minfvi;vgZ
r
F (y)n + (1  F (vi))F (y)n 1 dy.
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A.2 Derivation of  (vi)
Solving for
 
n
j

, the term
nP
j=0
(1 F (v))jF (v)n j
1+j
 
n
j

can be extended to
nX
j=0
(1  F (v))j F (v)n j n!
(1 + j) j! (n  j)! .
Since (1 + j) j! = (j + 1)!, the term can be restated as
nX
j=0
(1  F (v))j F (v)n j n!
(j + 1)! (n  j)!
which can further be simplied by applying Newtons Binomial Formula, as follows:
According to Newtons Binomial Formula,
(a+ b)n =
nX
j=0
an jbj

n
j

= an +

n
1

an 1b+

n
2

an 2b2 + :::+ bn,
the following relation can be deducted
(a+ b)n+1 =
n+1X
j=0
an+1 jbj

n+ 1
j

= an+1 +

n+ 1
1

anb
+

n+ 1
2

an 1b2 +

n+ 1
3

an 2b3 + :::+ bn+1
from which it follows that
nP
j=0
an jbjn!
(j+1)!(n j)! can be restated as
(a+b)n+1 an+1
(n+1)b
.
Substituting F (v) for a and (1  F (v)) for b yields
nX
j=0
(1  F (v))j F (v)n j n!
(j + 1)! (n  j)! =
(F (v) + 1  F (v))n+1   F (v)n+1
(n+ 1) (1  F (v))
=
1  F (v)n+1
(n+ 1) (1  F (v)) .
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Therefore, it follows that
 (vi) =
 
vi  B
 "
2
1  F (v)n+1
(n+ 1) (1  F (v))   F (v)
n
#
or
 (vi) =
 
vi  B
 2  1  F (v)n+1  (n+ 1) (1  F (v))F (v)n
(n+ 1) (1  F (v)) .
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A.3 Derivation of @(vi)@vi
To generically determine bidders marginal utility from not exercising the Buyout
Option, a case di¤erentiation for the two cases where vi < v and vi > v is necessary
and the expected marginal payo¤ for either case must be separately analyzed.
First, consider bidders marginal utility from not exercising the Buyout Option for
all vi < v:
From  (vi) it follows that
 (vi)jvi<v =
viZ
r
F (y)n + (1  F (vi))F (y)n 1 dy.
Di¤erentiating over vi yields
@ (vi)
@vi

vi<v
= F (vi)
n + (1  F (vi))F (vi)n 1  
viZ
r
f (vi)F (y)
n 1 dy.
Next consider marginal utility from not exercising the Buyout Option for all bidders
with vi > v:
Again, from  (vi) it follows that
 (vi)jvi>v = (vi   v)

F (v)n + (1  F (vi))F (v)n 1
	
+
vZ
r
F (y)n + (1  F (vi))F (y)n 1 dy.
Di¤erentiation over vi here yields
@ (vi)
@vi

vi>v
= F (v)n + (1  F (vi))F (v)n 1
  (vi   v)F (v)n 1 f (vi) 
vZ
r
f (vi)F (y)
n 1 dy.
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Therefore, the marginal expected payo¤ for any bidder with vi 6= v can be restated
as
@ (vi)
@vi
= F (min fvi; vg)n + (1  F (vi))F (min fvi; vg)n 1
  (vi  min fvi; vg)F (min fvi; vg)n 1 f (vi) 
minfvi;vgZ
r
f (vi)F (y)
n 1 dy.
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A.4 Derivation of Probability Density Functions
To derive the distribution functions and probability density functions for the model
at hand, order statistics need to be applied. Only the details necessary are here
being presented to be able to relate to the methods used for the computation of the
results.1
Assume X1; X2; :::Xn are n random variables independently drawn from a common
continuous distribution function F (x) with a probability density function f (x). The
associated order statistics are obtained by sorting the n xis in increasing order and
denoted by X1:n; X2:n; :::; Xn:n, where Xn:n is the highest order statistic denoting the
largest of the xis.
The cumulative distribution functions for any Xi:n (1  i  n) are given by
Fi:n (x) = Pr (Xi:n < x) =
nX
r=i

n
r

F (x)r (1  F (x))n r (A.1)
and the probability density function for Xi:n (1  i  n) by
fi:n (x) =
n!
(i  1)! (n  i)!F (x)
i 1 (1  F (x))n i f (x) . (A.2)
If the population of variables is absolutely continuous, the joint probability density
function of Xi:n and Xj:n (where 1  i < j  n) is
fi;j:n (xi; xj) =
n!
(i  1)! (j   i  1)! (n  j)!F (xi)
i 1 (A.3)
 (F (xj)  F (xi))j i 1 (1  F (xj))n j f (xi) f (xj) .
1 See Balakrishnan and Gupta (1998) and Balakrishnan and Rao (1998).
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The joint probability density function of three or more variables Xi1:n; Xi2:n; :::; Xik:n
(with 1  i1 < i2 < ::: < ik  n) can be obtained from
fi1;i2;:::;ik:n (xi1 ; xi2 ; :::; xik) =
n!
(i1   1)! (i2   i1   1)!::: (n  ik)!F (xi1)
i1 1(A.4)
 (F (xi2)  F (xi1))i2 i1 1  :::
 (1  F (xik))n ik f (xi1) f (xi2) :::f (xik) .
Since the private valuation vi for any bidder i in the model is a random variable
drawn from F (v), it follows that the corresponding order statistics can be derived by
ordering the n+ 1 valuations in increasing order (v1, v2, ..., vn+1, where v1 denotes
the smallest and vn+1 the largest of these variables). Denote by V1:n+1, V2:n+1,
..., Vn+1:n+1 the order statistics where V1:n+1 is the rst order statistic denoting the
smallest and Vn+1:n+1 is the highest order statistic (or n+1th order statistic) denoting
the largest of the vis. As for the model, the cumulative distribution function is given
by F (v) and the probability density function by f (v) = @F (v)
@v
.
The cumulative distribution function of any order statistic Vi:n+1 (1  i  n + 1)
can then be derived from (A.1). Specically, the cumulative distribution functions
of Vn+1:n+1, Vn:n+1 and Vn 1:n+1 (the highest, second highest and third highest order
statistic) are
Fn+1:n+1 (v) =
n+1X
r=n+1

n+ 1
r

F (v)r (1  F (v))n+1 r
= F (v)n+1 ,
Fn:n+1 (v) =
n+1X
r=n

n+ 1
r

F (v)r (1  F (v))n+1 r
= (n+ 1)F (v)n (1  F (v)) + F (v)n+1
and
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Fn 1:n+1 (v) =
n+1X
r=n 1

n+ 1
r

F (v)r (1  F (v))n+1 r
= n (n+ 1)F (v)n 1 (1  F (v))2
+(n+ 1)F (v)n (1  F (v)) + F (v)n+1 .
Of specic interest for the model are the probability density functions to be able
to compute the sellers expected utility. The probability density function for the
largest of the n+1 realized vi (denoted y in the model) can be obtained from (A.2):
fy (y) = (n+ 1)F (y)
n f (y) .
For the joint probability density function of y and z, (A.3) can be applied:
fz (z; y) = n (n+ 1)F (z)
n 1 f (z) f (y) ,
and for the joint probability density function of y, z, and q, (A.4) is adopted, thus
fq (q; y; z) = n (n+ 1) (n  1)F (q)n 2 f (q) f (z) f (y) .
From here it follows that the probability density function of the largest of the n+1
realized vi is
h (y) = (n+ 1)F (y)n f (y) .
The probability density function of the second largest of the n+ 1 realized vi given
the realized value of the largest of the n+ 1 realized vi is
k (z) = k (z j y) = fz (z; y)
fy (y)
=
n (n+ 1)F (z)n 1 f (z) f (y)
(n+ 1)F (y)n f (y)
=
nF (z)n 1 f (z)
F (y)n
.
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Accordingly, the probability density function of the third largest of the n+1 realized
vi conditional on the largest and second largest realized vi is
l (q) = l (q j z; y) = fq (q; y; z)
fz (z; y)
=
n (n+ 1) (n  1)F (q)n 2 f (q) f (z) f (y)
n (n+ 1)F (z)n 1 f (z) f (y)
=
(n  1)F (q)n 2 f (q)
F (z)n 1
.
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A.5 Derivation of U (v; r)
Substituting h (y) = (n+ 1)F (y)n f (y), k (z) = nF (z)
n 1f(z)
F (y)n
and l (q) =
(n 1)F (q)n 2f(q)
F (z)n 1 into U (v; r) yields:
U (v; r) =
vHZ
v
8>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>:
yR
v
u (2B (v; r)) nF (z)
n 1f(z)
F (y)n
dz
+
vR
r
266666664
8>>>><>>>>:
zR
r
"
u (B (v; r) + q)
 (n 1)F (q)n 2f(q)
F (z)n 1
#
dq
+
rR
vL
"
u (B (v; r) + r)
 (n 1)F (q)n 2f(q)
F (z)n 1
#
dq
9>>>>=>>>>;
nF (z)n 1f(z)
F (y)n
377777775
dz
+
rR
vL
u (B (v; r)) nF (z)
n 1f(z)
F (y)n
dz
9>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>=>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>;
(n+ 1)F (y)n f (y) dy
+
vZ
r
8>>>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>>>:
yR
r
2666664
8>><>>:
zR
r
u (z + q) (n 1)F (q)
n 2f(q)
F (z)n 1 dq
+
rR
vL
u (z + r) (n 1)F (q)
n 2f(q)
F (z)n 1 dq
9>>=>>;
nF (z)n 1f(z)
F (y)n
3777775 dz
+
rR
vL
u (r) nF (z)
n 1f(z)
F (y)n
dz
9>>>>>>>>>>>=>>>>>>>>>>>;
(n+ 1)F (y)n f (y) dy
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or
U (v; r) =
vHZ
v
8>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>:
yR
v
u (2B (v; r))nF (z)n 1 f (z) dz
+
vR
r
8>>>><>>>>:
zR
r
"
u (B (v; r) + q) (n  1)
F (q)n 2 f (q)
#
dq
+
rR
vL
"
u (B (v; r) + r) (n  1)
F (q)n 2 f (q)
#
dq
9>>>>=>>>>;nf (z) dz
+
rR
vL
u (B (v; r))nF (z)n 1 f (z) dz
9>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>=>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>;
(n+ 1) f (y) dy
+
vZ
r
8>>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>>:
yR
r
8>>>><>>>>:
zR
r
"
u (z + q) (n  1)
F (q)n 2 f (q)
#
dq
+
rR
vL
"
u (z + r) (n  1)
F (q)n 2 f (q)
#
dq
9>>>>=>>>>;nf (z) dz
+
rR
vL
u (r)nF (z)n 1 f (z) dz
9>>>>>>>>>>=>>>>>>>>>>;
(n+ 1) f (y) dy,
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which can further be simplied to
U (v; r) = u (2B (v; r))
vHZ
v
n (n+ 1)F (z)n 1 f (z) [F (vH)  F (z)] dz
+
vZ
r
"
u (B (v; r) + q)n (n+ 1) (n  1)F (q)n 2 f (q)
 [F (v)  F (q)] [F (vH)  F (v)]
#
dq
+
"
u (B (v; r) + r)n (n+ 1)

F (r)n 1   F (vL)n 1

 [F (v)  F (r)] [F (vH)  F (v)]
#
+u (B (v; r)) [F (r)n   F (vL)n] (n+ 1) [F (vH)  F (v)]
+
vZ
r
8<:
zZ
r
"
u (z + q)n (n+ 1)
 (n  1)F (q)n 2 f (q)
#
dq
9=; f (z) [F (v)  F (z)] dz
+
264 n (n+ 1)

F (r)n 1   F (vL)n 1


vR
r
u (z + r) f (z) [F (v)  F (z)] dz
375
+u (r) (n+ 1) [F (r)n   F (vL)n] [F (v)  F (r)] .
Finally, substituting for F (vL) = 0 and F (vH) = 1 yields
U (v; r) = u (2B (v; r))
vHZ
v
n (n+ 1)F (z)n 1 f (z) [1  F (z)] dz
+
vZ
r
"
u (B (v; r) + q)n (n+ 1) (n  1)F (q)n 2
f (q) [F (v)  F (q)] [1  F (v)]
#
dq
+u (B (v; r) + r)n (n+ 1)F (r)n 1 [F (v)  F (r)] [1  F (v)]
+u (B (v; r))F (r)n (n+ 1) [1  F (v)]
+
vZ
r
8<:
zZ
r
"
u (z + q)n (n+ 1)
 (n  1)F (q)n 2 f (q)
#
dq
9=; f (z) [F (v)  F (z)] dz
+n (n+ 1)F (r)n 1
vZ
r
u (z + r) f (z) [F (v)  F (z)] dz
+u (r) (n+ 1)F (r)n [F (v)  F (r)] .
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A.6 Derivation of B (vH ; r)
From
B (v; r) = v  
264
(n+1)(1 F (v))
2(1 F (v)n+1) (n+1)(1 F (v))F (v)n


vR
r
F (y)n + (1  F (v))F (y)n 1 dy
 375
and applying the rule of Bernoully-de lHosptial (lim
x!a
f(x)
g(x)
= lim
x!a
f 0(x)
g0(x) ), thus
lim
v!vH
(n+ 1) (1  F (v))
2
 
1  F (v)n+1  (n+ 1) (1  F (v))F (v)n
= lim
v!vH
  (n+ 1) f (v)
 2 (n+ 1)F (v)n f (v)  (n+ 1)  f (v)F (v)n + (1  F (v))nF (v)n 1 f (v)
= lim
v!vH
 1
 F (v)n   (1  F (v))nF (v)n 1
= 1,
it follows that lim
v!vH
B (v; r) = vH  
vHR
r
F (y)n dy and therefore
B (vH ; r) = vH  
vHZ
r
F (y)n dy.
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A.7 Derivation of USV A (r)
When substituting h (y) = (n+ 1)F (y)n f (y), k (z) = nF (z)
n 1f(z)
F (y)n
and l (q) =
(n 1)F (q)n 2f(q)
F (z)n 1 into USV A (r) it follows that
USV A (r) =
vHZ
r
2666666666666664
8>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>:
yR
r
8>><>>:
zR
r
u (z + q) (n 1)F (q)
n 2f(q)
F (z)n 1 dq
+
rR
vL
u (z + r) (n 1)F (q)
n 2f(q)
F (z)n 1 dq
9>>=>>; nF (z)
n 1f(z)
F (y)n
dz
+
rR
vL
u (r) nF (z)
n 1f(z)
F (y)n
dz
9>>>>>>>>>=>>>>>>>>>;
 (n+ 1)F (y)n f (y)
3777777777777775
dy.
From rearranging it follows that
USV A (r) =
vHZ
r
8<:
zZ
r
"
u (z + q)n (n+ 1)
 (n  1)F (q)n 2 f (q)
#
dq
9=; f (z) [F (vH)  F (z)] dz
+
vHZ
r
"
u (z + r)n (n+ 1)

F (r)n 1   F (vL)n 1

f (z) [F (vH)  F (z)]
#
dz
+u (r) (n+ 1) [F (r)n   F (vL)n] [F (vH)  F (r)] .
Further simplifying by substituting for F (vL) = 0 and F (vH) = 1 yields
USV A (r) =
vHZ
r
8<:
zZ
r
"
u (z + q)n (n+ 1)
 (n  1)F (q)n 2 f (q)
#
dq
9=; f (z) [1  F (z)] dz
+
vHZ
r
u (z + r)n (n+ 1)F (r)n 1 f (z) [1  F (z)] dz
+u (r) (n+ 1)F (r)n [1  F (r)] .
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A.8 Derivation of  (vi)
Substituting for
maxfvi;rgZ
r
(vi   y)nF (y)n 1 f (y) dy
= (vi  max fvi; rg)F (max fvi; rg)n   (vi   r)F (r)n
+
maxfvi;rgZ
r
F (y)n dy
and
maxfvi;rgZ
r
(vi   y) (n  1) (1  F (vi))F (y)n 2 f (y) dy
= (vi  max fvi; rg)F (max fvi; rg)n 1 (1  F (vi))
  (vi   r)F (r)n 1 (1  F (vi)) +
maxfvi;rgZ
r
F (y)n 1 (1  F (vi)) dy
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into  (vi) yields
 (vi) = max fvi   r; 0gF (r)n + (vi  max fvi; rg)F (max fvi; rg)n
  (vi   r)F (r)n +
maxfvi;rgZ
r
F (y)n dy
+max fvi   r; 0g

F (r)
n 1 (1  F (vi))

+(vi  max fvi; rg)F (max fvi; rg)n 1 (1  F (vi))
  (vi   r)F (r)n 1 (1  F (vi))
+
maxfvi;rgZ
r
F (y)n 1 (1  F (vi)) dy,
which can further be simplied to
 (vi) = max fvi   r; 0gF (r)n 1 [F (r) + (1  F (vi))]
+ (vi  max fvi; rg)F (max fvi; rg)n 1 [F (max fvi; rg) + (1  F (vi))]
  (vi   r)F (r)n 1 [F (r) + (1  F (vi))]
+
maxfvi;rgZ
r
F (y)n + F (y)n 1 (1  F (vi)) dy.
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A case di¤erentiation is needed for the two cases of vi > r and vi < r:
For a bidder with vi > r,  (vi) is given by
 (vi)jvi>r =
viZ
r
F (y)n + F (y)n 1 (1  F (vi)) dy
and for a bidder with vi < r by
 (vi)jvi<r =
rZ
r
F (y)n + F (y)n 1 (1  F (vi)) dy.
Thus,  (vi) for either case can be stated as
 (vi) =
maxfvi;rgZ
r
F (y)n + (1  F (vi))F (y)n 1 dy.
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Appendix B
Mathematical Proofs for Chapters
5 and 6
B.1 Proof of @(vi)@vi

vi<v
< @(vi)@vi

vi=v
Proof. Start by noting that
@ (vi)
@vi

vi<v
= F (vi)
n + (1  F (vi))F (vi)n 1  
viZ
r
f (vi)F (y)
n 1 dy
and
@ (vi)
@vi

vi=v
= F (v)n + (1  F (v))F (v)n 1  
vZ
r
f (v)F (y)n 1 dy.
Dene (v; vi) =
@(vi)
@vi

vi=v
  @(vi)
@vi

vi<v
. Therefore it follows that
(v; vi) = F (v)
n   F (vi)n
+(1  F (v))F (v)n 1   (1  F (vi))F (vi)n 1
 
vZ
r
f (v)F (y)n 1 dy +
viZ
r
f (vi)F (y)
n 1 dy.
If it can be shown that (v; vi)jvi=v  0 and
@(v;vi)
@vi
< 0, it will follow that
@(vi)
@vi

vi<v
< @(vi)
@vi

vi=v
.
119
Start by noting that
(v; vi)jvi=v = 0.
Furthermore,
@(v; vi)
@vi
=  nF (vi)n 1 f (vi) + f (vi)F (vi)n 1
  (1  F (vi)) (n  1)F (vi)n 2 f (vi)
+
viZ
r
@f (vi)
@vi
F (y)n 1 dy + f (vi)F (vi)
n 1 ,
which equals1
@(v; vi)
@vi
=  f (vi)F (vi)n 2 [(n  2)F (vi) + (1  F (vi)) (n  1)] < 0.
It has thereby been proven that @(vi)
@vi

vi<v
< @(vi)
@vi

vi=v
.
1 Since @f(v)@v = 0 (due to the nature of the uniform distribution).
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B.2 Proof of @(vi)@vi

vi=v
> @(vi)@vi

vi=v
Proof. The condition @(vi)
@vi

vi=v
> @(vi)
@vi

vi=v
can be restated as
2
 
1  F (v)n+1  (n+ 1) (1  F (v))F (v)n
(n+ 1) (1  F (v))
 
8<:F (v)n + (1  F (v))F (v)n 1  
vZ
r
f (v)F (y)n 1 dy
9=;
> 0,
which equals
2
 
1  F (v)n+1  (n+ 1) (1  F (v))F (v)n
(n+ 1) (1  F (v))
 F (v)n 1 +
vZ
r
f (v)F (y)n 1 dy
> 0
or
1
(n+ 1) (1  F (v))
(
2
 
1  F (v)n+1  (n+ 1) (1  F (v))F (v)n
  (n+ 1) (1  F (v))F (v)n 1
)
+
vZ
r
f (v)F (y)n 1 dy
> 0.
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Dene
a (v) =
1
(n+ 1) (1  F (v)) ,
b (v) = 2
 
1  F (v)n+1  (n+ 1) (1  F (v))F (v)n
  (n+ 1) (1  F (v))F (v)n 1
and
c (v) =
vZ
r
f (v)F (y)n 1 dy.
It remains to be shown that a (v), b (v), and c (v) are positive for all F (v) < 1.
a (v) > 0 clearly holds since 1  F (v) > 0.
Next, consider b (v):
Dene
A (v) = 2
 
1  F (v)n+1  (n+ 1) (1  F (v))F (v)n   (n+ 1) (1  F (v))F (v)n 1 .
If A (vH)  0 and @A(v)v < 0 for any v < vH , it will follow that A (v) > 0 for all
F (v) < 1.
Since F (vH) = 1 it follows that
A (vH) = 2
 
1  F (vH)n+1
  (n+ 1) (1  F (vH))F (vH)n
  (n+ 1) (1  F (vH))F (vH)n 1
= 0.
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Furthermore,
@A (v)
@v
=  2 (n+ 1)F (v)n f (v)  (n+ 1) f (v)F (v)n + (1  F (v))nF (v)n 1 f (v)	
  (n+ 1) f (v)F (v)n 1 + (1  F (v)) (n  1)F (v)n 2 f (v)	
can be simplied to
@A (v)
@v
=   (n+ 1) (n  1) f (v)F (v)n 2  1  F (v)2 ,
which is negative for all F (v) < 1. Therefore, it has been proven that b (v) > 0.
c (v) > 0 since f (v) > 0 and
vR
r
F (y)n 1 dy > 0.
Since a (v) > 0, b (v) > 0 and c (v) > 0 for all F (v) < 1, it follows that a (v)b (v)
c (v) > 0 for all F (v) < 1. It has thereby been proven that @(vi)
@vi

vi=v
> @(vi)
@vi

vi=v
for all F (v) < 1.
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B.3 Proof of @B(v;r)@v > 0
Proof. The rst derivative of the threshold Buyout Price subject to v is
@B (v; r)
@v
= 1 
8>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>:
 
264
(n+1)f(v)
2(1 F (v)n+1) (n+1)(1 F (v))F (v)n


vR
r
F (y)n + (1  F (v))F (y)n 1 dy
 375
 
266666664
(n+1)(1 F (v))
2666664
 2 (n+ 1)F (v)n f (v)
+ (n+ 1)F (v)n f (v)
  (n+ 1) (1  F (v))nF (v)n 1 f (v)
3777775
[2(1 F (v)n+1) (n+1)(1 F (v))F (v)n]2


vR
r
F (y)n + (1  F (v))F (y)n 1 dy

377777775
+
26664
(n+1)(1 F (v))
2(1 F (v)n+1) (n+1)(1 F (v))F (v)n

24   vRr f (v)F (y)n 1 dy + F (v)n
+(1  F (v))F (v)n 1
35
37775
9>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>=>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>;
.
Rearranging yields
@B (v; r)
@v
= 1 
264
(n+1)(1 F (v))
2(1 F (v)n+1) (n+1)(1 F (v))F (v)n


F (v)n 1  
vR
r
f (v)F (y)n 1 dy
 375
+
2666664
(n+1)f(v)
2(1 F (v)n+1) (n+1)(1 F (v))F (v)n


1 +
(n+1)(1 F (v))[ 2F (v)n+F (v)n (1 F (v))nF (v)n 1]
2(1 F (v)n+1) (n+1)(1 F (v))F (v)n



vR
r
F (y)n + (1  F (v))F (y)n 1 dy

3777775 .
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Dene
a (v) = 1 
264
(n+1)(1 F (v))
2(1 F (v)n+1) (n+1)(1 F (v))F (v)n


F (v)n 1  
vR
r
f (v)F (y)n 1 dy
 375
and
b (v) =
2666664
(n+1)f(v)
2(1 F (v)n+1) (n+1)(1 F (v))F (v)n


1 +
(n+1)(1 F (v))[ 2F (v)n+F (v)n (1 F (v))nF (v)n 1]
2(1 F (v)n+1) (n+1)(1 F (v))F (v)n



vR
r
F (y)n + (1  F (v))F (y)n 1 dy

3777775 .
For @B(v;r)
@v
to be positive it remains to be proven that a (v) > 0 and b (v) > 0.
It will rst be shown that a (v) > 0:
a (v) = 1 
264
(n+1)(1 F (v))
2(1 F (v)n+1) (n+1)(1 F (v))F (v)n


F (v)n 1  
vR
r
f (v)F (y)n 1 dy
 375
is equal to
a (v) =
1
2
 
1  F (v)n+1  (n+ 1) (1  F (v))F (v)n

8>>><>>>:
2
 
1  F (v)n+1  (n+ 1) (1  F (v))F (v)n
  (n+ 1) (1  F (v))F (v)n 1
+(n+ 1) (1  F (v))
vR
r
f (v)F (y)n 1 dy
9>>>=>>>; .
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Note that 1
2(1 F (v)n+1) (n+1)(1 F (v))F (v)n > 0 since 
1  F (v)n+1  (n+ 1) (1  F (v))F (v)n
can be rewritten as
(1  F (v))  1 + F (v) + F (v)2 + :::+ F (v)n  (n+ 1) (1  F (v))F (v)n
= (1  F (v)) 1 + F (v) + F (v)2 + :::+ F (v)n   (n+ 1)F (v)n
= (1  F (v))
"
nX
i=0
F (v)i   (n+ 1)F (v)n
#
,
which is positive for all F (v) < 1 since
nP
i=0
F (v)i > (n+ 1)F (v)n > 0. From
here it directly follows that 2
 
1  F (v)n+1  (n+ 1) (1  F (v))F (v)n > 0 for all
F (v) < 1. Further, note that (n+ 1) (1  F (v))
vR
r
f (v)F (y)n 1 dy > 0 and that
2
 
1  F (v)n+1   (n+ 1) (1  F (v))F (v)n   (n+ 1) (1  F (v))F (v)n 1 > 0.2 It
has therefore been proven that that a (v) > 0 for all F (v) < 1.
In a second step it is being shown that b (v) > 0:
Recall that
b (v) =
2666664
(n+1)f(v)
2(1 F (v)n+1) (n+1)(1 F (v))F (v)n


1 +
(n+1)(1 F (v))[ 2F (v)n+F (v)n (1 F (v))nF (v)n 1]
2(1 F (v)n+1) (n+1)(1 F (v))F (v)n



vR
r
F (y)n + (1  F (v))F (y)n 1 dy

3777775 .
2 See Proof in Appendix B:2..
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Dene
c (v) =
(n+ 1) f (v)
2
 
1  F (v)n+1  (n+ 1) (1  F (v))F (v)n ,
d (v) = 1 +
(n+ 1) (1  F (v))  2F (v)n + F (v)n   (1  F (v))nF (v)n 1
2
 
1  F (v)n+1  (n+ 1) (1  F (v))F (v)n
and
e (v) =
vZ
r
F (y)n + (1  F (v))F (y)n 1 dy.
As it has already been shown above, c (v) > 0 for all F (v) < 1. Clearly e (v) > 0
for all F (v) < 1. What remains to be shown is that d (v) > 0 for all F (v) < 1.
Rearranging d (v) yields
d (v) =
1
2
 
1  F (v)n+1  (n+ 1) (1  F (v))F (v)n
2  1  F (v)n+1  (n+ 1) (1  F (v))F (v)n 1 f2F (v) + (1  F (v))ng	 .
Dene
g (v) = 2
 
1  F (v)n+1  (n+ 1) (1  F (v))F (v)n 1 f2F (v) + (1  F (v))ng .
For d (v) to be positive, it su¢ ces to show that g (v) > 0. If g (vH)  0 and @g(v)@v < 0
it is proven that g (v) > 0 for all v < vH .
First, note that
g (vH) = 0.
Furthermore,
@g (v)
@v
=  2 (n+ 1)F (v)n f (v)
  (n+ 1) f (v)F (v)n 2
8><>:
"
[ F (v) + (1  F (v)) (n  1)]
f2F (v) + (1  F (v))ng
#
+(1  F (v))F (v) [2  n]
9>=>;
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or by rearranging
@g (v)
@v
=  n (n+ 1) (n  1) f (v)F (v)n 2 [1  F (v)]2 < 0.
Thereby it has been proven that b (v) > 0 for all F (v) < 1.
Since a (v) > 0 and b (v) > 0 for all F (v) < 1 it follows that @B(v;r)
@v
> 0 for all
F (v) < 1. It has therefore been proven that @B(v;r)
@v
> 0 for all F (v) < 1.
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B.4 Proof of @B(v;r)@r > 0
Proof.
@B(v;r)
@r
clearly is positive for all F (v) < 1 since (n+1)[1 F (v)]
2(1 F (v)n+1) (n+1)(1 F (v))F (v)n > 0
and F (r)n + (1  F (v))F (r)n 1 > 0 for all F (v) < 1.3 It has thereby been proven
that @B(v;r)
@r
> 0 for all F (v) < 1.
3 See Appendix B:3.
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